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Preface
This study of the patent policies of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration was undertaken under a grant (NsG 425,
Supplement No. I) from NASA to The George Washington University. We
had been doing patent research of our own choosing under an earlier
NASA grant (NsG 425). This study, which began on September i, 1965,
was done at the request of NASA, whose officers gave us muchhelp.
But they did not direct our investigation or in any way guide us to
conclusions. Thus the evaluations and conclusions, as well as the
errors, are ours alone.
We are indebted to many persons for giving us factual infor-
mation, opinion, and advice. In NASA we had the full cooperation
of the Office of Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters and
of the Inventions and Contributions Board. We interviewed patent
attorneys of many of NASA's contractors; we are grateful to all those
who filled out our burdensome questionnaire. We thank the inventors
and the NASA licensees who also took the trouble to answer the question-
naires we sent to them.
Our research assistants made it possible for us to deal with
masses of factual materials. We acknowledge the help of Stephen
Van Dyke Baer, Diana C. Flood, Adrienne L. Harkins, Nancy A. Hyman,
Gerard L. Lagace, Livia T. Limarzi, Clayton C. McCuistion (who
carried out some of the technical statistical analysis), Nancy A.
Sweeney, and Thomas A. Zener.
As Appendix A we include a Legislative History of the Property
Rights in Inventions Provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 by David E. Aaronson. He cheerfully takes sole responsi-
bility.
Donald Stevenson Watson
Principal Investigator
Mary A. Holman
Associate Investigator
Washington_ D.C.
August 31, 1966
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Chapter i
Introduction
The controversies over the patent policies of the federal govern-
ment have been clashes of opinions, most of them resting on weak
foundations of little factual knowledge. Some of the issues controverted
are sheer figments of imagination rather than questions that can be
answered by appeals to facts. But the body of empirical knowledge on
the results of patent policies is growing, so that it will be possible
for policy making to depend upon firmer analyses supported by more
abundant facts. Perhaps however it is too much to hope that policies
will be governed by analysis. Patent policies are only one of the issues
in the complex relations between government and industry. Those rela-
tions are influenced as much by tradition and by economic philosophies
as by marshaling of facts.
This monograph is an analysis and an evaluation of the patent
policies of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We offer
it as an addition to the body of empirical knowledge.
The Public Interest
The patent policies of a federal agency are the servants of the
public interest. The public interest consists of thousands of objectives,
large and small, far and near, important and unimportant, pursued by
government and by private organizations and individuals. The public
interest in, say, the prevention of pollution is one thing; in the
prices of farm products it is something else. Relevant here is the
public interest in the disposition of rights to the inventions emerging
from research and development financed by the federal government. To
that particular interest we address ourselves.
The public interest that NASA's patent policies can serve is:
I. The advancementof technology;
2. the promotion of the agency's missions; and
3. the contribution to other goals of the federal government.
Before specifying these three objectives more closely, we must
point out that N_A's patent policies are only one of the servants, or
instruments. There are hundreds of others, if we take the federal
government as a whole; most of the other instruments are much stronger
and more efficacious than the patent policies of any agency, including
NASA. Even so, the problem before us is that of the contribution, small
though it might be, that NASA's patent policies can make to the three
objectives.
The advancementof technology--the progress of useful arts--takes
place in manifold ways. In large part it comesabout through an onrushing
stream of inventions, improvements, and innovations. In the usual
economists' definition, innovations are new methods of production put
into actual commercial operation by entrepreneurs. Typically if not
nearly always, innovations comeabout through investments madeunder
risk, and after periods, sometimesmanyyears in length, of development
effort and expense. Many innovations embodypatented or patentable
inventions. Economic growth depends in good part on the numbersand
kinds of innovations that occur over time. Here we touch on a vast
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subject. For present purposes, it is enough for us to draw attention
to two of the many keys to the advancement of technology, keys directly
relevant to the patent policies of federal agencies. One is incentives
and the other is the mechanism for the transfer of new technology.
The story of incentives and patents has been told often enough.
Obviously, a government agency's patent policies should work to maintain
and even to strengthen the incentives of inventors to disclose inventions
to their employers, of contractors to report inventions, of contractors
to work on, to refine, and to develop promising inventions. Then there
are the incentives to take the risks and the expenses of bringing the
promising inventions to market. A federal agency might have another
objective for its patent policies, an objective which being met dulls
the incentives to disclose and develop. This can happen. If it does,
the agency should make up its mind as to the acceptable compromise
between stimulating incentives and meeting the other objective.
The transfer of new technology, from its originator to others who
will use it, is a mysterious process, so much so that organized research
has not yet succeeded in ripping off the shrouds. Still, transfer does
occur, through the imitation of innovations, the spread of knowledge
("the information explosion"), as well as through other means, including
even theft and bribery. Government patent policies can contribute their
part by pushing inventions into the stream of commerce. Patent depart-
ments in the federal government can, and some do, cooperate with programs
for the diffusion of new technical knowledge.
The promotion of the agency's missions by its patent policies is
a matter negative rather than positive. That is to say, its patent
4policies should not stand in the way of the agency's broad program
objectives. In particular, procurement policy and patent policies are
intertwined in relations of harmonyand conflict. Procurement policy
aims at securing the services of the contractors with the best know-how,
personnel, and facilities. Procurement policy tries also to accommodate
standing goals of national policy, such as fostering small business,
aiding depressed areas, paying prevailing wages, preventing discrimi-
nation, and the like. At the sametime, procurement can have consequences
that are usually viewed as undesirable from the standpoint of still
another goal of national economic policy. That is, despite the efforts
to award more contracts to small business firms, military and space
procurement dollars continue to be spent with the largest corporations.
National Science Foundation data show that two-thirds of all the R & D
performance in industry for the federal government is carried out by
only 20 companies--the aerospace and electronics giants.
Procurement is a force many times more powerful than patent policy
ever could be. What procurement does, patent policy can hardly undo.
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Criteria of Evaluation
Table I--i takes the broad aims of the public interest served by
NASA's patent policies and divides them into specific aims. These last
will serve as our criteria of evaluation.
After investigation and analysis of their actual operation we
shall evaluate NASA's patent policies with the following tests or criteria:
i. Disclosure of inventions: An effective patent policy
I
I
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Broad Aims:
Advancement
of Technology
Promotion of
Agency Missions
Contribution to
Other Goals of
Government
Table I--i
The Public Interest
served by
NASA's Patent Policies
Specific Aims:
( disclosure of inventions
(
( utilization of inventions
(
( encouragement of development
( of inventions
(
( transfer of technology
( best contractors
(
( protection in procurement
( protection of health
( welfare
(
( avoidance of concentration
( and monopoly
6results in reports of invention disclosures from all contractors
receiving disclosures from their employees. Reporting, however, is in
principle a simple matter of compliance on the one side and of moni-
toring on the other. Muchmore important is the effectiveness of patent
policy in encouraging the inventiveness of scientists and engineers, in
stimulating them not just to turn in more paper, but to work harder on
promising new ideas.
2. Utilization of inventions: An effective patent policy
results in early commercial use of those inventions capable of it.
This meansan active program of licensing and of exclusive licensing of
government-ownedinventions and of the transfer of principal rights to
contractors when there are no overriding reasons not to do so.
3. Encouragementof development of inventions: Some
inventions require further development before they can be put on the
market. The investment in development is normally subject to risks
which often will not be undertaken unless they can be reduced by the
shelter of the temporary patent monopoly. An effective patent policy
will recognize and act on such circumstances.
4. Transfer of technology: An effective patent policy is
a useful ally to other policies of an agency whose overt mission includes
the advancementof technology.
5. Best contractors: An effective patent policy does not
stand in the way of the agency's being able to obtain the services of
the best qualified contractors.
6. Protection in procurement: An effective patent policy
II
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makes it unnecessary for an agency to pay royalties on inventions made
from government funds.
7. Protection of health and welfare: An effective patent
policy will make available for general use inventions having to do
with health and safety.
8. Avoidance of concentration and monopoly: An effective
policy will not permit visible accretions of concentrated private
economic power.
An effective patent policy cannot be passive and adaptive. Nor
can it expect to achieve all of the foregoing goals all at once. Here
and there, compromises must be made. The government agency, no less
than contractors, must make its decisions under conditions of uncertainty;
retrospect will show that some mistakes will have been made.
Chapter 2
The Commercial Use and Potential of
Inventions from Government-FinancedResearch
Few of the inventions from the research conducted by and for the
National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration are in actual commercial
use. This is true both of the inventions licensed by NASAand of those
where NASAhas waived part of its rights. In chapters to follow we
shall present our findings on the commercial use and potential of the
i_entions _m NASAresearch.
In this chapter we want to offer perspective, so as to showwhat
can reasonably be expected of the development and adaptation of NASA-
originated inventions for commercial purposes. The perspective comes
mainly from the experience of other agencies of the government.
First of all, we want to deal briefly with certain prevalent
ideas on the commercial value of inventions from government-financed
research.
The Mythology of GovernmentPatent Policies
In the debates over government patent policies certain themes
constantly recur. Someof the principal themesare beliefs that we
choose to call myths.
One of the older myths was that there should be a uniform patent
policy for all agencies. This has been displaced by the newer myth
that the federal agencies, with different missions, R & D programs,
and decision-makers, will apply uniform criteria in the samemanner.
9
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The greatest of the myths is that the patented inventions coming
from government-financed research and development are numerousand valu-
able. The belief prevails in industry; it is manifested by industry's
continued insistence that when title goes to business firms, they will
have the protection and thus the incentive to develop and to make
available to the public a great manynew products. The Presidential
Memorandumof 1963 calls the inventions "a valuable national resource."
Somehowthere is an impression that a companyacquiring patent rights
to such inventions may"make manymillions of dollars. ''I This myth
is accompaniedby another, to the effect that the samepatent rights
in R & D contractors would becomequite worthless if the government
should acquire them.
Another set of myths centers about monopoly and economic concen-
tration. Somehowit is believed that letting industry acquire titles
to inventions from government contracts results in undue concentration
of economicpower. The concentration of research and development
contracts supposedly results in an equal concentration of patents.
Another article of faith is that business firms cannot acquire dominant
positions if the government takes titles to patents.
I
I
I
iEditorial, "Patents and Equities," Washington Post, April 17,
1966.
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Results of Other Investigations
But the inventions from government-financed R & D are neither
numerous, given the vast amounts of R & D paid for by the federal
government, nor are they, as a group, particularly valuable. Table 2--1
displays the results of earlier investigations yielding estimates of the
percentages of these inventions in actual commercial use.
We shall take the figure of I0 per cent as a modal value for the
percentage of inventions in commercial use. A good indication of the
value of the inventions, i.e., the incomes earned from them, can be had
by perusal of the materials assembled in 1961, by the Senate Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. Judged by no matter what stan-
dard, that v_lue is low.
The Senate Subcommitteeo_ Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights
has been holding hearings on the patent system and on government patent
policies for manyyears. During the 1965 hearings, spokesmenfor
industry testified that titles so inventions are necessary as incentives
for risk capital. In response to this testimony, the Subcommittee
asked industry to provide it with case histories of inventions from
government-financed R & D that were developed because the companies
ownedpatent rights. The request was madethrough associations such as
the American Bar Association, the American Patent LawAssociation, and
the Aerospace Industries Association of America. So far (1966),
industry's response has been small. Only about two dozen companies
have supplied any information, half of them anonymously through the
Associations. None of the companieshas reported amounts of income
12
Table 2--1
Estimates of Commercial Use of Patented
Inventions from Government-FinancedR & D
Rate of Use
Source and Date in Per Cent Remarks
Watson, Bright, and Burns,
1960a
Senate Subcommitteeon Patents,
1961b
13
Holman, 1963c 10-15
Based on responses to
questionnaires sent to
102 firms owning (a ran-
domsample of) patents
licensed to DOD.
Based on responses to
questionnaires sent to
firms with largest R & D
contracts with DOD.
Government-ownedinven-
tions. Based on responses
to questionnaires sent to
inventors (of a random
sample of patents).
aD. S. Watson, H. F. Bright, and A. E. Burns, "Federal Patent Policies in
Contracts for Research and Development," Patent, Trademark s and Copyright Journal,
Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 1960, p. 342.
bpatent Practices of the Department of Defense, Preliminary Report of the Sub-
committee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary,
U. S. Senate, 87th Congress, ist Session, 1961, p. 35.
CMary A. Holman, "The Utilization of Government-Owned Patented Inventions,"
Patentj Trademark, and Copyright Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 1963, p. 155.
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attributable to these patented inventions. Most of the companies could
not identify development expenditures for particular inventions.
Experience of NASA Contractors in Other
Government Research
In February, 1966, we sent a questionnaire to all organizations
and persons who had, to the end of 1965, been granted waivers by NASA.
The waiver holders include 68 business firms and nonprofit organizations.
Questionnaires from 64 firms and organizations were returned to us.
One set of questions were about the contractors themselves rather than
about their waived inventions. We asked the NASA contractors who had
been granted waivers to tell us how many patented inventions they own
that resulted from other--other than NASA--government-financed R & D.
We also asked for the percentages of these inventions that have been
commercially used.
To these questions we received 36 usable replies. We did not
count !icensi_g as commercial use. After some hesitation we decided
not to include the response of an aerospace company which is much more
patent conscious than most of the others. This company has 440 patents
from government-financed R & D. Of these it "estimated" that 50 per
cent are in commercial use. This figure seems much too high; anyway,
the company said that the figure is "nothing but a guess."
The 36 contractors reported a total of 3,488 patented inventions
from other government research. Of these, 235, or 6.7 per cent, are in
commercial use. (If the aerospace company with the doubtful reply is
included, the rate of use rises to 11.6 per cent.)
14
This result for commercial use--the 6.7 per cent--is close to the
1961 findings of the Senate Subcommitteeon Patents. Manyof the
companiesresponding to the Senate Subcommitteealso answered our
questionnaire. Wehad two purposes in seeking information on commer-
cial use of inventions from other government research. Onewas to
establish a point of reference to judge the commercial use of inventions
originating from NASA-sponsoredresearch. The other purpose was to see
if there had been any change since 1960. Weheld the tentative hypo-
thesis that there might well have been, owing to the lags of time that
often exist between the issue of a patent on an invention and its
entering the stream of commerce. Princeton University once had rights
in a patent that yielded not a cent of income until its sixteenth year,
whereupon the patent brought in a substantial sumof money. If, then,
the military R & D of the 1950s has a delayed commercial spillover, we
see no evidence of it from the patent data furnished us by the 36 con-
tractors holding waivers from NASA. Patent attorneys of several of the
largest companies in the economyconfirm, at least for their own
companies, our finding that the rate of commercial use continues to be
stable at its low level.
Experience of Research Corporation
Betweencommercial research and patenting on the one hand and
government research and patenting on the other lie the research and
patent activities of the nonprofit organizations. Their activities
resemble muchmore closely those of government than those of industry,
I
I
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because the research is not directed toward profits and because
patentable inventions are always unplanned byproducts. The largest
single center of university patenting is Research Corporation, which
provides patent services for about 180 colleges, Universities, and
scientific institutions.
Research Corporation receives disclosures from the institutions
it serves, evaluates the inventions, examines their commercial potential,
has their patentabilities determined, and selects some for patent appli-
cation. Income from licensing is divided among the inventors, their
employers, and Research Corporation. In the period from 1946 to early
1966, Research Corporation received about 6,000 disclosures. About
700 patent applications were filed. Of the 60 inventions that Were
licensed, just 30 yielded any income. In other words, less than 5 per
cent of the inventions covered by patents or patent applications were
in actual commercial use. And only about one half of one per cent of
the inventions submitted were brought into commercial use.
The inventions handled by Research Corporation come from non-
commercial environments. Nearly always they come in singly. Very
much the same is true of the inventions received by NASA's own labora-
tories and from the nonprofit organizations. Even the inventions from
most contractors come from the noncommercial environment of companies'
aerospace divisions, or military products divisions, or federal systems
divisions, or defense and space divisions, etc. In these divisions the
research work for the government is typically segregated. The prin-
cipal motive in these divisions is get the next contract or to get
s16
more contracts. Perhaps the word noncommercial is a little too strong,
but our purpose in employing the word is to draw attention to the
similarity of attitudes and motivations between a large facility
operated by a university and one operated as a segregated division
of a business corporation.
The Probabilities of Commercial Use
Take a typical or average R & D contract of one million dollars.
The probability that the work under the contract will yield a patented
invention that will bring in any income at all is less than 0.01, some-
where in the neighborhood of 0.05. In other words, there is less than
one chance in a hundred that patent rights in such a contract have any
dollar value. So far as we know, patent rights have almost never been
the objects of negotiation. If indeed they were highly valuable, a
rational contractor would take a lower fee. For example, he would
accept a 6 per cent fee with patent rights but would insist on an 8 per
cent fee without them.
We now turn to the proof of the statement that there is less than
a 0.01 probability that a million-dollar contract will yield an inven-
tion of commercial value:
i. There is no certainty (probability = 1.0) that the work
under a million dollar contract will yield any invention disclosures.
One contract might result in several, of course, but other contracts
might have none. We show in Chapter 3 on disclosures that contractors
disclose to NASA at a rate not higher than 0.6 inventions per million_
17
of R & D. For present purposes, however, we will assumethe proba-
bility of 0.9 disclosures per million dollars. That is, we assumea
high probability, but not certainty.
2. Next we assumea probability of 0.14 that the disclo-
sures are worth the trouble of preparing patent applications.
Experience shows that NASAor its contractors think that 0.14 of all
disclosures justify the expense of application.
3. The probability that a patent will be granted upon an
application is 0.6. This numberalso reflects experience.
4. The probability that a patented invention coming from
government-financed research and development will be used commercially
can be put at 0.I. Wehave already discussed this number.
5. Whenthese probabilities are combined by multipli-
cation, the result is a numberwell less than 0.01. The four sets of
decisions are independent: Those of the inventor, of the patent depart-
ment, of the Patent Office, and of the market.
To illustrate the significance _ +_ _^_i_+ ..... ___
Suppose that a contractor would want to put a value on potential net
income from the patents he might get as an incident to his doing R & D
for the government. Take $i00 of such income potentially receivable
ten years from now. Its present value discounted at i0 per cent (a low
rate of return for internal use) is about $38.50. The probability of a
commercially profitable invention is 0.01, at the most. It follows that
the present expected value of the $I00 is 38 cents, or less.
18
In this chapter we have surveyed five groups of evidence or
experience. The results are always the same, namely, that noncommercial
research results in few patented inventions that enter the stream of
commerce. This, then, is what is to be expected from the research
conducted by and for NASA. The low rate of commercial use does not
indicate flaws or faults in patent policy. The low rate is in the
nature of things.
Chapter 3
Disclosures
Inventions are incidental and unpredictable byproducts of the
research financed by the federal government. That research is under-
taken to widen knowledge and to create better methods and devices for
use in the manifold activities of government. It is the task of
government patent policy to dispose of the rights to the inventions
made in the course of government-financed research, to promote their
utilization, and to do so under the public interest.
Before it brings its power to decide whose invention it is--the
government's or the contractor's--patent policy plays a role, conscious
or unconscious, in influencing the quality and the quantity of inven-
tion disclosures.
The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration has madea
greater effort than any of the other major agencies to get as many
disclosures as possible from its contractors. Beginning in December,
1962 with the Reporting of NewTechnology clause, NASAhas required
the reporting of "innovations" as well as of prima facie patentable
inventions. Innovations are discoveries, or improvements, or newways
of doing things, which, though not patentable, are thought to have
enough merit to be worth disseminating. Upon being madeknown to
other business firms, and upon being actually utilized, the innovations
then advance technology generally and bring benefits from aerospace
research to the civilian economy. Such is NASA'sTechnology Utilization
19
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Program whoseactivities are in someways enmeshedwith NASA'spatent
program. We shall deal only fleetingly with TUP. Wehave had neither
the resources nor the competence to evaluate that program.
Patent policies can influence the volume of invention disclosures
in several ways. One is through programs of awards to inventors. NASA
has a program for the employees in its own laboratories. Awards and
other incentives to the employees of contractors had not been under-
taken, with an exception to be mentioned later, by NASAin the period
to the end of 1965. Any effort by a government agency to stimulate
the creativity of contractors' employees is bound to raise problems,
not the least of which would be resentment by manycontractors at what
they would consider interference with the exercise of a management
function. Patent policy in operation could conceivably enlist the
cooperation of contractors not just to disclose fully all that they
already have but to spur the creative engineers to turn up more really
good inventions. Patent policy in operation also poses a task of
monitoring.
• 21
The Process of Disclosure
An invention springs into life as an idea. Creativity and seren-
dipity both play their roles. The idea is subjective, an opinion. It
may or may not be recognized and identified by other persons as some-
thing new and useful. The idea may or may not be communicated by its
inventor to other persons. Whether and how the idea, which might turn
out not to be new after all, is communicated to others depends on the
environment the inventor works in. That environment, besides the obvious
_=rr n_ _h_ _n_ n_ _n_n_r_n_ h_ng Hndertaken. possesses a set of
incentives, which can range from weak to strong. The set of incentives
includes (I) those of the engineers to look for new ideas, (2) those of
the engineers to report new ideas, (3) those of supervisors and others
to encourage reporting, and (4) the incentives of the patent staff to
identify the new ideas that can lead to something patentable.
In all this, uncertainty prevails. Decisions have to be made
without knowledge of the probabilities. The decisions are to pass the
idea on or to reject it. How the decisions are made is a function of
the set of incentives.
Various methods are used to transform ideas into invention dis-
closures. A common device is the more or less elaborate invention
disclosure form with spaces for the signatures of witnesses and that
sort of thing. The inventor takes the time and trouble to fill out
the pages of __e fo_. Some of NASA's contractors have abandoned the
long disclosure form, in the belief that it actually inhibits the
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communication of new ideas. Instead, these contractors rely on patent
liaison, i.e., on men who act as the link between the laboratories and
the patent department and whose function it is to circulate in the
laboratories, to find promising ideas, to evaluate them, and to pass on
the good ones in written form. In one electronics company, the "patent
engineers" are young men in training to become patent attorneys. In
another, they are older men, no longer creative or productive at the
bench, but still valuable employees because of their experience. Other
companies have tried and abandoned the use of roving patent liaison men.
In one of NASA's smaller contractors, the patent attorney himself circu-
lates in the laboratories, obtaining invention disclosures, in his words,
"by osmosis."
The main point here is that the flow of invention disclosures
is a stream that can be made to run fast or slow. One set of incentives
for all concerned can yield, say, twice as many disclosures as another,
for a given amount and kind of R & D and for a given level of inherent
Creativity of the engineers doing the R & D. This is true even though
contractors conscientiously meet the requirement of reporting inventions
and nonpatentable "new technology."
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Disclosures from Commercial and from
Government-FinancedResearch
It is commonknowledge that commercial research yields far more
invention disclosures than does research conducted by or for the govern-
ment. The yield can be measured for a unit of input, which could be
either a million dollars of R & D expenditure or a man-year of the
service of a scientist or engineer. We shall shortly offer someestimates
of the order of magnitude of the difference in yield betweenbusiness
and government.
Disclosures in commercial research
These propositions seem to be valid for large-scale commercial
R & D carried on by a company for the purpose of increasing its expected
future profits:
i. Disclosure of inventions by an employee is voluntary;
it cannot be compelled. The employee must be motivated to write down
or to take the time to talk about an idea or a proposal that might
benefit his company, whose share in the expected profits seems to be
always greater than the inventor's.
2. Companies with large-scale commercial R & D are usually
patent conscious. If scientists and engineers are not fully aware of
this, every effort is undertaken to indoctrinate them. I
Icf., Worth Wade, The Corporate Patent Department t^_ ...._, v_, Penn. :
Advance House, 1963), Chap. XI, "Patent Indoctrination of Technical
Personnel."
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3. Such companieshave various ways and meansof providing
incentives and stimulating their employees to make invention disclosures.
But there are many"problems," because creativity is unscrutable, motives
are complex and not fully fathomable, technology moves fast, and future
profits are uncertain. Financial rewards are obvious enough, so is
exhortation by top management,and so is encouragementof technical
publication. Somecompanies like to couple the inventor's namewith
his invention in intracompany discussions and memoranda. Just what is
the optimummix of these and other incentives no one probably knows or
ever will know. Oneproblem is how to be sure to recognize and identify
correctly those inventions not directly related to the work at hand or
to a particular product line. Even General Electric looks upon this
problem as important, because this companyhas a small group of menwhose
duties include the search for the off-beat new technologies that remain
invisible to division patent attorneys who can see only their own product
lines.
Practice differs in the ways raw inventions are put through screens
to becomerefined enough to be considered for patent application. There
can be one or two screens, or several, with formal or informal procedures.
But at each screen the question is--accept or reject. The criteria are
the company's patent objectives.
Everyone agrees that, if the effort is put forth, more disclosures
per year can always be obtained. Supposea large companyis getting
1,000 disclosures a year from its commercial laboratories. That number
could be increased to, say, 1,500 disclosures a year at a cost, and, it
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seemscertain, at an increasing cost per disclosure. The additional
500 disclosures have an additional expected value. On the average,
however, the additional expected value, per disclosure per year, must
diminish. It follows that, given a clear view of the probabilities of
discounted future profits, there is an optimum number of disclosures;
any larger numberwould entail a present additional cost of the dis-
closure mechanism, a cost in excess of the estimated future payoff from
the additional disclosures. Without a clear view of the probabilities
of future profits, the decision as to how manydisclosures to strive
for can be madeonly in a fuzzy way. Nonetheless, the decision has to
be made.
Disclosures in government-financed research
I. As in commercial research, disclosures by contractors'
employees are voluntary.
2. The aura of patent consciousness is hardly likely to
prevail in government work, because the purposes of that work do not
include the fencing of a product line with patents.
3. Contractors have no incentives to stimulate the moti-
vations of their employees to make invention disclosures. To this
perhaps harsh generalization there are three exceptions: (I) Contractors
who follow as literally as they can the requirement to report new tech-
nology do report more disclosures. One way to report more is to send
in inventions in their raw or only slightly refined condition. Another
way is to sharpen the stimuli to employees. So far as we can tell, how-
ever, only the larger aerospace companies could, in the period covered
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by our analyses, have constituted this kind of exception. (2) Contractors
who foresee the possibility of commercially useful inventions as a by-
product of research for the government. But since this possibility is
small, it does not justify the cost of a mechanismof disclosure that
would bring out manymore disclosures. (3) Contractors who carry over
into governmentwork the procedures of stimulation they use in their
own commercial work. RCA, for example, rewards inventors whenpatent
applications are filed, even when the government files applications.
But patent counsel in RCAbelieve that the government is so slow in
filing that the delays discourage inventors, putting still another
damperon disclosures during the course of government work. Manyof
NASA'scontractors, however, have done very little commercial work of
their own. Several of the large aerospace contractors reward inventors
only for patent applications filed by the companies themselves. The
carry-over of commercial procedures for drawing disclosures out is
stopped dead in its tracks when companies put commercial and government
research into separate compartments or divisions, as most of them do.
Government-financed R & D includes muchdevelopment work, exten-
sive and expensive testing, and the construction of elaborate, special-
purpose facilities. It is commonlybelieved that costs are not rigidly
controlled in government work and that, for example, a device that will
work a trifle better with gold plating will in fact be gold plated.
Emphasis falls on the expected performance of the esoteric equipment
wanted by the government. In contrast to normal practice in commercial
work, less attention is given to detail by patent attorneys monitoring
government-financed R & D.
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Order of Magnitude of Disclosures from
Commercial Research
A good thing to knowwould be the total numberof disclosures
in all of industry. This number is not known, but_we think a plausible
range for this number can be stated. The range can be found from the
following estimating procedure:
i. From the Patent Office, we have 26,632 patents assigned
to domestic corporations in 1963 and 27,836 issued in 1964. To smooth
the numbers a bit, we take the 1963-1964average of 27,234 assigned
patents.
2. Wenext need an estimate of the number of patent appli-
cations. Weassumethat it takes 4 years from application to issue and
that the ratio of patent applications to patents is 10/6. Using these
assumptions and rounding, we have 45,400 as the estimated average of
patent applications by domestic corporations in 1959 and 1960.
3. Here we must cope with "the propensity to patent," i.e.,
the ratio of patent applications to disc!osures. For twelve of NASA's
contractors we have information on their propensities to patent. The
quality of the information varies from a patent attorney's guess to
careful statistical compilations from companyrecords. But the data
are all of a piece and are consistent. The companies for which we have
propensity data are: Douglas Aircraft, Electro-Optical Systems, General
Dynamics, General Electric, HughesAircraft, IBM, North American Aviation,
Northrop, RCA,Republic Aviation, United Aircraft, and Westinghouse
Electric.
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The propensities range from about i0 to about 25 per cent. The
aerospace companies are in or near the i0 per cent ratio; the large
electric companies are close to the 25 per cent figure. Becausewe
have this information for so few companies, we would not put much trust
in an average. Thus w_ will stay with the 10-25 per cent range.
This means an assumption that the propensity lies within that
range and that occurrences outside the range are quantitatively unimpor-
tant. Table 3--1 shows that possible range of disclosures for various
propensities.
4. According to the National Science Foundation, 262,600
scientists and engineers (full-time equivalent) were employed on R & D
work in industry in January of 1959. Dividing the ranges of disclosures
by the numberof scientists and engineers gives a range of disclosures
per man. The result, shown in Table 3--1, is close to the usual rule
of thumb of one disclosure per manper year.
The total number of inventions disclosed to the federal govern-
2
ment has been about i0,000 a year since 1960. The Federal Council for
Science and Technology reports a figure of I0,000 to 12,000 for the
fiscal years 1963 to 1965.
Our range of estimates for total disclosures to domestic corpo-
rations includes, strictly speaking, those disclosures to government that
resulted in subsequent title to industry. We can ignore this, because
2Donald S. Watson and Mary A. Holman, "The Federal Government's
Propensity to Patent," Patent_ Trademark_ and Copyright Journal,
Vol. i0, No. I, pp. 61-74.
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Table 3-- i
Estimated Rangeof Invention Disclosures to
Domestic Corporations
Average for 1959 and 1960
Propensity to
Patenta,
in Per Cent
Estimated
Invention
Disclosures b
Estimated Invention
Disclosures per R & D
Scientist and Engineerc
i0 454,000 1.73
15 303,000 1.15
20 227,000 0.86
25 182,000 0.69
aRatio of patent applications to disclosures.
bAverage numberof patents assigned to domestic corporations in 1963 and
1964, multiplied by 10/6 (to estimate patent applications), and multiplied by
the reciprocal of the propensities.
CDisclosures divided by 262,600, the number of full-time R & D scientists
and engineers employed in industry in January, 1959, according to the National
Science Foundation.
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the small numbergets lost in the range.
Anyway, we believe that disclosures to government are between
5 and i0 per cent of the disclosures to corporations. We shall be
silent here on the comparative qualities of the two groups of disclosures.
The federal government finances about three-fifths of all research
and development.
Disclosures per scientist and engineer
Another way of putting into perspective the number of disclosures
by contractors to NASA is to match the disclosures against an estimate
of the number of scientists and engineers employed in industry on NASA
work. We have already mentioned the rule of thumb, which has many
obvious qualifications and exceptions, to the effect that there can be
expected one invention disclosure per year for each scientist or engineer
employed in R & D activities. The rule is intended to apply, of course,
to commercial rather than to government work. The 1963 report to NASA
by Westinghouse 3 said that the experience of that company shows an average
rate of invention disclosures of about 0.8 per engineer-year. The
rate in the Westinghouse government products divisions was given at about
0.5 per engineer-year. Westinghouse counted only those engineers whose
work gave them the possibility of being inventive.
Since 1963, Westinghouse has modified its policy on disclosures,
3Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Astronuclear Laboratory, NASA
Industrial Applications Contract (NASw-644) to Office of Technology
Utilization_ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, September 27,
1963, p. 8.
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reducing the pressure on its divisions to hit the target of nearly one
per engineer-year. Westinghouse now receives fewer total disclosures,
with less strain and expense, but with, we are told, just about as many
disclosures of a quality worth filing on.
Wehave also heard it said that an engineer employed on NASA
contract work can be expected to makeabout one-third as manydisclosures
as one working in a wholly commercial laboratory. This belief can be
put to test with more estimates derived from simple manipulation of
received data.
Table 3--2 gives estimates of the numberof contractor disclosures
to NASAper scientist and engineer. The main task here is to calculate
the number of scientists and engineers working in industry on NASA
contracts. This number is not reported anywhere. The calculation is
from National Science Foundation data. The estimated expenditures on
R & D for 1960-1965 by business firms working for NASAare divided by
$60,000, which is the "R & D cost" per full-time scientist and engineer
engaged in R & D. This R & D cost, as reported by NSF, varies muchby
industry and by size of firm. Wehave taken the highest figure of NSF,
so as to get a conservative, i.e., low estimate. And it must be clear
by now that a conservative estimate is desirable.
The last column in Table 3--2 gives the disclosures per manyear.
Experience of a large company
One of the large electric companies gave us internal data on its
invention submissions and patent applications for the four years from
1960 through 1963. The data separate inventions and applications from
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Table 3--2
Estimated Contractor Disclosures to NASA
per R & D Scientist and Engineer
1960 to 1965
Yeara
Estimated
Numberof R & D
Scientists and
Engineersb
Numberof
Contractor
Disclosures
Estimated
Disclosures
per Man
1960 1,500 71 0.05
1961 6,800 162 0.02
1962 12,000 449 0.04
1963 27,000 759 0.03
1964 47,000 1,203 0.03
1965 54,000 2,094 0.04
aDisclosures for calendar years.
bEstimated from NSFdata. Estimated NASAexpenditures for R & D from
business contractors divided by $60,000--a high figure for "R & D cost" per
full-time R & D scientist and engineer.
Sources: NASAand NSF.
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company-fundedR & D and from government-funded R & D.
The dollar volume of this firm's company-fundedR & D is a confi-
dential figure. But we have grounds to believe that half of the firm's
scientists and engineers are at work on government contracts. In any
event, the samefirm reported in 1960 to the Senate Subcommitteeon
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights that companyR & D funds in the
decade of the 1950s were about equally divided between companyand
government R & D work. Wewill now assumethat for 1960-1963 this
company' -_ ....... _ _-. _.._ _+,.,_s R & D activities were =x_u ..... _=i
and government R & D.
From its own R & D, this company had 8 to I0 times as many invention
submissions as from government-funded R & D. The following numbers are
company-funded inventions as a multiple of government-funded inventions.
1960 .......... 8.4,
1961 .......... 9.1,
1962 .......... 9.7, and
1963 ......... 11.3.
The Rate of Invention Disclosure to NASA
Experience shows a fairly stable relation between dollar volumes
of R & D and numbers of inventions disclosed to the government. Over
the years, a million dollars of government-financed R & D has been
accompanied by, roughly, one to three invention ui=ulu=u_es.
The rate of disclosure to NASA is lower than to other government
agencies. We have made extensive tabulations, agency by agency, on R & D
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dollars and numbersof invention disclosures. Wehave split R & D into
its componentsof basic research, applied research, and development.
Wehave taken price inflation out of the R & D data. Wehave tried
different time lags between R & D and invention disclosures. No matter
how the calculations are made, the result is always a lower rate of
disclosures to NASA.
There is no need to belabor the point. It suffices to bring
forward just one computation. From the Annual Report on Government
Patent Policy, June 1965, of the Federal Council for Science and
Technology, we take the figure for total invention disclosures to the
federal government in the fiscal year 1964. The number is 10,929.
Disclosures to NASA were 1,547, and thus there were 9,382 disclosures
to all other federal agencies. Because it almost always takes several
months for inventions to be reported, the data on R & D for the fiscal
year 1963 are appropriate. The National Science Foundation reports
that R & D expenditures (not obligations) in fiscal 1963 were $11,988
million; NASA's were $2,540 million and thus the rest of the government
spent $9,448 million. These numbers give 0.61 disclosures per million
dollars for NASA and 0.99 disclosures for the rest of the government.
Employee and contractor disclosures
Tables 3--3 and 3--4 show the numbers of invention disclosures
from NASA employees and from contractors and the average numbers of
disclosures from a million dollars of R & D expenditures. The R & D
figures are our estimates, based on data published by the National
Science Foundation. Most of the published data of NSF are obligations,
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Table 3--3
EmployeeDisclosures and R & D Expenditures
Estimated Intramural
Estimated Intramural R & D Expenditures Disclosures
Employee R & D Expenditures, per Disclosure, per million
Yeara Disclosures millions of dollars millions of dollars dollars
1960 123 162.6 i. 3 0.78
1961 131 I'_.0• *, i. i 0.91
1962 212 158.0 0.7 1.43
1963 435 282.2 0.6 I. 66
1964 412 598.7 1.4 0.71
1965 382 744.7 1.9 O.53
aFiscal year for R & D. Calendar year for disclosures. Thus disclosures
are lagged six months.
Sources: Disclosure data from NASAfiles. R & D data from National
Science Foundation.
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Table 3--4
Contractor Disclosures and R & D Expenditures
I
I
I
I
Estimated Extramural
Estimated Extramural R & D Expenditures Disclosures
Contractor R & D Expenditures, per Disclosure, per million
Year a Disclosures millions of dollars millions of dollars dollars
1960 71 141.3 2.0 0.50
1961 162 490.0 3.0 0.33
1962 449 911.4 2.0 0.50
1963 759 1,816.7 2.4 0.42
1964 1,203 3,017.1 2.5 0.40
1965 2,094 3,429.1 1.6 0.63
aFiscal year for R & D. Calendar year for disclosures. Thus disclosures
are lagged six months.
Sources: Disclosure data from NASA files. R & D data from National
Science Foundation.
37
whose annual amount, for an agency such as NASA,is much larger than
the amount of actual expenditures. But NSFdoes have one historical
series of expenditures for R & D and R & D plant. The ratio of these
expenditure data to the obligation data is applied to the obligation
data for NASA's intra- and extramural R & D, to yield the estimates in
Tables 3--3 and 3--4.
The tables lag disclosures six months behind R & D expenditures.
It is clear from the tables that, except for 1965, inhouse R & D yielded
more inventions per million dollars than did the R & D performed by
contractors.
Attitudes and opinions of inventors
In Chapter 4 we discuss the responses to a questionnaire we sent
to a group of inventors of NASA-owned inventions. At this point we can
make use of their responses to a question on incentives to disclose.
Question: "What do you think could or should be done to improve
incentive programs to encourage greater disclosure and more complete
reporting of the new technology coming from research financed by NASA?"
Thirty-seven inventors either said that they had no opinions or
they left the question blank. As is to be expected, the largest number
of inventors recommended monetary awards. Relatively more contractor
employees than government employees made this suggestion. Clearly
associated with the matter of cash awards is the administration and
selection of these awards. A number of inventors urged that the awards
system be improved. But almost as many believe the existing system is
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Table 3--5
Attitudes and Opinions of Inventors
Responses to Question on
Incentives to Greater
Disclosure
Numberof
Replies Per Cent
No comment
Monetary awards
Existing procedure excellent or adequate
Wider publication and professional recognition
Improve disclosure evaluation system
More time to write disclosures
Permit inventor to retain patent rights
Permit contractors to retain patent rights
Total
37 40.6
16 17.6
12 13.2
i0 ii.0
7 7.7
3 3.3
3 3.3
3 3.3
91a i00.0
aSomeinventors gave more than one reply.
Source: Questionnaires returned by inventors. SeeChapter 5.
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good or at least adequate:
More realistic awards would help. Two inventors split
$150 for a revolutionary system. One inventor
receives $500 for an improvement in a motor controller.
Why? Both were based on the effect on the immediate
program. Both were evaluated by assorted supervisors
and other persons, most of whomwere not familiar with
the problems, and all of whomdid so by way of a form
that is ill-planned. All were busy and did not want
to be bothered.
I feel that the incentive awards assigned to some
inventors are completely out of line with the awards
given to other inventors. Mywhole attitude and that
of manyothers is rather negative to the incentive
program for just this reason. I believe that a mistake
i p ibl ......... '-- ry ch _--s oss e. _=L a mm_L=_= creates ve mu =Lm.
The board that judges these inventions is probably
given an impossible task to fairly divide the awards
money. I should think that the individual supervisors
are better judges of a man's work.
I think the current awards program is excellent and
should be continued. I do feel, however, that the
entire patent procedure takes too long, but I don't
know'what can be done to speed it up.
In addition to monetary awards, many inventors would like to have
wider publication of their reports. Professional recognition, of course,
is important and some inventors resent having the name of the Administrator
of NASA on the patent. Several corporate patent counsel told us that this
practice creates dissatisfaction among employees.
Number of contractors makin_ disclosures
The 4,700 contractor disclosures received by NASA to the end of
December 1965 came from about 300 contractors. The exact number depends
on whether parent corporations and their subsidiaries are counted as
separate contractors.
NASA has had about 20,000 contractors altogether. Many of them
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have furnished ordinary supplies and services such as construction and
transportation. Howmanyhave had R & D contracts we do not know. But
whatever the numberof contractors who could be exBected to have one or
more invention disclosure, we suspect that it is muchmore than 300.
Invention disclosures to the end of 1965 came from about 250
business firms. A minority of the universities madedisclosures. The
numberof these was 33, out of a total of more than 200 which had had
contracts.
FromNASA's disclosure files, we obtained someincomplete data on
contracts and subcontracts for someof the contractor disclosures.
It turns out that most of the invention disclosures coming from
subcontract activities are sent in by companies that are also prime
contractors. Subcontracts from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory are
scattered all over, as is well known. Manyof the corporations whose
namesare household words have reported inventions from JPL subcontracts.
The big prime contractors also engage in extensive subcontracting among
themselves, with an ensuing small flow of disclosures. Wecould identify
only a few disclosing subcontractors who are not prime contractors.
Of the 300 contractors with disclosures, probably fewer than i0
per cent were subcontractors only. And we also guess that only about
one or two per cent of all subcontractors have submitted invention
disclosures.
Of the i00 largest prime contractors in 1965, only 64 had ever
disclosed one or more inventions to NASA. Disclosures could, however,
scarcely be expected from a few of the empty-handed 36; these few are
construction and service companies.
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The lack of $ood data
The number of disclosures to be expected from an average, rather
than a particular, contractor has a fairly close relation to the dollar
volume of R & D performed by the contractor. We have done enough quanti-
tative analysis, with data other than NASA's, to be certain of this.
That is to say, we think there is a strong presumption that a group of
contractors doing an average of $I00 million each of R & D in some time
period will disclose several times as many inventions as a group doing
an average of $I0 million each. Whether the number is i0 times (or more
or less) as great is another question whose answer is probably of interest
only to economists.
However that might be, we do not know the dollar volume of R & D
for the contractors who have disclosed inventions to NASA. Nor do we
have such data for the leading (say, the first 5_ contractors. All we
have are the figures for prime contract awards. But even with these
data we can do a little. There is a significant relationship between
total cumulative (1959-1965) disclosures and cumulative (1959-April
1966) awards. Using Spearman's formula for rank correlation and
selecting for our sample the fifty top firms ranked by total disclosures,
we obtain a correlation coefficient Rrank = .7058; that is to say,
the deviations between the rankings of total disclosures and of
cumulative contract awards for these fifty contractors are very small.
Rrank has a range from +i.00 when the rankings are identical to -i.00
when the rankings are exactly reversed.
A good fit (r = .823) is also obtained for this same group of 50
contractors using the simple linear regression model Y = a + bX, where
42
Y represents cumulative disclosures and X represents cumulative contract
awards, with a and b as constants. With the top one hundred contractors
ranked by total disclosures as the sample, the simple linear regression
¢
model provides a slightly better fit (r = .839). Our calculation of
the regression constants yields the equation: Y = 17.54 + .000257.X;
that is, one disclosure can be expected for each additional four million
dollars of cumulative contract awards. For the one hundred contractors,
70 per cent of the variation in total disclosures can be explained by
variation in cumulative contract awards.
The standard error, or closeness, of the regression coefficient
(b = .000257) is very small (sb = .000000532), indicating that this
estimate also fits the data well. Student's t-test of the correlation
coefficient is significant at 1%; i.e., there is less than one chance
in one hundred that a value for r as high as .839 could occur if total
disclosures and cumulative contract awards were not related. These
contract data, however, are much less than could be desired for a
detailed analysis of the functional relationship between disclosures
and R & D effort.
We were given permission to examine figures for subcontracts
for individual contractors. But then we were told that it is quite
impossible, at least without a prodigious amount of sheer clerical
drudgery, to know the net contract position of the leading contractors.
By net contract position we mean prime contract amounts minus subcontract
amounts plus amounts of subcontracts undertaken by prime contractors.
We have noticed that some of NASA's large prime contractors accept
small subcontracts from one another. But, unless we are very much
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mistaken, no one in NASAknows howmuchactual work is being done for
the agency by its leading contractors. Neither does anyone seemto
know how muchR & D work, as distinct from production, each leading
contractor has been doing. All this despite the computer.
For all we know the data we wish we had had lie quietly and
undisturbed in the innards of the computer, needing only the touch of
the programmer to becomeuseful output for policy makers.
The point is that data on actual R & D performance for the leading
contractors would be one way, but only one, to monitor, at least prima
facie, the volumes of disclosures to be expected from contractors. We
are aware that somekinds of R & D are expected to be less productive
of inventions than others.
Causes of the Lower Rate of Disclosure to NASA
Just why the rate of disclosure to NASAis lower is not a problem
to manyobservers of goverp__entpatent policy. They would simply explain
the lower rate by uttering the words "title policy. ''4 So simple an
explanation will not do, if only because it is also true that NASA'srate
of disclosure is less, and not insignificantly less, than the rates of
the other leading title-policy agencies. Weshall return later to the
influence of patent policy on invention disclosures.
4For example: "The fact is that NASA'srecord on disclosures is
very poor--which NASAofficials freely admit--and it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that the title concept of the SpaceAct is largely
responsible." This is from page 15 of Ownership of Inventions Developed
in the Course of Federal Space Research Contracts. Report of the Sub-
committee on Patents and Scientific Inventions of the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics. April 5, 1962.
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We think that several causes operate to makeNASA's rate lower:
I. Such an apparently simple matter as the definition of
"R & D" probably has something to do with it. Wehave been using the
R & D data published by the National Science Foundation, which in turn
gets its information from NASA. Wehave no doubt that NSFdoes the best
it can. But good intentions alone will not give a sharp edge to a
definition--of exactly what R & D is. Nor do they suffice to bring order
out of intractably difficult original statistical materials. Wehave not
had the resources to probe into the NSFdata on NASA's R & D. We can
only give a provisional opinion, namely, that the data overstate the
amount of the R & D work for NASA. For one thing, "R & D Plant" looms
large for NASAin the period 1962-1965. So does the development part
of research-and-development. Few inventions can come from buildings,
launch facilities, specialized structures, and elaborate testing activi-
ties. These matters probably lower the discrepancy between disclosure
rates, but not enough to explain it all away.
2. Another possible cause of NASA's lower rate of dis-
closure is the character of the work done by and for NASA. There seems
to be someagreement on this point both inside and outside the agency.
Muchgovernment-financed R & D is of the exotic sort that results in few
inventions. The argument here has it that NASA's R & D, by and large,
is even more so. Onceagain, we have not had the resources to explore
this matter as muchas it probably deserves. But we can record a common
opinion.
3. It is well known that NASAvehicles and the other
I|
I
|
I
I
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equipment need to be as reliable as they can be made. A small increment
from one level of reliability toward a higher that is closer to perfect
reliability is likely to produce fewer inventions because the emphasis
falls on using the tried and true rather than in creating entirely new
devices and methods. We have been told that NASA procurement officers
have frequently specifically instructed contractors not to go ahead with
novel approaches but instead to modify and improve existing technology.
4. A large part of NASA's money goes to the aerospace
industry. In the course of our research into the relations between
volumes of R & D and numbers of patented inventions, we have observed
that this industry differs sharply from other industries when R & D and
s
patents are important. In the aerospace industry, R & D dollars result
in relatively fewer patents than in other industries. To illustrate and
to indicate orders of magnitude, we can now use one of our computations.
In a simple model, let it be assumed that numbers of patents are
proportional to dollars of R & D. Because basic research and because
development do not, or at least are not supposed to, produce many pat-
ented inventions, take the "applied research' data of the National Science
Foundation. To allow for time needed to report disclosures, to prepare
patent applications, and go through the Patent Office, let patents be
lagged five years after the conduct of applied research. We have an
estimate of the 1962 distribution of assigned patents among industries,
with the NSF classification. Accordingly, we use the 1957 data from NSF
on applied research by industry.
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The model is
P = a + bR,
where P is (estimated) patents by industry for 1962, R is millions of
dollars of applied research, and a and b are constants. Whenthis
5
equation is fitted to data for 9 industries, the fit is good
(R2 = 0.925). The 9 industries exclude the aircraft and missiles
industry (NSFdesignation). To include this industry spoils the fit,
i.e., the industry has far fewer patents per million dollars of applied
research. The fitted equation for the 9 industries is
P = --651 + 44.8R
The equation can be used to calculate how manypatents the aircraft and
missiles "should" have had in 1962. "Should" meansas manyas the
average of other industries, taking into account the amount of applied
research. The calculation gives this result: in 1962 the aerospace
industry had i/8 as manypatents as it should have had.
Sucha calculation would deserve suspicion if it stood naked and
alone. But qualitative support can be given to the calculation. Patents
do not seemever to have been as important in the aircraft industry as
in, say, the pharmaceutical or electric industries. Aircraft profitable
to their manufacturers have owed their success to superiority of design
rather than to patented features. Since 1917 the Manufacturers' Aircraft
Association has furnished the machinery for cross licensing of patents
5Food and kindred products, drugs and medicines, other chemicals,
fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical communication and
equipment, scientific and mechanical measuring instruments, and stone,
clay, and glass.
I •
t
i
||
I
i
47
within the industry. Because there is no fear of infringement, firms
in the industry have a smaller incentive to take out patents. 6 If, then,
the aerospace companies are less interested in patents than companies
in other science-based industries, it should follow that they are less
concerned about ferreting out invention disclosures. That is, inde-
pendently of patent rights and reporting clauses in government contracts,
the environment and attitudes in the laboratories and patent departments
of the aerospace companies have not been conducive to disclosure. An
aerospace company makes awards to inventors when the company files a
patent application; inventors also share in royalties. But no awards
7
are made when the government files applications.
5. There is no way to measure the effect of NASA's patent
policies on the volume of disclosures. But we can point to two things.
One is the dominating image of the patent policies and the other is the
sheer number of contractors.
The prevailing image is that NASA is a title-policy agency that
grants waivers only grudgingly. Of course, some contractors, especially
the larger ones, do have a more or less correct understanding of how NASA
6More materials on this point and on inventiveness in the industry
are to be found in David R. H. Sawers, "Inventions and Innovation in
Airplanes," Appendix 7, Economic Concentration, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate. Part 3, Concentration, Invention, and Innovation. 1965.
7
An excellent treatment of the problem of stimulating disclosures
is contained in Wilson R. Maltby, "Need for a Federal Policy to Foster
Invention Disclosures by Contractors and Employees," Federal Bar Journal
Vol. 25, No. i, Winter 1965, pp. 32-40. See footnote 2 on disclosures by
aerospace companies. We are aware of the fact that NASA inaugurated a
large-scale TUP program at North American Aviation in the middle of 1965.
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really operates. A few contractors express themselves in fact as being
well pleased with NASA'spolicies and practices. But it is our clear
impression that most contractors see not the reality but the prevailing
image. Their compliance with the reporting requirements is not likely
to be eager. The mechanismsthey set up to obtain and report invention
disclosures are almost certain to be barely minimal. In processing raw
ideas for inventions the successive sets of decisions to forward or to
reject are more likely to contain a higher proportion of rejections
when all concerned know that somebodyelse is going to get the title.
We know that whena government agency puts direct pressure on large
contractors to disclose more, more will be disclosed. The tap can be
opened wider, at a cost. But the image of NASA's policies deters
contractors from doing all they can to stimulate their employees on
governmentwork to turn out really good inventions.
A title policy can work well in getting disclosures only if the
agency has few contractors. The agency with the oldest title policy
has very little contract research; its own intramural research is
conducted in just a half dozen or so centers. The agency with the most
vigorous title policy gets over 90 per cent of its disclosures from 14
contractors. It is thus easy for these agencies to monitor their
contractors. In sharp contrast, NASAhas thousands of scattered
contractors--over 2,000 prime contractors and tier upon tier of sub-
contractors. Thoroughmonitoring would have a prohibitive cost. The
alternative is to bring about better cooperation with a new system of
incentives.
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The Quality of Disclosures
So far we have been discussing mere numbersof invention
disclosures. Besides, we have madeno distinction:between disclosures
of inventions and disclosures of new technology. The records we examined
do not make that distinction. Webelieve that contractors differ much
in what and how they report. Someof the larger contractors apparently
follow the reporting requirements as literally as they can. On the other
hand_ a patent attorney for a large companytold one of us that he would
report four times as many invention disclosures as he does, if he were
to take NASA's requirements literally. Rawinventions, he explained,
\
have to be worked on and refined. The point, then, is that ten disclosures
from contractor A might be quite a different batch of inventions than ten
disclosures from contractor B.
From the information available to us, the only possible measure
_ _i ........ ,.... is ..... +_.... planned prepa-of the quality v_ _= ........ t_ _^c^ _.e_=_a ..... , _.
ration, of patent applications. Here are decisions by patent attorneys,
in NASA or in industry, that the inventions are patentable and are also
worth the cost of preparing patent applications. For inventions covered
by petitions for waiver, we take the petitions as indexes of quality--
the contractors think the inventions are worth both the trouble of
preparing petitions and applications.
For NASA-owned inventions and for the period to December 31, 1965,
we counted as "quality disclosures" those on which patents had been
issued, those on which an application was pending in the Patent Office,
and those on which an application was being prepared. Some inventions
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were still undergoing search, and thus are not counted. Their numbers
are offset, at least in part, by the numbers of patent applications
withdrawn or denied.
As measured in this way, the quality of the inventions submitted
by NASA's employees is muchhigher than that of the inventions turned
in by contractors. Table 3--6 shows that the quality of an average i00
inventions by NASAemployees is about three times as great.
The apparent difference in the qualities of contractor and NASA
employee inventions needs explanation. First of all, the quality of
contractor inventions is measuredby petitions for waiver, as well as
by patent applications. As Chapter 6 shows, manycontractors have not
petitioned or have been reluctant to petition because of the way (right
or wrong) they look upon the waiver policy and its administration. Thus
the numberof petitions, and thus of quality disclosures from contractors,
is lower than it could have been. But we do not know just how much the
inhibitions on petitioning have lowered the index of quality for contrac-
tors.
The rate of patent applications on NASAemployee inventions is
about four times higher per I00 disclosures. For this there are several
causes. One seemsto be simple convenience. It is easier for NASA's
patent staffs in the field centers to handle the employee inventions.
The inventors are there at the centers, at most only a few buildings
away. The inventors can help the attorneys as the applications are being
prepared. In contrast, the employees of contractors are much less
accessible, mere distance being only part of that inaccessibility. Then
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Table 3--6
Quality Disclosures from Contractors and
from NASAEmployees
to December31, 1965
Contractors
NASAemployees
Total
Total Quality
Disclosures Disclosures
Quality in
Per Cent of
Total
4,728 655 13.8
1,871 740 39.6
6,599 1,395 21.1
Source: Files of AGPand ICB, NASA.
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too, the technical evaluators who help in making the decisions on whether
to file patent applications at all are said to have a predeliction in
favor of the inventions from NASA's employees. The technical evaluators
are likely also to be less familiar with the technologies by contractors
and therefore, perhaps, fail to foresee promising devices. Conceivably,
contractors could channel someof their best inventions so as to keep
them out of the government's clutches and would mostly disclose inventions
of no particular interest to themselves.
Decline in the apparent quality of contractor disclosures
Table 3--7 exhibits the decline in the quality of contractor
disclosures, as measured by petitions for waiver. The other index of
quality, patent applications, remained steady. The decline shown in
the table is more apparent than real, because after 1962 disclosures
came to consist of "innovations" as well as inventions. The sharp drop
in 1965 is also explained by the slightly greater stringency of the
waiver regulations coming into force late in 1964.
Table 3--8 shows quality disclosures by groups of contractors.
The "other companies" are medlum-sized and small companies.
Appendix B gives a list of all contractors who have made disclosures
to NASA.
The Distribution of Disclosures Among Contractors
As is to be expected, the big contractors turn in more disclosures.
Table 3--9 presents conventional concentration ratios for disclosures
and cumulative prime contract awards. The discrepancy between the
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Table 3--7
Ratios of Petitions for Waivers on
Inventions to Disclosures from
Contractors
1960--1965
Year
1960
Petitions per
Calendar Year
Disclosures
per Fiscal
Year
Ratio of
Petitions to
Disclosures,
in Per Cent
13 54 24.0
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Notes:
30 77 40.0
53 350 15.1
46 521 8.8
93 I, 040 8.9
78 1,610 4.8
Petitions are those for which dates are available.
Petitions are lagged six months behind disclosures.
Sources: Disclosures: AGPfiles, NASA.
Petitions: ICB files, NASA.
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Table 3--8
Quality Disclosures by Groups of Contractors for
Contractors with Four or More Quality Disclosures
to December31, 1965
Quality Ratio in
Group Disclosures Disclosures Per Cent
Aerospace companiesa
Other large companiesb
Other companiesc
Universities and nonprofit
organizations d
Total
2,105 208 i0.0
921 89 i0.0
Ii0 51 46.0
408 155 38.0
3,544 503 14.0
aAerojet General, Avco, Bell Aerospace, Bendix, Douglas, General Dynamics,
Hughes, LTV, Lockheed, McDonnell, North American, United Aircraft, and TRW.
bcompanies in 1965Fortune Directory: Ampex, Collins Radio, General
Electric, General Mills, Honeywell, IBM, Monsanto, RCA, Sperry Rand, and
Westinghouse.
CBarnes Engineering, Beckman Instruments, Electro-Optical Systems, GCA,
Hazelton Laboratories, Peninsular Chemical Research, and Varian Associates.
dCalifornia Institute of Technology, lllinois Institute of Technology,
Midwest Research Institute, MIT, Southern Research Institute, Stanford Research
Institute, University of Arizona, and University of California.
Sources: Files of AGP and ICB, NASA.
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Table 3--9
Concentration Ratios for Contractor
Disclosures and for Cumulative
Prime Contracts
Selected groups of
contractors ranked by
numbers of disclosures
and by sizes of prime
contract awards
Percentage of total
Disc losur es,
by all
contractors
Disclosures,
by business
firms only
Cumulative
contract
awards to
business firms
First 4 contractors 37 39 39
First 8 contractors 51 53 54
First 20 contractors 72 74 70
First 40 contractors 82 84 75
First I00 contractors 92 94 90
Note: Disclosures are for tbe entire period from 1959 to December 31, 1965.
_I ........ AGP files, NASA.Sources: _.
Contract awards: NASA's Prime Contractors and Prime Contract
Awards as of April 307 1966.
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ratios for the first 40 and first i00 contractors means, we are certain,
that the large contractors take more seriously their duty to disclose,
rather than that their work for NASA is more productive.
Pareto distributions
The distribution of disclosures among contractors--large, medium-
sized, and small--can also be measured by fitting a Pareto distribution.
The advantage here is that a single number states the degree of concen-
tration.
Take double-log paper. On one axis, put numbers of contractors.
On the other axis, put the cumulative distribution of disclosures by
groups of contractors--the first 4 have an average of so many or more
disclosures, the first 8 have an average of so many or more, etc. When
the points thus plotted lie along a straight line, the distribution is
a Pareto distribution. The slope of the line is the famous Pareto _ ,
the coefficient of "inequality," or "concentration."
Table 3--10 shows the Pareto alphas, calculated by the usual least-
squares method, for contractors' disclosures, quality disclosures, and
for direct contracts awarded in the fiscal year 1965. The other numbers
in the table indicate that the fits are good.
These Pareto alphas signify that quality disclosures are much less
concentrated than total disclosures, i.e., that relatively more quality
disclosures come from medium-sized and smaller contractors.
We can put the alphas into perspective by comparing them with
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Table 3--10
Pareto Alphas for Contractor Disclosures,
Quality Contractor Disclosures, and Cumulative
Contract Awards
Pareto Standard
Distribution Alpha Error R2
Disclosures of first i00'
contractors ranked by
numbers of disclosures
Quality disclosures of
first i00 contractors
ranked by numbers of
quality disclosures
Cumulative contract awards
of first i00 contractors
ranked by size of contract
awards
0.6832 0.0336 0.9781
0.7935 0.0434 0.9738
0.5505 0.0354 0.9661
Sources: Disclosure data: AGP files, NASA.
Contract data: NASA_s Prim_ CuL_L_tor_ --_ ____A _ ......
A....a_ == of April 30_ _.__
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other computations we have made. 8 The concentration of disclosures is
numerically almost identical with the concentration of patents acquired
by business firms under the license policy in the period 1946-1962.
The higher concentration of contract awards by NASA is about the same
as the concentration of the R & D prime contracts awarded by the Depart-
ment of Defense in the late 1950s.
In other words, the concentration of NASA's contracting and of
its disclosures follows the pattern of the big agencies of the federal
government. With NASA, concentration is no more and no less than with
them.
Find ing s
i. One of the tasks of government patent policy is to foster
inventiveness. NASA's patent policies have not been as successful as
they might have been.
2. The numbers of disclosures to be expected from NASA-financed
R & D is about one-tenth of the number to be expected from equivalent
volumes of commercial R & D.
3. Per million dollars of R & D, the rate of disclosure to NASA
has been less than the rate to the combined other agencies of the
federal government.
4. The rate of disclosure fromcontractor R & D has been lower
8Donald S. Watson and Mary A. Holman, "Concentration of Patents
from Government-Financed Research in Industry," Review of Economics
and Statistics, forthcoming.
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than the rate from NASAemployees. In 1965, however, the contractor
rate was higher.
5. Only 300 of the thousands of NASAcontractors have madeany
disclosures at all. Most of the few disclosures coming out of sub-
contracts have comefrom firms that are also large prime contractors.
Somelarge prime contractors have madeno disclosures to NASA.
6. The low rate of disclosures by NASAcontractors has many
causes. Important causes are the character of R & D work for NASA,
the patent tradition of the aerospace industry, the absence of incen-
tives to contractors to motivate their employees to disclose, and the
prevailing image of NASA'spatent policies.
7. A title policy cannot work well, owing to the expenseof
monitoring, with hundreds or thousands of scattered contractors.
8. The "quality" of invention disclosures can be measuredby
the numbers of patent applications and petitions for waiver. Employee
disclosures have a higher quality. Contractor disclosures have been
declining in quality, owing to the inclusion amongdisclosures of a
larger proportion of nonpatentable innovations.
9. The quality of the disclosures for the smaller contractors,
and from the universities and nonprofit organizations is muchhigher
than those of the aerospace companiesand of other large contractors.
i0. The distribution of disclosures amonglarge, medium-sized,
and small contractors is "normal." It follows the pattern of the
distribution of contracts°
!
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Chapter 4
The Utilization of NASA-Owned Inventions
At the end of 1965, the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration held a portfolio of 780 inventions--512 of them patent
applications, the others issued patents.
Most of the inventions on which NASA has title or has applied for
title are devices or processes of use solely in NASA and in other
government programs. In _-'-_-- _i^ _,^_^ _ _+=_+=_ e_= _e_
of the government. In selecting inventions for patent application, the
criterion of government use is, however, only one of those employed by
NASA's patent attorneys and technical evaluators. They adduce in fact
i
several criteria, one of which is commercial potential. This criterion
is much more important for employee inventions than for contractor
inventions. Contractors have the option of petitioning for waivers;
if they do not it seems reasonable to suppose that they do not think
much of the commercial future of the inventions in question.
In any event some small fraction of NASA's inventions have com-
mercial potential. These inventions are available for private exploi-
tation in NASA's licensing program.
IAppendix H contains tables on the use of the criteria to select
inventions for patent application. The data in the tables cover the
period to July 31, 1963. The pattern of decisions is fairly stable
over time. The Appendix also has tables on the time lags between the
various sets of decisions in bringing inventions to the stage of patent
application.
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NASA's Propensity to Patent
The ratio of the number of patent applications filed by NASAto
the number of inventions disclosed to NASAis thepropensity to patent.
The size of the propensity is, of course, the result of NASA's screening
of inventions for patent applications. Table 4--1 showsdata on NASA
invention disclosures and on patent applications. To allow for eval-
uation and time for patent preparation, application data are lagged one
year, e.g., applications filed during calendar year 1960, are divided
by the numberof invention disclosures in 1959. The table showsa
decline in NASA'spropensity to patent. Disclosures have been coming
in at a faster rate than the numbersof patent applications filed.
A drop in the propensity to patent from 56 per cent to 15 per cent2
cannot be explained solely by the fact that NASAhas been receiving more
disclosures covering innovations and unpatentable items since it incor-
porated the more stringent "Reporting of NewTechnology" clauses into
its contracts. Indeed, data separating the propensity for contractor
inventions and for employee inventions show that the propensity has been
stable for contractor inventions. Table 4--2 shows that between 1963
and 1965, the propensity to file on employee inventions dropped by about
2Between1945 and 1963, the government-wide propensity to patent
was about 28 per cent. It declined in the late 1940s, after the back-
log of invention disclosures from World War II had been handled. Then
it rose in the early 1950s, declining again in the early 1960s. The
propensity varies widely by government agency (from a low of i0 per
cent to a high of 80 per cent), depending on the numbers of attorneys
and the criteria used for selecting inventions. See Watson and Holman,
"The Federal Government's Propensity to Patent," Patent_ Trademark and
Copyright Journal, Vol. i0, No. I, pp. 61-74.
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Table 4--1
NASA's Declining Propensity to Patent
Propensity in
Per Cent:
Calendar Invention Patent Applications
Year Disclosures Applications Lagged OneYear
1959 109 26 --
1960 194 61 56
1961 293 69 36
1962 661 96 33
1963 1,194 138 21
1964 1,615 197 17
1965 2,476 249 15
Note: The propensity for a year is the numberof patent applications in
that year divided by the numberof disclosures in the preceding year, to allow
for the time to evaluate inventions and to prepare applications.
Source: AGP, NASA.
64
Table 4--2
Propensities to Patent for Employee
and Contractor Inventions
Propensity Propensity
for Applications for
Applications Employee on Contractor
Calendar Employee on Employee Inventions, Contractor Contractor Inventions,
Year Inventions Inventions Per Cent Inventions Inventions Per Cent
1962 212 80 -- 447 16 --
1963 435 i01 48 759 37 8
1964 412 131 30 1,203 66 9
1965 382 158 38 2,094 91 8
Notes: Applications separated for employee and contractor inventions only
since 1962. Applications are lagged one year behind disclosures.
Source: AGP, NASA.
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i0 percentage points. NASAhas been compelled to becomemore selective
in choosing inventions for patent applications. This is another way of
saying that given the size of a patent department, there tends to be an
inverse relation between the numbersof inventions and the propensity
to patent.
Table 4--2 also reveals howmuchhigher is NASA's propensity for
employee inventions than for contractor inventions. In Chapter 3, we
indicated that employee inventions seemto be of higher quality than
contractor inventions. But it is _-._.I 4_uuuuL_u__ employee i_Tentions ares
on the average, four times as good.
Patent counsel in NASAsuggest several reasons for the large
difference in the propensities. One is that the time required and
probably the cost to file patent applications are greater for contractor
inventions. Someof NASA'sattorneys in field offices guess that it
now takes two or three times as long to file applications on contractor
inventions. A contractor's employeemight be located across the con-
tinent rather than across the street.
Patent counsel in at least one large field center wait to file
applications on contractor inventions because they expect contractors
to file petitions for waivers. With waivers, NASAcontractors are
obligated to file patent applications, thus reducing NASA'sburden of
filing. However, in _apidly moving fields of technology this delay
might meanfewer applications on inventions madeby employees of con-
tractors.
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The Technology Utilization Program
On the total of about 6,600 inventions disclosed to NASAat the
end of 1965, well over half (3,952) did not warrant patent applications;
of these, about 1,090 inventions were not patentable.3 Weconjecture
that someof the remaining inventions are patentable. The Office of
Technology Utilization screened someof these; the more promising ones
have been amongthe approximately 600 inventions published as Tech
Briefs. Another unknownproportion of these inventions are available
in documents to industry through NASA'sRegional Dissemination Centers.
Wedo not know how manyof these "rejected" inventions reach the main-
stream of commerce,nor do we know if any good ones have been lost. 4
The Licensing of Government-OwnedInventions
The government does not use its inventions in the sameways as
business firms. Governmentagencies usually grant revocable, royalty-
free, nonexclusive licenses upon request. With minor exceptions, the
government does not use its patented inventions for bargaining or for
3The figure of 1,090 is an estimate, based on information about
invention disclosures submitted to NASAto July 31, 1963. Of the 1,008
cases to that date 633 did not becomethe subjects of patent applica-
tions. Of these, 177 inventions received adverse search reports.
Without examination of each docket, it is not possible to know why
inventions receive "P-3," i.e., inactivated ratings. Wedid not examine
individual disclosure dockets for inventions submitted after July 31,
1963.
4From time to time the Technology Utilization Program publishes
case histories of technology transfers.
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income. The Federal Aviation Agency's licensing policy is one excep-
tion. That agency attempts to recover some of its R & D costs by
charging royalties, hoping to shift the R & D burden from the general
taxpayer to those benefiting directly from the research.
An exclusive license agreement entered into by NASA in mid-June,
1966, might be considered the result of bargaining. But the agreement
is really a means of protecting the government in its procurement acti-
vities. AVCO, Inc., and NASA filed patent applications on similar
inventions. The AVCO invention did not result from any government funds.
Patent counsel in NASA believe that AVCO's claims were stronger than
those of the government. Patent counsel also believe that the govern-
ment would probably use the invention. To avoid the possibility of an
infringement suit and also the cost of attacking the AVCO patent in
court, NASA requested and got a cross-license agreement. AVCO gave the
government a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to its patented inven-
tions. In exchange, NASA gave AVCO an exclusive license to its patent.
Use without licenses
The government does not usually prosecute companies infringing
its patents.5 Because of this patent counsel in industry, and some in
government, argue that government ownership of patents is contrary to
the philosophy of the patent system. However, most government patent
attorneys maintain that widespread commercial use of government-owned
inventions either with or without licenses benefits the economy.
5The Tektronix Case is the exception.
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NASA'sLicensing Program
By December31, 1965, NASAhad granted 107 nonexclusive licenses
on 46 different patented inventions and inventions under patent appli-
cations. (This information was given to us directly by the office of
the Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters. Weare unable to
explain the discrepancy between these numbersand the somewhathigher
figures appearing in NASA'sProgramReview Document, Patent Program,
April, 1966, page 32.) Ninety-seven different companies hold these
licenses. These inventions comprise 6.0 per cent of NASA's portfolio
of patent applications and patents. Of the issued patents, i0.i per
cent were licensed. This compares with a government-wide rate of 14.2
per cent for patents licensed at the end of fiscal year 1964. 6
If a patented invention is not licensed nonexclusively within two
years after its issue, NASA can grant an exclusive license. At the end
of 1965, NASA had one exclusive license agreement in effect. NASA ter-
minated another exclusive license agreement with Union Carbide Corpor-
ation, at the request of the licensee. Under this agreement, Union
Carbide was to spend at least $20,000 annually (for a three-year period)
for development of the licensed invention. Because superior substi-
tutes became available, Union Carbide could not justify substantial
development expenditures on this invention.
6Federal Council for Science and Technology, Annual Report on
Government Patent Policy, June 1965, p. 35.
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questionnaires to licensees
In February, 1966, we sent one questionnaire to each firm for
each nonexclusively licensed invention. A copy of the questionnaire
is in Appendix D. We questioned licensees to find<out about the actual
commercial use and the commercial potential of their licensed inventions.
We also wanted to know how well the rate of NASA's licensing reflects
the rate of commercial use. Previous studies have shown that the number
7
of licenses is not a good measure of use.
From responses to the initial mailing, a mail follow-up in late
March, and about a dozen phone calls in April, we found out about almost
all (over 90 per cent) of NASA's licensed inventions. Appendix Tables
F--I through F--6 show the responses to this questionnaire. The tele-
phone company had no business or personal listing for 7 of the licensees.
These companies are probably no longer in business. Officers in six
companies disclaimed being licensees (i.e., they had requested infor-
mation and not licenses).
As a group, the companies 1_eensed to use NASA's inventions are
quite different from the contractors granted waivers. Most of NASA's
licensees are small businesses, scattered over the country; many of the
companies holding waivers are large firms, geographically concentrated.
We asked the licensees to give us brief descriptions of their firms,
including major product lines and numbers of employees. Of those
7Mary A. Holman, "The Utilization of Government-Owned Patented
Inventions," Patent_ Trademark_ and Copyright Journal, Vol. 7, Nos. 2
and 3, Summer and Fall, 1963, pp. 135-139 and pp. 330-335.
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responding to this request, 16 per cent had fewer than i0 employees,
38 per cent employed between i0 and 50 people, 13 per cent between 51
and I00, Ii per cent between i00 and 1,000, and 22 per cent of the com-
panies had more than 1,000 employees. Ten of NASA's licensees are also
NASA contractors; two of them have petitioned for waivers.
The major product lines of NASA's licensees are too diverse and
too numerous to list completely. Some of the major product lines of
NASA's licensees include:
Photographic and fishing tackle accessories;
electrical protection services for fire, burglary, etc.;
water conditioning equipment;
manufacture of loud speakers;
consulting engineers;
residential real estate;
paints, varnishes, lacquers, and resin;
producing, refining, and marketing of petroleum and
petroleum byproducts;
inks and epoxy compounds;
micro-clean packaging materials;
marine equipment;
machinery maintenance;
industrial air and hydraulic cylinders;
molded rubber products;
high temperature vacuum furnaces; and
hospital equipment (sales).
Sources of information on inventions
Almost 50 per cent of the responding licensees learned about the
availability of the inventions directly from NASA's information dissem-
inating channels. NASA's Tech Brief series was the most frequently
cited source of information. Ten licensees learned about the inventions
from NASA employees. Indirectly, NASA's information disseminating mech-
anism must have been the source of the information to some additional
licensees. Of the 6,000 to 7,000 names on the mailing list of Technology
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Utilization, 3,000 to 4,000 are those of trade and professional journals.
As Table 4--3 shows, trade and professional journals are an important
source of information about NASAinventions. Five companiesmadethe
inventions under prime or subcontracts.
The sources of information about NASA's inventions contrast
sharply with the sources of information about government-ownedinven-
tions licensed by other governmentagencies. In 1962, 44 per cent of
a group of randomly sampled companies licensed to use government-owned
inventions stated they knew about their licensed inventions because they
madethem under one of their contracts. Eighteen per cent of the same
group of licensees learned about the inventions by routine patent
searches, 7 per cent from trade and professional journals, and only 9
per cent from government publications.
Commercial Use and Potential of
NASA-OwnedInventions
Be!ore we discuss the use _d uL_=_uu=LLLza_O_ vf _TAOA ......
inventions, we shall now explain the definitions that will be employed.
Definitions of use
We shall put inventions from NASA-financed R & D into seven
groups. We do this for both the licensed and the waived inventions.
We use the replies of licensees and of waiver holders to our
8As might be expected, discussion with agenay representatives was
the source of information of about a third of the patents licensed by
the Department of Agriculture. Holman, op. ci___t.,pp. 328-330.
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Table 4--3
Sources of Information About NASAInventions
Sources of Information Number Per Cent
NASATech Brief
Trade journal
NASApersonnel
Patent Gazette
Made the invention
Told by another company
Small Business Administration
Total
25
23
i0
5
5
2
2
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34.7
32.0
13.9
6.9
6.9
2.8
2.8
i00.0
Source: Licensee Questionnaire.
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questionnaires to group the inventions.
The advantage of seven groups over the usual two (commercial use
or no commercial use) lies in the effort to get at commercial potential.
This of course is a matter of judgment. The judgments will be those of
the persons--contractors, inventors, and licensees--supplying us with
information. We have to interpret that information, and in so doing,
make other judgments.
The seven groups are:
Group CU. Inventions in actual commercial use: These
inventions bring in revenue, or reduce costs. The inventions
are products sold, or parts of products sold, or are used in
the sale of services. We include sales to foreign governments
as commercial use. Income from licensing also puts an invention
in this group. But the mere fact that an invention is licensed
does not put it into this group. Employment of the invention
in manufacturing operations does, however, count as use.
Group GU. -.... _--_ in ....... _ ...._o_c ..... : This group
contains the inventions with some kind of actual use by or for
the government. Some inventions from government-financed R & D
are used, not in commerce in the ordinary sense, but in acti-
vities conducted by or for the government. Contractors can use
such inventions in conducting R & D for the government, or
include them in special-purpose equipment sold to the government.
Besides this, inventions developed in government laboratories
can be and are used in further R & D in government laboratories.
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The importance of inventions used only in or for the government
has been almost totally neglected. They too are a "national
resource ."
Because they are not likely to know, we did not ask
licensees about government use. In Chapter 6 we report on
government use of the inventions waived by NASA.
Group CA. Inventions commercially available but not yet
sold: These are products or components, etc., that are available
for sale but are not yet actually sold. They can be listed in
catalogues or otherwise advertised. Because many a product comes
to market only to fail, we think it well to distinguish groups
CU and CA.
Group HP. Inventions with high commercial potential:
To be included in this group, inventions must meet two or more
of the following tests: Funds must have been spent by the owner
or the licensee on development or marketing, or both. Commercial
use must be expected in the fairly near future. The owner or
licensee must have a high degree of belief (i.e., probability
of at l_ast 50 per cent) of expected use. Where a contractor
has licensed the invention to a business firm, the license is
negotiated and there is some statement of specifics about the
commercial potential of the inventions.
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Group MP. Inventions with moderate commercial potential:
These must meet two or more of the following tests: The owner
or licensee must have a moderate degree of belief of expected
use (i.e., probability of at least 25 per cent). It is expected
that funds will be spent for developing or marketing the inven-
tion. There is some statement of specifics.
Group LP. Inventions with low commercial potential:
These have some glin_nering of commercial utility. In this group
we also put the inventions covered by automatic cross-licensing
agreements.
Group NP. Inventions with zero commercial potential:
They hardly need definition.
Opinions of inventors
We asked inventors about the commercial use and potential of the
inventions they had made for NASA. Although inventors probably tend to
uLLuuzy optimistic, ................................
cycles of their inventions.9 The inventors in our survey had made the
I01 patented inventions that issued to NASA on or before December 31,
1964. We chose that date to make some allowance for possible time lags
9We also sent questionnaires to inventors to get facts that are
comparable to existing data supplied by inventors employed in other
government agencies and from inventors whose work is not supported
with federal funds. Finally, we wanted the opinions of inventors so as
to gain more insight into incentives to disclose, to disseminate infor-
mation, and to use new tecl_ology.
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i0between patent issue and commercial use.
Onequestionnaire was sent in February, 1966, to each inventor
(142 inventors) for each of his inventions (169 questionnaires). We
sent follow-up questionnaires in late March. Fifty-seven per cent of
the inventors completed questionnaires, providing information for 72
per cent of the inventions in the survey. Appendix Tables E--I through
E--8 show the rates of reply to each question--by invention, by inven-
tor, and by questionnaire.
The replies of inventors to our questions clearly reflect the
wide gap between their vision of commercial potential and the actual
commercial use of the inventions. The replies also show that many
inventors believe that exotic power systems and componentshave com-
mercial potential. Of the 73 different inventions for which we have
information, their inventors believe that 52 (70 per cent) hold com-
mercial potential. Whether an invention has commercial potential or
ii
not is, of course, an opinion. Inventors, particularly government
employees, usually do not make the managementdecisions to commercialize
10The total number of patented inventions that issued to NASAon
or before December31, 1964, was 134. Wedid not send questionnaires
to the inventors of the 33 patented inventions conceived before NASA's
inception.
llAn examination of about half of all invention disclosures re-
ceived by NASAbetween its inception and July 31, 1963, showed that
technical evaluators in NASAeither could not or would not express an
opinion about the commercial potential of 794 of the 1,008 cases studied.
There was a statement about the commercial potential of only 66 of the
375 inventions on which patent applications had been filed. Of the 66
inventions, technical evaluators believed that 80 per cent had commer-
cial potential.
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inventions. However, NASAhas issued licenses on 18 different patented
inventions included in the inventor survey. On fifteen of these patents,
the inventors believed the invention had commercial potential, as the
licensee obviously believed.
The following excerpts are typical of the descriptions that inven-
tors give about the commercial potential of their inventions:
Commercial potential is apparent in that the Aircraft Company
is currently considering the concept for application in their
supersonic transport design.
The patented invention could have application in high performance
engines where aerodynamic loading is high. Generally, operation
performance is kept below that at which blade vibration would be
critical.
The patented invention can be used for propelling commercial
aircraft, or maybe used as the exhaust nozzle for lift engines
in sometypes of vertical take-off aircraft.
The basic concept is applicable to any fluid propulsive system;
hence such systems which mayeventually have commercial trans-
portation use are probable. On the other hand, immediate
utilization for commercial use is not likely.
For holding the body in a fixed position for medical reasons.
it rocket engines have commercial use--y_s.
Any process requiring a heat exchanger capable of heating gases
to very high temperatures, above the capability of present day
commercial heat exchangers.
The most likely commercial application would be attitude control
and station keeping for a communications satellite.
For testing hydrodynamic drag characteristics of underwater
vehicles.
It can replace rivets in aluminum structures...Boats and auto-
mobiles could be fabricated using the process wherever rivets or
spot welds are currently used.
Scuba divers, boat enthusiasts, small plane enthusiasts, etc.,
for the device is small, compact, light, and pocket-sized.
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Only one inventor reported that his invention is in commercial
use. The inventor reports that, "It is part of the Company'sentry in
the supersonic transport competition now under way." According to the
inventor, the invention cannot be commercially used without further
development. "It must be tailored to the specific design it is to be
used on--that is the portion of wing that movesmust be determined for
stability and control considerations."
Although the inventor reported actual commercial use of this
invention, such use, obviously, will not materialize for several years.
The supersonic commercial transport seemsto be still in the drawing
board stage.
Use by licensees
The replies of licensees about the actual and anticipated use of
their licensed inventions contrast sharply with the opinions of inventors
about the commercial potential of inventions. Table 4--4 shows that
only 9 of the 47 (about 19 per cent) inventions licensed by NASA are in
actual use or are commercially available. One of these inventions is
licensed exclusively.
NASA's licensing program is new and so far small. That any
inventions at all have reached the market must be looked upon as a
favorable indication. We shall later compare NASA's licensing program
with those of four nonprofit organizations.
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Table 4--4
Commercial Use and Potential of
Inventions Licensed by NASA
Use Number Per Cent
Commercially used
Commercially available
High potential
Moderate potential
Low potential
No potential
Total
5a i0.6
4 8.5
4 8.5
7 14.9
23 49.0
4 8.5
47 a I00.0
/,
alncludes one invention under exclusive license.
Source: Licensee _uestionnaire,
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Case histories of NASA's licensed inventions
In this section we present short case histories of the 20 inven-
tions that have moderate or higher potential for commercial use.
Group CU Inventions. Five of NASA's licensed inventions are in
actual commercial use. To repeat, for an invention with a "CU" rating
the licensee must have reported income or use in manufacturing.
Inventions (2): Variable Frequency Magnetic Coupled Multivibrator
(Patent Application Serial Number: 14,488)
Variable Frequency Magnetic Multivibrator
(Patent Number: 3,128,389)
Company: Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., an electronics firm,
with about 1,500 employees. Sole licensee of both
inventions.
Description of commercial use: The company first used the two
inventions as components in a telemeter system it made for
NASA. Electro-Mechanical Research later incorporated the
two inventions in five spaceborne telemeter systems that
were sold to the Soci_t_ d'Instrumentation Schlumberger for
the French space program. The five systems were sold for
$200,000. Roughly 20 per cent of this income is attri-
butable to the inventions licensed from NASA. The company
spent a "slight" amount for development. It does not
expect to undertake any future development, nor does it
plan further use of the inventions because the "state of
the art has past the usefulness of the device."
Invention: Cryogenic Connector for Vacuum Use
(Patent Application Serial Number: 411,944)
Company: Cryolab, Inc. The company is a NASA contractor with
7 employees. Cryolab learned about its licensed
inventions from a trade journal. Sole licensee.
Description of commercial use: The connector is a part of an
all-metal valve for vacuums. Several of the devices have
been made; one has been sold. The company spent "some"
money to make shop and sales drawings. The president of
Cryolab says that his company has not benefited from its
work on the device because of insufficient market demand.
'_oderate" development effort might be undertaken in the
future, if a better market materializes. The company
II
I
I
i
i
I
I
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believes that it would put more of its resources into
product improvement and market development if it had
exclusive rights to the invention.
Invention: Differential Temperature Transducer
(Patent Application Serial Number: 255,132)
Company: The Delta-T Company is a one-man, one-product operation.
The owner, a former NASA employee, is patentee and sole
licensee.
Description of commercial use: The inventor left the government
to establish the Delta-T Company_ which produces the dif-
ferential temperature transducer. The company spent a
"moderate" amount for technical development. Expected
future development costs are "slight." Sales are reported
to have been quite modest. The licensee has tried unsuc-
cessfu!!y to obtain exclusive rights to the invention. He
believes exclusive rights are essential for the success of
the product because of market development costs.
Invention: Function Generator or Line Following Servosystem
(Patent Number: 2,837,706)
Company: EXACTEL Instrument Company, Inc., has 15 employees.
The company's president made the invention about I0
years ago when he was employed by NASA.
Description of commercial use: EXACTEL Instruments holds an
exclusive license to use this invention. In October, 1965,
the company _nld two _ystems. In mid-1966_ the commercial
future and benefits to the company were unknown. The com-
pany spent about $7,000 developing the invention.
Group CA Inventions. Four of NASA's licensed inventions are in
this group. These are inventions that are available on commercial
markets, but have not yet actually been sold.
Invention: Automatic Thermal Switch
(Patent Application Serial Number: 453,231)
Company: Arthur D. Little, Inc. Sole licensee.
Description of co_e_r_=1 use: Arthur D. Little, Inc. learned
about the invention from a NASA Tech Brief. It subsequently
requested and was denied an exclusive license. The device
has been incorporated in highly specialized cryogenic equip-
ment made by the company. Corporate officials hope to sell
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between i0 and 20 units of the equipment annually. The
expected sales price of each unit is between $300 and
$400. If expected sales materialize, somefraction of
this income will be attributable to the licensed invention.
Inventions (2): Space Capsule
(Patent Number: 3,093,346)
Aerial Capsule Emergency Separation Device
(Patent Number: 3,001,739)
Company: Spacerama, Inc. (formerly the Steelcraft Corporation).
According to the licensee, the company had no employees
at the time it replied to the questionnaire (February
15, 1966). Sole licensee for both inventions.
Description of commercial use: At a cost of $147,000, the com-
pany produced one model of the space capsule as an enter-
tainment ride. The capsule was on top of a 106' tall
"rocket." The device is now for sale.
Invention: Dynamic Transducer
(Patent Application Serial Number: 355,129)
Company: Straindyne Engineering Company. The I0 employees of
this company engage in the production of transducers.
Sole licensee.
Description of commercial use: Straindyne Engineering has spent
about $3,500 on this invention. There have been over 300
inquiries about this invention; but there have been no
sales and the company has had only "negative benefits"
from the licensed invention. The company would engage in
market research if it had exclusive rights to the invention.
Group HP Inventions. There are four inventions with high commer-
cial potential.
Invention: Alkali Metal Protective Coating
(Patent Application Serial Number: 452,945)
Companies (3) : W. P. Fuller Paint Company, a division of Hunt
Foods, Inc. Approximately 1,300 people are
employees of Fuller Paint.
Garan Chemical Corporation, with 50 employees,
makes chemical specialty products.
I
l
i
l
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Louisville Paint Manufacturing Company, Inc.
This company was purchased in September, 1965.
It has 15 employees, but it expects employment
to rise to about 30 by the end of 1966.
Description of commercial potential: The probability of use is
estimated to be between 50 per cent and 90 per cent. Two
of the three companies believe the product will be commer-
cialized late in 1966. Each of the companies has spent
funds for development. One spent $300, another spent about
$4,000, and a third made a "moderate" expenditure. Future
costs might total between $25,000 and $30,000 for two of
the firms. Most of this is to be for testing and sales
development. The three companies gave the same reason why
the invention has not yet been actually commercialized--
inability to standardize formulas. None of the firms would
commercialize the invention more rapidly with exclusive
rights.
Thirteen additional firms are licensed to use this
invention; commercialization by i0 of the 13 companies is
remote. The other 3 companies are more enthusiastic and
might commercialize the invention. These companies have
also encountered serious flaws in development.
Invention: Sterilization Process and Product
(Patent Application Serial Number: 440,033)
Company: Scientific Enterprises, Inc. The company manufactures
micro-clean packaging materials for the aerospace
industry. It has 20 employees. Sole licensee.
Description _ ...... =_Iv_ _v_u,,=Lcxax potential: Scientific Enterprises is
in the process of putting the invention in use, having
spent a "moderate" amount on development. The company
believes that there is a 75 per cent probability that the
invention will be on the market in the spring of 1967.
At present, the technology is too sophisticated for the
aerospace industry. According to the company, exclusive
rights to the invention would not hasten commerciali-
zation.
Invention: Electrical Connector for Flat Cables
Companies (2): G. T. Schjeldahl Company's 900 employees produce
special purpose machinery.
Brown Engineering Company, Inc. The company
employs 3,500 professionals to develop and to
make electronic equipment and vehicle and ground
support structures.
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Description of commercial potential: The probability of expected
commercialization in the near future is 50 per cent. Each
companyhas spent funds for development; one companybe-
lieves future development costs could amount to $50,000.
The reasons for lack of use are insufficient market demand
and high development costs. Each companysays it would
develop the invention faster with exclusive rights. One
companyis waiting for a specific order to justify devel-
opment investment.
Invention: Optical Communications Device
(Patent Number: 3,215,842)
Companies: This invention shows strong commercial potential
when the replies of the 29 licensees are pooled.
Description of commercial potential: One firm, the Acme-Lite
Manufacturing Company, believes there is a 50 per cent
probability that it will commercialize the invention by
1967. But that company has not yet spent money on the
invention. Four additional firms are less optimistic
about the commercial potential of the invention, believing
the probability of use is between 30 to 40 per cent. Only
one of these companies has incurred development costs,
which were "slight". The concensus among all of the firms
is that future development costs will be small. The main
reasons for lack of actual commercial use are insufficient
market demand and better alternatives. None of the five
licensees who are most likely to commercialize the inven-
tion believe exclusive rights would expedite matters.
Almost all of the 20 licensees learned about the invention
from local newspapers, popular magazines, and trade journals.
Group MP Inventions. Seven of NASA's licensed inventions hold
moderate commercial potential.
Invention: Gas Purged Dry Box Glove
(Patent Application Serial Number: 425,096)
Companies (2): The Pioneer Rubber Company
Renco Dry Box Glove Company
Description of the commercial potential: The combined replies of
the two licensees give this invention a moderate chance of
being commercialized. Each company has spent development
funds. One company made the invention for NASA; that com-
pany believes there is only a I0 per cent probability of
commercial use. The other company estimates the probability
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at 25 per cent. Oneof the companies believes the invention
would be developed with exclusive rights. The reasons for
the lack of actual commercial use are insufficient market
demandand the availability of substitutes.
(One additional companyis licensed to use the inven-
tion but commercial use by that companyappears to be
unlikely. )
Invention: Slit Regulated Gas Journal Bearing
(Patent Number: 3,132,903)
Company: Miniature Precision Bearing Company, sole licensee.
Description of commercial potential: After spending about $500
on this invention, the company gives a 10-20 per cent proba-
bility that it will commercialize the invention in late 1966.
Actual commercialization is contingent on the success of
additional development work. At present, the technology is
too sophisticated.
Invent ion : Process for Applying a Protective Coating for Salt
Bath Brazing
(Patent Number: 3,008,229)
Company: R. S. Cowen, Inc. Manufactures marine equipment.
Description of commercial potential: The company does not yet
know whether the invention has marine applications. The
firm made a "moderate" expenditure for development. The
company believes that its efforts would be greater with
exclusive rights.
fTT_ _.. _ _ 1__ _c _
Invention: Hydraulic Drive Mechanism
(Patent Application Serial Number: 425,362)
Companies (2) : Barry Controls
Superior Manufacturing and Instrument Corporation
Description of commercial potential: After "slight" development
expense, one of the companies hopes to have the product
commercialized by January, 1967. That company believes
exclusive rights would help in recovering a possible
$20,000 for future development costs. When that company
has only nonexciusive rights, it uses the technology in
_LuuUUL= on a == needed basis" rather _ho_ investing in a
"broad product line." The other company, which to date has
only investigated market potential, believes it would do
more with the invention if it had exclusive rights.
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Invention: Frangible-Tube Energy Dissipation
(Patent Application Serial Number: 209,479)
Companies (2): Aerotec Industries, Inc.
Hexcel Products, Inc.
Description of commercial potential: The combined replies of
the firms give this invention a moderate possibility for
commercial use. One company expects a change in the size
of the market by 1968 or 1969. The company gives the
invention a 50 per cent probability for that time. One
of the companies said that exclusive rights would hasten
development. Future development costs might total bet-
ween $30,000 and $50,000.
Invention : Method of Improving the Reliability of a Rolling
Element System
(Patent Application Serial Number: 431,235)
Company: Houdaille Industries, Inc.
Description of commercial use: "Moderate" funds have been
spent on this invention. The company gives the invention
a 50 per cent probability of being used in "the next few
years." Company officials state that commercialization
would be faster with exclusive rights.
(Use by the other licensee is remote.)
Reasons for nonuse of NASA's inventions
A sizable proportion of NASA's patented inventions are not
commercialized because the inventions have government applications only.
Whether NASA or NASA contractors hold titles to the patents on these
inventions is of little importance. Twenty-five per cent of all inven-
tors believe that this is why their patented inventions have not been
and will not be used. This reason is cited more frequently by NASA
employees than by employees of NASA contractors--29 per cent compared
with 12 per cent, respectively. "For government use only," is the
reason given by a slightly larger percentage of inventors with AEC and
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Table 4--5
Reasons for Nonuseof Inventions
Ownedby NASA
By Inventor By Licensee
Reasons No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Insufficient market demand 34 30.7
Governmentuse only 28 25.2
Superior substitutes 9 8.1
More important alternatives 3a 3.0
Technology too sophisticated 12 10.8
Insufficient time 2b 1.8
Development showedserious flaws i .9
Development cost too high 7 6.9
Insufficient publicity II 9.9
Outside product line 0 0.0
Invention obsolete 3 2.7
Other i c .9
Total iii i00.0
34 27.2
3 2.4
20 16.0
14 ii .2
3 2.4
12 9.6
9 7.2
8 6.4
0 0.0
7 5.6
4 3.2
li d 9.6
125 I00.0
alnventors reported more important research and development projects.
blnventors reported inventions still in experimental stage.
Clnvention being tested for safety by the United States Coast Guard.
dlncludes: 7 licensees that are no longer in business and four
licensees having only academic interest in the inventions.
Source: Inventor and Licensee Questionnaires.
I88
with DOD--31 per cent. 12 The closely related reason, too sophisticated
technology, accounts for the nonuse of an additional i0 per cent of
NASA's inventions.
Because the licensed inventions have been selected by firms for
their apparent commercial potential these two reasons are less important
reasons for nonuse by licensees. In contrast, insufficient market demand,
availability of substitutes, and better alternative investments are the
main deterrents to commercialization by nonexclusively licensed firms.
A better invention was the reason why Union Carbide requested NASA to
terminate its exclusive license.
Use without licenses?
The commercial use of NASA's patented inventions without licenses
could be important if it would impair estimates of how much new tech-
nology gets used. We know of no evidence suggesting that any of NASA's
inventions have been used without licenses. But we cannot rule out the
possibility.
Furthermore, it is not likely that many of NASA's inventions are,
or will be, used without licenses. This would be true even if NASA
did not enforce its patents. NASA provides technical assistance to its
licensees, including the heretofore unheard of thing of seeing to it
that licensees can get copies of patent applications pending in the
U. S. Patent Office. This technical information is not as readily
available to unlicensed firms. NASA can grant exclusive rights to its
12Holman, op. cit.
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patented inventions that have not been licensed nonexclusively. The
exclusive licensee can, of course, enforce the rights transferred by
NASA.
If the experience of other government agencies is any guide,
the most that can be expected is that for each licensed invention in
13
use, another will be used without a license. But whether this will
happen to NASAis sheer speculation.
DevelopmentExpenseand Effort
It is generally agreed that patent rights can be necessary as an
incentive to call forth private risk capital to bring inventions to the
point of practical application. Wheninventions are technically devel-
oped, risks can still exist. They include those risks associated with
advertising and marketing. Inventors and firms licensed to use NASA's
inventions provided someinformation about development expenditures.
As we said. inventors believe that about 30 per cent of their
inventions lack co_nerciai potential. Obviously, no funds will be
spent on these inventions. Inventors report that slightly over half of
those with commercial potential require further development. The per-
centage of NASA's inventions that need more development is about the
sameas that for government-ownedpatented inventions administered by
the Department of Defense and by the Atomic Energy Commission.14
i31bi___dd.,pp. 149-161.
141bi____d.,p. 152.
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The response of licensees to the request that they supply data
on actual amounts spent to develop NASA'sinventions was disappointing.
Only 8 companies (including NASA's exclusive licensee) provided dollar
figures on development costs. Twenty-six additional companies, however,
supplied qualitative information. These qualitative statements about
development expenditures must be interpreted cautiously. The amount of
development that one companybelieves to be "slight" might be considered
"moderate" or "substantial" by another company. For example, several
thousand dollars spent for development might be insignificant to a
companywith annual sales amounting to millions of dollars, whereas the
sameexpenditure for a one-man, one-product companymight be "substantial."
Nevertheless, qualitative statements about development costs tell us some-
thing about the relative importance of NASA-ownedinventions compared
with alternative investment opportunities within a given firm.
The following 7 companies spent about $17,000 (together) devel-
oping NASA-ownedinventions: Fuller Company,Koppers Company,Louis-
ville Paint Manufacturing Company,Miniature Precision Company,The
Pioneer Rubber Company,G. T. Schjeldahl, and Straindyne Engineering
Company. Slightly over half of that amount was for the development of
the Alkali Metal Protective Coating. The Steelcraft Companyspent
$147,000 to build the entertainment device that incorporates two of
NASA's licensed inventions.
The qualitative replies show that no companyspent what it
believed was a "substantial" amount on a NASA-ownedinvention. Sixteen
of the 26 companies giving qualitative information incurred "slight"
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development expenses. The remaining i0 licensees spent "moderate"
amounts.
So far, NASA's exclusive license agreements require licensees to
spend funds for development.15 Union Carbide's exclusive license ended
when development funds were not justified. In its exclusive license
agreement with NASA, the Exactel Instrument Companyagreed to spend a
minimumof $5,000 annually (for at least three years) on engineering
and market development. By mid-1966, that companyhad spent about
$7,000.
Exclusive Rights
Nonexclusive licensing is a factor contributing to the lack of
use of NASA's inventions. To be sure, it is not the only reason nor
is it the most important one. The great majority of NASA's inventions
lack commercial potential. Nevertheless, 19 of NASA'snonexclusively
1 J ..... .1 J ..... _." ............ L c,f 1L.--J ...... .1
IJ¢:; J..¢l._ I..t. _:_ ¢; _1. I... '_[I. --
merclally. Replies of licensees indicate that ii of the 19 inventions
would have been developed faster, or brought into use, if the companies
had had exclusive rights to the inventions. Several of the companies
stated that they had requested, and were denied, exclusive licenses.
Two of the three firms with inventions in actual use want exclusive
rights. The third company does not: the inventions are obsolete.
15Does not include the unusual license agreement with AVCO, Inc.
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Comparisonof NASAwith Four Nonprofit Organizations
A little more, though admittedly incomplete, light can be thrown
on NASA's licensing program by comparing it with those of three leading
universities and Research Corporation. Somenumbers are displayed in
Table 4--6.
For the comparison, the universities we chose are the California
Institute of Technology, the University of California, and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. These distinguished universi-
ties are important as contractors to NASA. Besides that, their patent
officers furnished us with data. So far as we can tell, the other non-
profit organizations that are important NASAcontractors, as judged by
numbers of disclosures and petitions for waiver, carry on patent acti-
vities on only a meager scale. A possible flaw in our comparison is
that still other larger and patent-conscious universities might have
patent operations quite different from those of the three we have
selected.
NASAand these patent-conscious institutions resemble each other
in several ways. They are nonprofit and they have fairly sizable patent
operations. For the universities, inventions are a mere byproduct of
the research they conduct and sponsor. Patentable inventions do turn
up; something must be done with them. In addition to obtaining patents
on inventions from its sponsored research, Research Corporation also
serves about 180 universities and other nonprofit organizations through
its invention evaluation and patent licensing (see Chapter 2) programs.
To put the good inventions into commercial use, NASA, the universities,
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Table 4--6
Patent Licensing Activities of NASA,of Research Corporation, and of
Three Leading Universities--California Institute of Technology,
University of California, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Periods: For NASAand Caltech, to Dec. 31, 1965
For Univ of Calif and MIT, to June 30, 1965
For Research Corporation, early 1966
Research Univ of
Portfolio
Patents issued
Patent applications
Total
Inventions licensed
Patents issued
Patent applications
Total
Total 1 ie_nRe_
Inventions yielding income
268 NA 62 NA 143
512 NA 52 NA 62
780 700 a 114 i17 b 205
25 NA 22
22 NA 6
47 c 60 a 28
87 200 a 28
5c, e 30 a 19 f
43
27g
118
36
154
39 d
20
aNumbers are approximate, b"upwards of 117." Clncludes exclusive
licensee.
d"Actlve" licenses. The government had licenses on 54 patents and
33 applications. There were 13 additional patents licensed both to the
government and to business firms. The total of patents and applications
with licenses to business firms only was 54.
eln actual commercial use, i.e., income to NASA's licensees.
flnc!udes 3 patents sold. gFor 1963-64 and 1964-65.
Source: Data supplied by the five organizations.
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and Research Corporation must find willing licensees. A great difference
is that NASAdoes not seek licensing income, whereas the other organi-
zations do. This is not because profits have even less of a meaning
for NASA_but rather because of the tradition in the federal government
that, in contrast to tradition, say in Western Europe, federal agencies
do not engage in the ordinary, routine, business activity of buying,
selling, and leasing property.
Another great difference is that the four nonprofit organizations
almost never file patent applications unless their patent officers
think the inventions have enough commercial potential to justify costs
of filing. Becauseit tries to recoup its patenting expenses, Research
Corporation considers NASAinventions as "not attractive" (not to men-
tion two or three from The George Washington University). In contrast,
only about 14 per cent of NASA's inventions were thought, at the time
of filing, to have any commercial potential at all (see Appendix Table
H- -3).
Thus it is not at all surprising that NASA has a much smaller
proportion of inventions in actual commercial use. Another cause must
be the newness of the agency and of its licensing program. The three
universities and Research Corporation have been in the patent business
much longer. They have built and are experienced in dealing with net-
works of communications with possible and potential licensees. They
solicit licenses for their patents. One of them employed for one year
a full-time agent with the principal duty of finding new licensees; but
he could not produce enough income to justify his salary. In contrast,
!i
|
i
I
I
I
I
I
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Research Corporation has (1966) a full-time agent whose duty it is to
find licensees for just a single invention (a cottage cheese flavoring
process). It is reported that he has more than paid his way. Although
the scale of their licensing operations is not large enough for really
aggressive soliciting, the three universities do in fact solicit within
the constraints of their resources. Each of these universities as well
as Research Corporation, is also an established center of research,
with many satellite private and public research organizations. In
contrast, NASA's patent licensing program works remotely and almost
passively. Lists of inventions available for licensing are disseminated
broadly by the Department of Commerce and by the Small Business Admin-
istration. The Technology Utilization Program also participates in
this activity.
Can NASA Encourage Wider Use?
Some _-_ma_ =h_,,_ _h_ __,,=ness ^# N_SA's _;;_ts to
encourage commercial use of its inventions comes from inventors and
licensees. Questions two and three of Part II of the inventor ques-
tionnaire were designed to get comments from inventors that reflect
approval or dissatisfaction with NASA's utilization policies. In
addition to the nine specific questions we asked licensees, we asked
for any comments that they wished to make about NASA's patent policies.
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NASA's technical information programs
We asked inventors, "How could or should NASA improve its
programs for disseminating information about the inventions it owns?"
(Part II-2).
Replies to this question indicate that most inventors are satis-
fied with NASA's programs for disseminating information about the
patented inventions it owns. Also, the responses of NASA inventors
are no different than the replies in 1962 of a group of inventors
16
employed in government agencies.
This question was not answered by 31 per cent of the inventors
who returned our questionnaires. Undoubtedly, this reflects some
indifference. Many NASA employee inventors think that their research
results are reaching industry because of the exchange of visits be-
tween people in industry and in government, and also because of NASA's
publication policies. With only a few exceptions, suggestions made by
inventors for improving NASA's information programs are the very things
that NASA is already doing. Inventors recognize this and believe that
these efforts should be intensified.
A frequent suggestion is that NASA establish a program and a
staff to rewrite technical reports for as many appropriate trade
journals as possible. Two inventors want NASA to subsidize publica-
tion in trade journals to insure widespread coverage. This recommen-
dation is in line with statements made by licensees. About one-third
1611olman, op. ci____t.,pp. 354-355.
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of them learned about their licensed inventions from trade journals.
Six inventors suggest that NASAestablish "Trade Fairs" where
working models of inventions could be shown. One inventor was quite
enthusiastic about a technology utilization conference that the Lewis
Research Center held for the petroleum industry. He believes that NASA
should sponsor more of these conferences.
NASA'sutilization programs
We also asked inventors, "How could and should NASA increase the
commercial use of inventions arising from the research it sponsors?"
(Part 11-3).
Comments made by inventors reveal that they believe the gener-
ation and dissemination of information about NASA's new technology
should be the limit of NASA's responsibilities to get inventions into
the mainstream of technology. Forty-three per cent of those answering
_LL_ question sai _ _+ _A_A _,,1_ =_,T_ _ _ _rhnn]ngv. And
another 22 per cent say that NASA has done all it should do and that
it is industry's responsibility to commercialize those inventions it
wants. About a fourth of the responding inventors believe that some
kind of exclusive rights is necessary for commercial development and
use of NASA's patented inventions. Exclusive licensing was cited as
the means to accomplish this as frequently as actual ownership of
patent rights by industry.
Few (only 24 per cent) licensees accepted our offer to comment
on NASA's patent policies. The conclusions that can be made from the
responses are: (i) there is no sharp criticism of NASA's patent
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policies and (2) there is someindifference toward NASA'spatent
policies by licensees. Several of them stated that they wanted some
form of exclusive rights, others merely elaborated on reasons for lack
of commercial use of licensed inventions, and still others described
their experiences with NASA's technology utilization programs. The
following are typical of the statements madeby licensees:
I still wish to obtain an exclusive license. I have exploited
this patented invention for three years with moderate success.
You should find a meansof providing exclusivity (at least some
degree). Public funds and public ownership are not incompatible
with parceling up exclusive areas for exploitation (i.e., manage-
ment of the asset).
Weare still proceeding with development work; to date we have
had little success. The films are powdery, lack adhesion, and
are of inferior quality.
Although we have used none to date, we feel that the NASATech
Briefs are worthwhile and appreciate receiving them.
Wefeel that most businesses, particularly small businesses
such as ourselves, are not aware of the programs available to
them through NASA. Someprogram should be initiated to bring
to the attention of more businessmen, the programs which are
available through NASA.
It would help us and help NASAto gain a better use of its
available technology if we could, first, receive a listing of
NASA'savailable inventions, preferably classified by scien-
tific discipline and/or area of technology and/or type of
manufacturing capabilities required; and, second, get more
detailed information on the items in which we might express
an interest on the basis of such a list.
GovernmentUse of NASA-ownedInventions
Inventors were asked to report use by NASA,or by any other govern-
ment agency, of their patented inventions. Their replies show that
about 65 per cent of NASA's inventions are used by the government.
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SeeAppendix Table E--7. By government use we meanproduction in govern-
ment installations; research in government laboratories; production for
the government in facilities ownedby contractors; and research for the
government in laboratories ownedby contractors.
From most of the replies it is difficult to know whether NASA's
is the only government use. Only three inventors explicitly state that
their inventions have been used by the Department of Defense. From
the descriptions of the government's use, we believe that most of NASA's
inventions are used only by NASA. One inventor said, i'First USAman in
space." Another stated that, "The NASAsurveyor spacecraft employs a
limited form of the invention." Still another inventor briefly said,
"Mercury spacecraft." A final typical reply was, "Used by JPL for
Mariner Space Probes."
The largest number of inventions used by NASAare products or
componentsof products. The next most important use of NASAinventions
is use in contractor-owned or government research laboratories. The
remaining inventions cover processes.
The rate of government use of patented inventions administered by
NASAis somewhatlower than the rate of government use of DOD's and
AEC's patented inventions. The government uses about 75 per cent of the
inventions administered by these agencies. The lower rate of government
use of NASA's inventions probably reflects NASA'spolicy of filing
patent applications on some inventions that L_I=LV_promise for co,mercia!
use and little prospect for governmentuse. Also, NASAuses a larger
percentage of the inventions it owns in research activities, compared
i00
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with wider procurement use for AECand DOD.
Not surprisingly_ the actual rate of government use as reported
by inventors is lower than the rate of use anticipated by NASA's
technical evaluators. Although it is probably less than for commercial
use, uncertainties create a gap between expected and actual government
use. The government also faces possibilities of nonuse of its inven-
tions because of rapid obsolescence, serious flaws in development, and
changing objectives. Examination of NASAdisclosure cases shows that
technical evaluators expect that NASAhas or will be using about 98
per cent of the inventions on which it files patent applications (see
Appendix G--2).
Find ing s
I. Two-thirds of the inventions ownedby NASAare used by or
for the government.
2. The rate of licensing has little or no relation to the rate
of commercial use.
3. Five of the inventions licensed by NASAare in actual com-
mercial use. Four of them are used by the companies where they
originated. Three others are on the market, but are not yet (end of
1965) in actual use.
4. Five more licensed inventions have high commercial potential.
Seven others have moderate commercial potential.
171bid., p. 363.
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5. As of April 1966, no NASA-ownedinvention appeared to have
a high value.
6. The development expenses so far incurred by NASA's licensees
have been quite modest.
7. The predominant causes for nonuse of the inventions licensed
by NASAare insufficient market demandand the availabilities of
superior substitutes.
8. NASA's licensing program can best be comparedwith those of
other nonprofit organizations.
9. Inventors believe that most of their inventions need further
technical or marketing development, or both.
I0. Inventors employed by contractors dislike seeing the Admin-
istrator's nameon patents.
Chapter 5
The Operation of the Waiver Policy
Public controversy over the patent policies of the National
Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration has focused on the waiver policy.
NASAhas been criticized both for granting too manyand for granting
too few waivers on inventions madeunder its contracts.
Background of the Waiver Policy
Section 305(a) of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAct of 1958
says that title to inventions madeunder NASAcontracts shall go to the
United States. Section 305(f) says that the Administrator maywaive
part of the rights of the government if he determines that doing so will
serve the interests of the United States.
The Act does not say that taking title shall be the normal action
and granting waivers the exceptional action. Neither does it say the
opposite. The Act offers no guides or criteria for this highest of
policy decisions: The wise mixture of titles and waivers. The intent
of Congress in adopting the patent provisions of the SpaceAct of 1958
is not fully clear. Appendix A covers the legislative history of these
patent provisions. In our opinion, the intent of Congress was to provide
a flexible blance betweeen the needs of government and the preservation
of incentives for individuals and business firms.
The atmosphere in 1958 was one of urgency. The space program
was new; space research held out the possibilities of unprecedented and
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perhaps awesomediscoveries. Great inventions would have to be under
control of the government, either because they would be part of the
keys to wholly new fields of science or would help create new industries.
The obvious precedent for NASA's taking title was atomic energy. At the
same time, the interests of industry in undramatic inventions were
recognized in the traditional manner, by providing in the waiver policy
for the preservation of incentives.
Title, then, was to be taken to the great or path-breaking
inventions of indisputable national interest. Waivers were to be
granted on humdruminventions of interest to industry and without
importance to government. So we interpret the intent of the Act.
The space program has accomplished muchsince 1958; space tech-
nology has advanced far. To date (1966), however, no powerful or great
invention has appeared. The significance of the patented inventions
coming out of NASA's programs is weak when it is contrasted with the
technical accomplishments in and for outer space.
The Presidential Memorandumof 1963 resembles the Space Act of
1958 in giving no guides as to the proportions in which titles go to
the government and to contractors. Although all federal agencies now
use the same criteria in deciding on the rights to inventions resulting
from their R & D, the various agencies interpret differently the criteria
set forth in the Memorandum.
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NASA'sCautious Procedures
In considering and acting on petitions for waiver, NASAhas
proceeded with great caution and circumspection. The cautious procedures
did not change after the Presidential Memorandum.The Inventions and
Contributions Board studies each petition with care; the staff of the
Board prepares written analyses of the petitions; the membersof the
Board deliberate the merits, under the regulations, of each of the
petitions. The General Counsel passes on the recommendationsof the
Board before they reach the Administrator.
Each petition must recite factual materials on, amongother
things, the kind of business the contractor is engagedin. NASAdoes
not take judicial notice that the companies whosenamesare household
words do what they do. The telephone companymust prove that it is in
the communications business. The best-known computer companymust get
together a package of k_v_.____ _o__ helD. Drove. iL i_ in _-^_=__.._+_.._
computer business. World-renowned universities must explain who they
are and what they do. A contractor making a second petition must repeat
the recital of facts. Each time a university petitions for a waiver, it
must explain how it intends to get the invention into commercial use.
NASA has no list of universities with approved patent policies.
On top of its prudence in granting waivers, NASA retains "March-
in-Rights." With them, NASA may compel contractors to grant licenses
on the waived inventions to others. At NASA's option, the licenses
might be royalty-free. NASA can use its "March-in-Rights" if:
(I) contractors do not work waived inventions, and make them reasonably
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available to the public, within three years of issue; (2) the inventions
are needed for the public health; and (3) the inventions are needed for
public use by government regulations.
NASAalso asks contractors to report annually on the actual and
expected commercial use of their waived inventions.
Titles and Waivers for Contractor Inventions
Even with its waiver policy, NASAstill takes titles to contractor
inventions. At the end of 1965, NASA's balance between titles and waivers
i
was about three to two. The experience of the Department of Defense
during the 17-year period ending in 1962 resulted in a ratio of titles
to licenses of about i to 3. At the end of 1962, DODhad been assigned
5,158 patented inventions and had licenses to an additional 16,925
patented inventions resulting from its contract research.
For employee inventions there are no policy issues. The inventors
are an unorganized and inarticulate group. Since 1950, government
agencies have been required by Executive Order to take titles to inven-
tions madeby their employees. The Presidential Memorandumof October
i0, 1963 does not mention inventions madeby government employees.
Occasionally, government employee inventors ask for titles to their
inventions. SomeNASAinventors have acquired ownership rights; a few
of their inventions have been commercialized.
INASAowned339 inventions from contractors. This number includes
patents issued and applications pending and in preparation. The
Inventions and Contributions Board had granted or recommendedgrant of
238 waivers.
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Action Under the Waiver Regulations
It would be inappropriate for us to make detailed commentaries
on the Patent Waiver Regulations of 1959, 1964, and 1966. Although
the petitioners and the Inventions and Contributions Board have to
observe them and proceed with due respect for their form, many of the
provisions in the regulations have not been operational, in the sense
that waivers are granted or denied because of these provisions. Hence
we shall ignore them and shall focus our attention on the policy
essentials.
Under the 1959 regulations the Inventions and Contributions Board
could recommend the grant of a petition if it found that the invention
was of only incidental utility to NASA, and that either the invention
had substantial promise of commercial utility or the contractor had
spent more of his own money than of NASA's on research leading to the
invention, or both The 1964 waiver r_ulaLiuu_ fulluw ............-- LLL_
guide lines of the Presidential Memorandum of 1963. In brief, a waiver
was granted if the petitioner could show that he would not acquire a
dominant position in a field of technology mainly developed and funded
by the government and that waiver of title was a necessary incentive
to induce him to spend money on the invention.
The 1964 regulations were more cumbersome in form and in substance;
they placed a much heavier burden of proof upon petitioners. The Board
does not accept naked allegations. It demands, and deliberates upon,
statements of specific facts. It is easy to see this in the Board's
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published decisions. The 1966 regulations seem to relax just a little
the rigor of the proofs the petitioner must submit.
Table 5--1 summarizes the actions of the Board to the end of 1965.
In our analysis of the waiver program we consider a petition granted
when the Administrator signs the document, rather than when the Board
recommends that he do so. Thus our percentage figure for grants under
the 1964 regulations might be too low; it is indeed based on small
numbers. In the Board's published decisions, 19 of 25 petitions, i.e.,
76 per cent, are recommended for grant.
Petitions for waivers on individual inventions
To December 31, 1965, 102 contractors had petitioned for waivers
on 313 inventions.3 There is a minor, and unimportant, discrepancy
between the numbers of petitions we counted from NASA's files and the
numbers of petitions reported by NASA in its April, 1966 Program Review
Document, Patent Program. In that report, the total number of petitions
on individual inventions is given as 326. As Table 3--7 shows, petitions
have been a sharply declining percentage of invention disclosures since
2NASA, Petitions for Patent Waiver. Findinss of Fact and Recom-
mendations of the NASA Inventions and Contributions Board. Washington,
D. C., 1966.
3After filing, 18 contractors withdrew 31 of their petitions. The
usual reason for withdrawal was that the invention lacked commercial
potential after superior substitutes were developed. Almost all of
these inventions were of little use to the government. NASA did not
file patent applications on most of these inventions and even abandoned
several patent applications. Under the waiver regulations of 1959, the
Inventions and Contributions Board granted 173 waivers to individual
inventions. Of these, contractors later requested NASA to void 13
waivers. These inventions too had lost their commercial potential and
contractors decided not to file patent applications.
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Table 5--1
Waiver Petitions Granted
to December31, 1965
Net Per Cent of Net
NASARegulation Petitions Petitions a Granted Petitions Granted
1959 regulations 220
1964 regulations 93
Blanket waivers (105) 76
Advance waivers (104) 151
Combinedblanket and 227
advancewaivers
192 173b 90.1
14 9b 64.3
ii 7c 63.6
136 30c 22.1
147 37c 25.2
apetitions minus those withdrawn and pending.
bBy the Administrator.
c!nCiudes those recon_nendedfor grant.
Source: ICB and AGPfiles, NASA.
ii0
1961. Petitions were 40 per cent of disclosures in 1961. In 1965,
contractors filed petitions on fewer than 5 per cent of their disclosures.
Table 5--2 shows that under the 1959 regulations the ICB granted
the majority of waivers (68 per cent) because of the inventions' commer-
cial potential. Twenty-seven inventions qualified under two or more
criteria. Only five per cent of the waivers were granted because the
inventions were conceived prior to and independently of work performed
under NASAcontracts. Contractors ownedpatents, or had filed patent
applications, before awards of contracts.
Wehave someinformation about the relative amounts spent by
contractors and by NASAfor 27 of the 38 inventions waived because they
had spent more of their own than of NASA'smoneyon research leading to
the inventions. These amounts were reported by contractors in their
petitions for waivers. The amounts reported spent by contractors in
the field of technology of the invention are many times the amounts
funded by NASA. SeeTable 5--3.
Reasons for denial
NASA denied 24 petitions for waivers to individual inventions on
or before December 31, 1964.4 All but five of these inventions were
denied under the 1959 regulations. NASA denied II petitions because
the inventions were primarily used for the operation of space vehicles
(Section 1245.104(a)). In addition to being inventions not generally
4We do not include petitions for waivers recommended for denial by
the ICB, nor do we include those inventions on which NASA granted waivers
for foreign rights.
iii
Table 5--2
Criteria for Granting Waivers under the
1959 Regulations
Applications
Criteria of Criteria Per Cent
Application filed before award 9 4.4
of NASAcontract (b-l)
Contract to nonprofit organization
not requiring delivery of models
or equipment (b-2)
Substantial promise of commercial
utility (b-3)
Contractor equity (b-4)
Foreign rights only (c)
Othera
Total _
12 6.0
138 68.3
38 18.8
4 2.0
1 .5
_ 1 tN/N /N
aparagraph (d) of section 1245.104 of Waiver Regulations. Invention out-
side the scope of paragraph (b); Administrator deemed that a waiver would be in
the interest of the United States.
bTotal number of individual waivers granted under the 1959 Regulations is
173. The applications of criteria are 202 because 25 inventions qualified under
2 criteria and 2 inventions qualified under 3 criteria. The total excludes one
blanket waiver and 2 class waivers.
Source: ICB files, NASA.
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Table 5--3
Amounts Spent by Contractors and by NASA
on Fields of Technology of Certain Waived Inventions
AmountsReported Spent
by Contractor in Field
of Technology of the
Invention
AmountsReported
Fundedby NASA Remarks
$289,300,000
ii0,000,000
6,300,000
4,500,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
2,549,000
2,430,000
2,100,000
1,800,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
$26,300,000
20,000
60,000
61,000
185,414
400,000
243,145
364,500
523,530
27,000
263,000
14,000
Approximate amount spent by
contractor since 1941.
Time period not given.
Amountspent by contractor
since 1947.
Amount spent by contractor
in i0 years. Contractor had
$25 million in sales during
preceding decade.
Amountspent by contractor
between 1952 and 1963.
Time period not given.
Amount spent by contractor
between 1957 and 1961.
Time period not given.
Time period not given.
Amount spent by contractor
since 1951.
Time period not given.
Time period not given.
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Table 5--3: Continued
AmountsReported Spent
by Contractor in Field
of Technology of the
Invention
AmountsReported
Fundedby NASA Remarks
$ 600,000 to
1,000,000
700,000
625,000
600,000
442,000
I.O
_6,000
400,000
400,000
363,000
$ ii, 000
80,000
57,000
95,000
ii,000
26,000
48,000
5,990
I
Amount spent by contractor
in last 20 years. Contrac-
tor provided extensive list
of patents
Time period not given.
Amount spent by contractor
in fiscal 1963. Contractor
has 4 patents in field.
Three inventions and 3 peti-
tions. Contractor in field
of technology since 1940s.
Contractor holds patents in
field.
Time period not given.
Time period not given.
Time period not given.
Two inventions and 2 peti-
tions. Timer period not
given. NASA funds for fea-
sibility study.
Time period not given. A
one dollar contract, but
contract made much govern-
ment information available.
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Table 5--3: Continued
AmountsReported Spent
by Contractor in Field
of Technology of the
Invention
AmountsReported
Funded by NASA Remarks
$ 350,000 $ 103,696
200,000 i00,000
103,000 28,000
Amountspent by contractor
in fiscal 1957-1960. Con-
tractor had sales of $2.5
million in fiscal 1961 and
$3.5 million in fiscal 1962.
Time period not given.
Time period not given.
Note: Contractors' namesand waiver case numbers are not given, to avoid
disclosing information that might be regarded as confidential.
Source: ICB files, NASA.
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eligible for waivers, the petitioners failed to show that these ii
inventions held substantial promise of co_aercial potential or that
the contractor's background R & D expenditures were large compared
with government funds. Petitions for waivers to inventions, not
essential to the space program, were denied because contractors
failed to show the inventions' commercial potential and also failed
to prove that substantial amounts of private R & D funds had been spent.
The other inventions denied under the 1959 regulations were madeby
non_eLv_- _g_n_z_eions.. under NASA contracts that called for the
delivery of models, equipment, or the development of practical
processes.
Five petitions were denied under the 1964 regulations. The
University of Arizona had four of these petitions. NASA denied the
four petitions because the University of Arizona failed to show how it
planned to get the inventions into commercial use. North American
Aviation filed the other petition. That company's contrail wa_ in the
field of technology of "soft-landing space vehicles."
The Inventions and Contributions Board published early in 1966
its reasons for recommending denial of four additional petitions for
waivers on inventions. Two petitions filed by Midwest Research
Institute were recommended for denial. In its petition Midwest Research
Institute said that it had an arrangement with Battelle Development
Corporation, but it failed to prove that it would submit the two inven-
tions to Battelle for evaluation. Avco Corporation was turned down
because it failed to show that risk capital had or would be spent for
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developing the invention and because it failed to showthat other
companies had patents. HughesAircraft Company'spetition was recom-
mendedfor denial for similar reasons. Manyof the petitions that ICB
rejected were poorly prepared. Somemerely restated NASA's criteria
for granting waivers, giving no specifics. None of the petitions denied
under the 1964 Regulations for individual inventions were denied because
the inventions were essential to the public health. Early in 1966
(after our cut-off date), however, the ICB recommended enial of one
of the four petitions for reconsideration madeby the University of
Arizona, because the invention relates to public health. The other
three were recommendedfor grant. Several contractors asked for recon-
sideration of their denied petitions. In most cases, reconsideration
resulted in favorable action by the Board, because the contractors
furnished the information lacking in their first petitions.
Fate of inventions in denied petitions
Seven contractors filed the 24 petitions denied by NASA by the
end of 1965. One contractor, North American Aviation, filed 12 of
them.
Patent counsel in NASA considered 13 of the inventions in the
denied petitions to be sufficiently valuable to warrant patent action.
Patent search for two of the inventions was adverse. One invention was
pending search and another was pending preparation of a patent appli-
cation at the end of 1965. NASA filed patent applications on nine of
the inventions. NASA has not granted any licenses to use these inven-
tions because there have been no requests.
117
Waivers as a Function of Disclosures, Contract Awards,
and Contract Size
The determinants of the number of waivers granted are numerous
and complex. A statistical analysis of the relationship between the
number of waivers granted (variable Y), total cumulative (1959-1965)
disclosures (XI) , cumulative (1959-April 1965) NASA prime contract
awards in millions of dollars (X2) , and contractor size in thousands
of employees (X3) has been somewhat fruitful. Constraints on data
limited this analysis to twenty-seven fairly large firms.
Utilizing the technique of multiple linear regression with the
number of waivers granted (Y) as the dependent variable and with XI,
X2, and X 3 as the independent variables results in the following
equation:
Y = 1.5148 + .0107.X 2 + .0022-X 2 -.0038.X 3
The coefficients describe the average effect on Y for a one unit change
in the independent variable being considered--holding the other
independent variables constant. That is, given the level of contract
awards and contractor size, one additional waiver is expected for about
one hundred additional disclosures by a contractor. Similarly, given
the level of total disclosures and contractor size, one additional
waiver is to be expected for about each additional $450 million in
cumulative contract awards.
The interrelation between cumulative disclosures and cumulative
contract awards is, as was shown in Chapter 3, highly significant
(r12 = .8088). In Chapter 3 we stated that it takes approximately
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four million dollars of cumulative contract awards to yield one
disclosure; the coefficient for X2 indicates that almost one half
billion dollars of additional cumulative contract awards are necessary
to yield one additional waiver.
The linear model fits the data for this group of contractors very
well. Fifty-eight per cent (Ry.123 = .7631) of the variation in the
numberof waivers granted can be explained by variations in the number
of disclosures, cumulative contract awards, and contractor size in
the equation. If no correlation exists betweenwaivers and these
variables, a value of R as high as 7631 could be expected toy.123
occur by chance less than one time in one hundred (according to a
test for the significance of the correlation coefficient using Student's
T-Test--t = 5.66 with 23 degrees of freedom).
Influence of size
The size coefficient is so small that it can be neglected. The
coefficient and its sign are not significant in the statistical sense;
that is, they could easily reflect chance variations. If size were a
definite determinant of the number of waivers granted to contractors we
could expect to find a significant relationship between Y and X 3. How-
ever, among this group of large firms, differences in size do not appear
to be an important characteristic in determining differences in waiver
holdings. The size variable contributes little to the explanation of
the variation in waivers, and when it is not included the variation
explained drops only 0.6 per cent.
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Class, Blanket, and AdvanceWaivers
Waivers granted at the time of contract are variously knownas
class, or blanket, or advance waivers. These terms are roughly inter-
changeable. Class waivers, however, were granted early in NASA's
activities, as the result of attention to special situations. The
recent tendency has been to refer to all waivers not covering indi-
vidual inventions as advance waivers.
The class waiver (W-140) granted under a cooperative agreement
with the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. in 1961 resulted in 24
"suggestions." Applications were filed on only two or three of these,
and only, we were told, for the sake of the i_ventors' egos. Otherwise,
the inventions have, we are told, no use to the Bell System, though they
might have to Comsat.
RCA's class waiver _-248) granted in April, 1964 resulted in two
invention disclosures by the end of 1965. Oneof these was found by RCA
to be less promising than had originally been believed. RCAchose not
to file a patent application and turned the invention over to NASA. On
the other invention, already in use in RCAlaboratories (though not yet
in commercial work), RCAdid file a patent application.
IBM's petition for a class waiver (W-133) was denied early in
1963. The Inventions and Contributions Board thought that since the
contract in question was a subcontract the petitioner ough_ to wait for
individual inventions and petition on them.
By the end of 1965 the Inventions and Contributions Board had
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received a total of 76 petitions for blanket waivers, most of the
petitions being made in 1965. Four were denied, four were withdrawn,
and only seven were granted. Still pending on December31, 1965 were
61 petitions for blanket waivers. However, the Inventions and Contri-
butions Board had recommendedaction on someof these. One or two of
the petitions were withdrawn because the contractors finished work
under their contracts, before any inventions appeared, and before the
Board could act.
In 1965 requests for over 200 advancewaivers were decided in
NASA's field centers. About half the requests were denied. The ratio
of denials to requests varied much from one field center to another.
Wehave the impression that a higher proportion of requests for advance
waivers are carelessly prepared than is true of petitions to the Board.
Of course, a good numberof the requests are prepared carefully
with full documentation. One of the largest electrical companies sent
in such a request. The Board reviewed and approved the favorable action
of the contracting officer. The companywas granted a blanket waiver
on all of the inventions coming from the work under the contract--which
was for $5,260.
Under the waiver regulations, universities and other nonprofit
organizations maynot be granted blanket or advance waivers. Even
though they might otherwise fully qualify, these organizations do not
meet the test of having "an established nongovernmental commercial
position." The fault here lies, not so muchwith the 1964 regulations,
as with the Presidential Memorandumfrom which the regulations were
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adapted.
So far as we can tell few inventions have been (to mid-1966)
reported by contractors who have received advance waivers. In mid-1966
headquarters had received invention disclosures from only one field
center.
The inventions came from three contractors. Other field centers
have received invention disclosures but have not had time to forward
reports to headquarters. Invention disclosure reports first go to
Technology Utilization offices. Marshall Space Flight Center, however,
has not received any inventions from contracts with advancewaiver
provisions.
Patent counsel at Goddard informed us that one contractor
reported i0 inventions. After patent search, the contractor filed
applications on two of the inventions. Langley has received about 18
disclosures, with contractors filing patent applications on about half
of the inventions. The Lewis Center has had ouc i_iv_ntion _o_i .... _
under patent application. Lewis also reports that there have been 6
invention disclosures madeunder a contract with a request pending for
advance waiver.
International Business Machines disclosed 6 inventions to the
MannedSpaceFlight Center. That companyindicated it had no intention
of filing patent applications on any of the 6 inventions. In addition,
MSFChas received 2 inventions, under patent applications, from Union
Carbide.
Union Carbide also disclosed an invention to JPL. The invention
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is covered by a patent application; it is under security restrictions.
In addition, JPL reports that work has been completed, with no inven-
tions, on another subcontract that incorporated the advance waiver
clause.
There is little doubt that time lags are responsible for the few
inventions reported by contractors holding advance waivers. There can
be delays in beginning work after a contract is executed. Then there
comesthe unpredictable lapse of time until an invention is made. After
that there is the period of time for the handling of the invention by
inventors' supervisors and by other menwho pass upon it. Whenthe
report of the disclosure finally gets into the stream of NASA's
information system more time elapses.
Contractors' Opinions of the 1964 Regulations
In Chapter 3 we discuss the effect on disclosures of the prevailing
image of NASA'spatent policies. Manycontractors think of NASAas a
title-policy agency with a tough waiver policy. It is not known or under-
stood that NASAdoes in fact grant most petitons for waiver.
As we have said, for individual inventions the 1964 regulations
are more onerous than those of 1959. The great difference is the
provision for advancewaivers in the 1964 regulations. Contractors_
accordingly, must weigh the disadvantage of the higher standards of
proof required in petitions for waivers on individual inventions against
the advantage of having the right to request advance waivers. But just
how the scales are tipped in contractors' minds we do not know for
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certain. This is an important matter because opinions of regulations
can influence the actions of contractors.
What we are sure of is that there is widespread misunderstanding
and ignorance of the waiver regulations. To this there are of course
exceptions. Still, it is to b_ rememberedthat nearly all of the
contractors we wrote to, or sent questionnaires to, or interviewed
were contractors with direct experience with the waiver regulations.
In the waiver questionnaire we asked contractors their opinions
of the effectiveness of the 1959 and the 1964 regulations in getting
inventions into the mainstream of commerce. Question 2, Part Vl of
our questionnaire was:
In your opinion, do NASA's new (1964) waiver regulations
do more or less than the old (1959) regulations to move
inventions into the stream of commerce?
Table 5--4 showsa slight preference for the 1964 regulations,
despite the fact that a somewhatsmaller percentage of petitions for
waivers h=v__been granned uuu=L..... LL_=_........_O_I°+_" The reason for the
preference must be the provision in the 1964 regulations for advance
waivers. A fourth of the contractors, all of whomhad been granted
waivers, do not know which set of regulations are superior. Webelieve
that this, along with the other kinds of replies shownin the table,
reflect misunderstanding and ignorance.
The following excerpts are typical of those madeby contractors
who prefer the new regulations.
A small research (for profit) firm responded:
Yes--Because the new regulations require the contractor
to establish his commercial position prior to the contract.
If the contractor wants commercial rights, he must pursue
them with a firm basis.
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Table 5--4
Opinions of NASAContractors
About the 1959 and the 1964
Waiver Regulations
Numberof Per Cent of
Reply to Question Contractors Contractors
Prefer 1964 regulations
Prefer 1959 regulations
Indifferent or no opinion
Neither regulation satisfactory
Do not knowa
Total responding to question
19 32.2
9 15.2
13 22.i
3 5.1
15 25.4
59 I00.0
alncludes 4 contractors who said "no comment."
Source: Waiver questionnaires.
m
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A medium-sized firm replied:
More. Simply because it is easier to obtain a waiver
and obtaining title is some inducement to develop an
invention.
A large aircraft company said:
More; by virtue of provision for waiver at time of
contract. Although the new provisions concerning
waiver after reporting of inventions may be some
improvement by reason of incorporation of the
President's Patent Policy of 1963, there remain
the old problems of satisfying NASA concerning
petition content and waiver voidability backfire
effect.
A large electronics company replied:
The 1964 NASA regulations are a step forward in that
the contractor can now know prior to accepting a
contract whether he will be able to retain title to
inventions. This aids the contractor in protecting
his proprietary interests, and benefits the govern-
ment in that the contractor is more likely to seek
contracts in areas in which he has know-how gained
from his own research and manufacturing experience.
Since contractors will be more likely to do govern-
ment research in the areas they know best s the flow
of inventions into the stream of commerce should be
One large contractor displayed the quality of his understanding
of the regulations in his reply:
Yes. The regulations and criteria are now simpler.
Non-use is no longer grounds for termination of
waiver. It is not seen, however, that such factors
will increase the requests for waiver.
One university replied simply, "Old regulations easier for
universities."
A spokesman for another university said,
From the University's standpoint they (the new)
do less since the universities do not have an
established commercial position as such.
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Contractors were also unhappy about the lack of uniformity among
field centers in interpreting criteria for advance waivers and also in
granting them. To someextent, this was corrected in May, 1966 when
NASAtook the responsibility for granting advancewaivers away from
contracting officers and placed that responsibility with the Inventions
and Contributions Board.
A large chemical firm replied,
Experience with the new NASAwaiver regulations is that
the contracting officer will not makea decision on the
blanket waiver so we prefer to request waivers as the
inventions are made. Thus for our corporation, the
regulations are substantially the same.
Problems of Administration
Like other quasi-judicial bodies, the Inventions and Contributions
Board is faced with administrative problems. We confine ourselves to
four following problems of administration: (i) defining "field of
technology;" (2) handling the nonprofit organizations; (3) speeding
the time required for acting on petitions; and (4) coordinating with the
Office of Technology Utilization.
Field of technology
Perhaps the most difficult task in interpreting and applying the
regulations of 1964 is given by the phrase "field of technology." The
Patent Waiver Regulations follow verbatim the language of the Presidential
Memorandum of 1963. Our comments here apply, then, both to the regula
tions and to the memorandum.
Obviously there can be no single and everlastingly correct
127
definition of field of technology. Definitions depend on purposes of
investigation or decision. Becauseof this, no help can be found in
established and well tested classifications or systems of definitions,
such as the classification of patents by the Patent Office, or the
classification of industries by the Bureau of the Census, or the
classification of fields of science by the National Science Foundation.
How to classify things is a problem sometimes solved by time;
those concerned come in the end to satisfactory agreement as to what
belongs into which group--or field. Such a solution is however unlikely
to occur for technology, in view of its ever-changing nature and the
rapid rate of obsolescence of so many of its parts. Besides that,
solution does not come when opposing interests try to frame definitions
of the same thing. Examples are "fair return" in the regulation of
public utilities and the "relevant market" in the prosecution of the
antitrust laws. Although a "good" definition of fair return or of
relevant mmrket _ght be worth millions of dollars to a business firm,
we find it hard to imagine that much money could be at stake in a defi-
nition of field of technology.
Clearly, science or technology can be divided into any number of
fields. If they are few, each field is then broad, with the result that
waivers would nearly always go to contractors. With many narrowly
defined fields, contractors would often find it difficult to qualify to
receive waivers.
It seems to be generally agreed that atomic energy is an example
of the kind of field where the test of government funding together with
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the possibility of dominancewould keep title out of the hands o_
private contractors. It is only slightly irrelevant for us to draw
attention to the fact that the long-standing and firmly administered
policy of government acquisition of all inventions having to do with
atomic energy did not prevent domination of the business of producing
large-scale nuclear reactors by two companies, which in 1966 had only
modest potential competition. Here again, it ought to be obvious that
patents are less important than they are usually madeout to be. The
success of two companies in getting orders for nearly all of the reactors
for large electric power plants seemsto be due scarcely at all, or for
all we knownot at all, to patents but rather to background, know-how,
and to copious amounts of private R & D.
However that may be, there is now no agreed-upon list of fields
of science or technology meeting the criteria of government funding plus
possible dominance. The Federal Council for Science and Technology in
its Annual Report on Government Patent Policy (June, 1965, p. 19) has
recommended that agencies identify the fields meeting the criteria. If
NASA would follow this suggestion, draw up and publish a list of these
fields, there would be costs and benefits. The costs would be the
trouble and the manpower of making the list. The benefits would accrue
to NASA field patent counsel, to headquarters patent counsel, and above
all to the Inventions and Contributions Board. The benefits should much
exceed the costs.
Still, the concept of "preferred or dominant position" remains
quite vague. In its 1965 interpretive statement on the Presidential
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Memorandum,the Federal Council for Science and Technology uses the
expressions "dominant position" and'_osition of patent dominance.''5
Dominant position in a "field" suggests the idea of "too large" a share
of a market and holding smaller competitors in somekind of thrall.
Patent dominanceis, or easily could be, something quite different, or
for that matter, several different things. It could meandominating a
small market, with one or several patents; or it could meandominating
several closely related markets, with dozens of patents; or perhaps it
could meanthe sheer sizes of patent portfolios.
Anyway, in following the directive of the Presidential Memorandum,
NASAhas a difficult task. The Inventions and Contributions Board must
decide whether exclusive rights to inventions would give contractors
dominant positions in fields funded by the government. The Board cannot
and should not proceed with the samedeliberation employed by the anti-
trust agencies when they face the problem of what are relevant markets.
Weventure the opinion that the Inventions and Contributions Board
has been too narrow, too literal, and not always consistent, in its
interpretation of field of technology. The lack of parallel definition
of field of technology arises in part because the Board starts from
definitions supplied by contractors in their petitions for waivers. This
speeds up the decision process a little. NASA'spublished waiver cases
show that the ICB acted on six petitions for waivers in the field of
51bid., p. 18.
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computer technology. This field of technology was defined in five
different ways--somebroad and somenarrow. The definitions included:
data processing, special-purpose digital computers, special-purpose
guidance computers, plated wire or thin memorydevices, and fluidics.
The universities and nonprofit organizations
In some ways the universities and nonprofit research organizations
are the second-class citizens in the community of research and patents.
This is not because the nonprofits are unimportant in federal R & D
programs. On the contrary, their role has been increasing and it is
not small. In the fiscal year 1965 alone, NASA had contracts with 197
universities and 74 other nonprofit organizations. By the end of 1965
NASA had received invention disclosures from 43 of these institutions.
California Institute of Technology heads the list of contractors with
the most "quality disclosures" (see Chapter 3). Waivers on 25 inventions
had been granted to 8 universities and nonprofit organizations by the end
of 1965.
Part of the problem of the position of the universities in NASA's
waivers program lies with attitudes both within and without the university
community. To discuss them is outside the scope of this inquiry. We
can however mention a few things. In their corporate capacities a few
universities will have nothing to do with patents. Two of NASA's waivers
6
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Petitions for
Patent Waiver a Findings of Fact and Recommendations of the NASA Inventions
and Contributions Board, (NHB 5500.1) Washington, D.C., 1966. The Waiver
cases are W-423, W-373, BW-322, W-366, W-367, and W-368.
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came from research conducted at Brown and Harvard Universities. In
both cases the petitioners were the professors, acting as individuals.
In general, however, the universities do have patent policies, practices,
7
and procedures. Manyof them use as agents Research Corporation,
Battelle DevelopmentCorporation and others. A few large universities
handle their own patent activities.
The nonprofit organizations are generally new. Theirs tends to
be a hand-to-mouth existence, with a preoccupation about keeping the
contracts coming in. Patents are less important than the flow of new
contracts. For years, one nonprofit organization waived patent rights
on all contracts so as to be sure to keep getting them; to its later
chagrin, this organization saw one of its inventions, from work sponsored
by a large business firm, become patented by that firm; the results of
this invention are seen by millions of people every day. The same non-
profit organization now however has an active patent program. Other
such organizations try to find licensees who will award contracts to
the organization for the further development of the licensed inventions.
The Presidential Memorandum of 1963 puts the universities and
nonprofits in another difficulty. That document does not once mention
them as contractors. Section 4 on definitions does, it is true, say
that the word contractor means, besides the obvious, "public corporation,"
and "institution" and "other entity." But in the critical Section i on
7Archie M. Palmer, University Research and Patent Policies,
Practices and Procedures, Publication 999, (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Science--National Research Council, 1962).
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basic policy, the Memorandumseemssimply to have forgotten about any
contractors except those with commercial positions and commercial inter-
ests. The best that the universities and nonprofits can hope for is to
comewithin "exceptional circumstances" under Section l(a) or "special
situations" under Section l(c).
NASA'swaiver regulations of 1964 (and of 1966) follow the
Presidential Memorandum.Thus, a business firm may qualify for an
advance waiver, but a university may not. The university does not have
"an established nongovernmental commercial position." In petitioning
for a waiver on an individual invention, the university has to go to
more trouble in proving that waiver of title is a "necessary incentive
to bring the invention to the point of practical application..." The
university has to showwhat its licensees have done or would do, or
what its patent agent's experience and probable future activities are.
The time required to act on petitions
From the records of the Inventions and Contributions Board we
have dates for 192 petitions. The dates are the dates of petition and
of action (grant or denial) by the Administrator of NASA. In analyzing
the time required for action, we omit the petitions withdrawn, those
still pending, and those recommended by the Board for grant or denial on
December 31, 1965. For 24 petitions granted or denied, one or both of
the dates are not readily available from the records.
The average time in the period 1959-1965 was 10.8 months. The
median was i0 months, i.e., half took less than i0 months and half took
more.
!i
I
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The standard deviation was 5 months, i.e., about two-thirds of
the petitions were acted on and decided (by the Administrator) within
a period of 5 to 15 months.
The range was 2 to 31 months. Only 21 petitions were acted on in
6 months or less. Seven took 2 years or more. Fifteen took 18 months
or more.
Here is a summary:
-- ii per cent took 6 months or less;
-- 72 per cent took 12 months or less;
-- 81 per cent took 18 months or less; and
-- 97 per cent took 24 months or less.
TUP versus waiver policy
NASA created its office of Technology Utilization to insure wide
dissemination of information about the new technology resulting from its
research and development. Tecnnoiogy D_iiization officers evaiua=e and
screen invention disclosures made by government employees and by employees
of NASA contractors. The Office of Technology Utilization publishes,
usually as Tech Briefs, descriptions of inventions and innovations be-
lieved to be valuable to business firms and other organizations.
NASA's technology utilization policy and its waiver policy seek
to accomplish the same end by different means. The goal of both, of
course, is the fastest and widest possible use of new technology. The
different means to this end reflect a century-old and continuing contro-
versy over the value and the effectiveness of the patent system. Which
is better in advancing technology? Free availability or temporary
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exclusivity? If both meansare to be employed, what is the domain for
each?
The Office of Technology Utilization publishes Tech Briefs on some
of the inventions covered by pending and granted petitions for waivers.
That Office reports that it reviewed 204 inventions under petitions for
waivers filed between October 29, 1959 and December31, 1964 and decided
to publish 72 of them. Our understanding of the matter is that Technology
Utilization published these cases in the belief that the waiver process
creates delays in getting inventions into the mainstream of commerce.
Several of NASA's contractors have complained strongly about TUP's actions,
contending that they are contrary to the intent of the waiver policy.
The publication policy can also makecontractors hesitate in de-
ciding to file petitions for waiver on individual inventions. Publica-
tion of an invention creates a statutory bar; patent applications must
be filed within one year of publication. By the end of December, 1965,
petitions for waivers had been pending an average of nearly ii months.
Contractors usually file patent applications on inventions under petitions
for waivers only after favorable action by the Inventions and Contributions
Board. Onecontractor said that his companybegan to file a petition
for waiver on an invention that seemedto have strong commercial potential.
To the contractor, "it did not makesense" to file the petition after
NASAdescribed the invention in a Tech Brief. This contractor was dis-
turbed becauseNASAdid not file a patent application on the invention.
He said that more of the instances will arise if the waiver procedure
becomesslower and the publication program more rapid.
II
l
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When Tech Briefs describe already patented inventions the effect
can be quite different from that of publication of inventionsunder
patent applications. This is true particularly when waiver holders have
licensing agreements. The patent application does not give the filing
party the right to exclude. Of course, assignees can file infringement
suits against unlicensed users after patent issue. Several contractors
complained that Tech Briefs hurt licensing arrangements that were in
process on inventions under patent applications. One contractor said
that he believes that, because of a Tech Brief, one of his inventions
will not be used by firms that otherwise might have been licensees.
The reaction of one NASA contractor to publication of waivedin-
ventions in Tech Briefs was, however, favorable. The contractor, a
small nonprofit research organization, welcomed the "free publicity."
Publication of Tech Briefs and granting waivers do not always
conflict as means of putting NASA's new technology into use. Not all
of NASA's inventions are patentable _ud _ot =_-11_^_ _.v_ ........_h=_ _p
patentable have commercial applications. But the policies do conflict
for some inventions. When NASA grants waivers to its inventions, NASA
relinquishes ownership rights, with certain stipulations. NASA con-
tractors can, and some have, reacted adversely because of the publica-
tion of the technology covered under their granted waivers. NASA should
request, and get, permission if it wants to publish inventions under
granted and pending petitions for waivers.
Also, if NASA does get permission to publish these inventions in
Tech Briefs, NASA should make certain that the individuals using the
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Tech Briefs know that the inventions are not freely available and that
arrangements for use of the inventions will have to be madewith the
waiver holders.
WhySo Few Petitions for Waiver?
To the end of 1965, only 121 of NASA's contractors had petitioned
for waivers. This number must be aligned with the number of contractors
reporting invention disclosures rather than with the total of many
thousands of contractors. About 40 per cent of the contractors with
disclosures to NASA made 389 petitions. Of these, 75 were petitions to
the Inventions and Contributions Board for class or blanket waivers.
Thus, 40 per cent of the disclosing contractors petitioned for waivers
on about 6 per cent of the inventions they reported.
We have already mentioned the fact that the number of requests
for advance waivers under the 1964 waiver regulations has also been
small. Only a little more than 2 per cent of the contracts executed
from October 1964 to the end of December 1965 were accompanied by requests
for advance waivers.
Patent counsel at NASA's leading centers have given us a little
more information on the ratios of requests for advance waivers to the
numbers of contracts executed. The ratio in 1965 varied from about one
per cent to about 8 per cent. At the center with the 8 per cent ratio,
however, all requests (from August 1964 to December 1965) were denied,
because they were poorly or inadequately prepared.
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Part Vl of our Waiver Questionnaire contained this question:
"It seemsthat NASA's contractors have maderelatively few petitions
for waiver. What could be the cause(s)?"
We had already been told that NASAofficials themselves are a
little puzzled by the sluggish response of industry to the waiver policy.
For this reason and after a look at NASA's own patent statistics we
decided to put the question into the waiver questionnaire. After we had
sent the questionnaire out, we learned that the patent department of one
of the largest companies had been wondering why its R & D activities for
NASAhad been generating few petitions for waiver. An internal memo-
randum in March 1966 from patent headquarters to the field patent attor-
neys contains this sentence: "The numberof Companyrequests for waiver
is lower than might be expected from NASA's --th largest contractor."
The replies to our question, the remarks madeto us during inter-
views_ together with reflection on our other findings lead to the heart
of _ ..... I .... _.... ,_ ,Jhy _n f_w n_titions have come in. Most in-
ventions from NASA contract research have no commercial potential, or
forseeable "civilian" application.
In reply to the question about the fewness of petitions, only a
minority (31 per cent) of the respondents said flatly that NASA inventions
generally do not have commercial prospects. Those who put it this way,
without any further explanation, often added that NASA inventions are
space oriented, or in esoteric fields, or are highly specialized, or
flatteringly, many years ahead of the times.
An additional 39 per cent of the respondents, however, expressed
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themselves somewhat differently. But when their replies are carefully
considered the answers amount to the same thing, i.e., lack of commercial
potential. The majority's typical answer, expanded a little and para-
phrased freely was this: "There have been few petitions because of the
red tape, the complicated procedure, the inordinate delay, the time and
effort, and the great expense of developing these inventions."
People will go to a lot of trouble and effort if they expect
large rewards. So too, we think, a patent attorney would devote much
time and effort to a petition for waiver if he thought his company would
thus acquire a really valuable invention. People will also wait, if they
have to, for a reward with expected value larger than the cost of waiting.
6o too with the patent department of a NASA contractor. To this last
statement there are, however, some qualifications. A few contractors
said that in today's technology, time is of the essence. If an invention
cannot be moved through its stages of development quickly, it might as
well be abandoned. The delay on the waiver cannot be brooked. A patent
attorney for one of the largest electronics firms said that his company
considers it unsound to petition for waiver on an individual invention
because "you don't know the terms." That is, the delay of perhaps a
year accompanies the uncertainty that the waiver will be granted at all.
There is, he continued, no pressure on ICB "to give the invention back."
His company prefers to request advance waivers from field centers.
There, the attorney said, NASA's technical people want jobs to be done
and will put pressure on the contracting officers to grant the advance
waivers.
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Even though many of the contractors' complaints about the waiver
regulations should be discounted, some of them heavily, we do think that
the reactions of contractors to the regulations are, other things being
equal, a minor cause of the fewness of petitions. Contractors react to
the image they see. Believing as many do that NASA interprets the
Presidential Memorandum of 1963 far more rigidly than was intended, that
NASA grants few waivers, that NASA is unreasonable in insisting on proof
of commercial position, some contractors do not prepare the petitions
that they could.
Ignorance and misunderstanding of the waiver regulations seem to
have stifled a few petitions. We have heard that small contractors who
must rely on outside legal advice have on occasion been told not to
bother with waivers. Attorneys for a large nonprofit contractor expressed
the opinion that the waiver regulations are hard to understand and that
the whole procedure seems to be too much trouble• One of the smaller
nonprofit contractors found that one of its petitions cost more than
twice as much as a patent application.
But not all contractors holding waivers complain and object. More
than a few say that they are well satisfied with the operation of the
waiver policy. Some find government paper work a normal fact of life•
Others are pleased with the cooperation they have had from NASA patent
personnel. One company with a waived invention already commercially
successful has nothing but praise for the waiver policy.
There could have been still fewer petitions were it not that
several were filed with the Board more for the experience than for any-
thing else. Attorneys for several large contractors told us that they
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filed their first petitions to see how the Board operates, to learn its
procedures, in short, to acquire the know-how for successful petitions.
The contractors replying to our Waiver Questionnaires gave still
other explanations for the small number of petitions for waiver.
Remember that they were asked not so much to say why their own petitions
were few in number but rather to give us opinions about waiver petitions
in general. It is ironic that attorneys for two small contractors said
that they think that large contractors are wary of waivers for "political"
reasons. That is, large contractors might find themselves in positions
where they would have to make public justifications of their actions in
seeking and holding waivers. Whether this is so we do not know, because
we are not privy to the inner decisions of the very large corporations.
Two of these whose names are household words do say of themselves that
they are highly selective in picking inventions for petition. For all
we know their selections committees keep their eyes on the weathervanes
of politics.
A waiver of title conveys of course only limited patent rights to
the contractor. Besides the usual license to the government the waiver
is subject to other reservations--the ominous "March-in Rights" of NASA.
Naturally, contractors do not like these other reservations. Some of
them make their dislike a cause for not petitioning more often.
In addition to the replies to our questionnaire, we obtained other
information that helps to explain why there are relatively few petitions.
Several of NASA's large contractors, each with more than a few invention
disclosures, had not petitioned at all by the end of 1965. Three of
these are aerospace companies.
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Wewrote to a selected group of the nonpetitioners, asking them
why. Wehad just a few replies. They are consistent with those
appearing in the completed Waiver Questionnaires. Oncemore, the main
theme sounds--the inventions from NASAcontracts have little or no
commercial potential. In its letter to us one of the companies said
that, "If an invention appears which appeals to us as being of the
type which we could satisfactorily exploit either through manufacturing
and marketing as a commercial product or to license out to others for
such exploitation, we would not hesitate to request a waiver." Another
companyexplained its not having petitioned by pointing to three sets
of causes. Onehas to do with the reporting of "new technology." In
meeting its obligations to NASA,said this company, it had been sub-
mitting nonpatentable inventions. Apparently, then, this companyfound
few inventions worth even a thought of possible petition. Of these
inventions, the letter went on to say, still fewer lie within the
commercial positions ef the company The candidates for _etition
surviving these two screens could not pass through the third: the
"...further extensive proof of position required by NASAwhen considering
a waiver request, the uncertainty of obtaining it, the cost of patent
prosecution, the continual administrative reporting to NASArequired if
a waiver is obtained, the uncertainty of retention of ownership of patent
rights and the mandatory licensing obligations..." Small wonder, then,
that this companyhas found "...no invention to date...to offer a
potentially sufficient economic remuneration to warrant the request of
a waiver."
142
Willingness to Bid for NASAContracts
In the late 1950s and in the early 1960s there was public discussion
of the question of the effects of government patent policies on contractors'
willingness to bid on R & D contracts with federal agencies. Weknow how
sensitive this question is and how difficult it would be to answer it
satisfactorily. Here too are motives, as well as real reasons and osten-
sible reasons for doing something or not doing it.
Our waiver questionnaire included this question:
"Has your companyever declined to bid on someother NASAcontract
because of NASA'spatent policies?"
Wehad replies to this question from 61 of the 67 contractors who
returned questionnaires. Of the 61, 47 said "no." This is about three-
quarters of them. The 14 respondents who said "yes" are, it should not
be forgotten, already contractors for NASA. The "yes" replies, then,
signify only that at one time or another the companies had not bid on
NASAcontracts and that patent policy was the reason. With the
resources available to us, we could not, nor did we try, to find out if
there are any highly qualified companies which never bid on NASAwork,
solely becauseof NASA's patent policies.
To someof the "no" answers additional remarks were added. A few
of these are worth repeating:
With the present waiver policy our fields of cormnercial
interest are adequately taken care of ( a large electric
company).
...but conditional bids have been submitted based on the
granting of a waiver. Advance waiver provision alleviates
this problem (an aerospace companywith more than a small
commercial position).
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...but NASA's policy is a strong incentive to develop a
product without NASA's support (a small company).
Our business is 90 per cent government. We can't afford
the luxury of not bidding (a medium-sized research and
engineering firm).
Where the answer was "yes," i.e., the companyhad indeed ever
declined to bid, the usual reasons was that such companies do not want
to jeopardize commercial patent positions. Three small firms gave such
answers. So did two aerospace companies. One of these, however, told
another group of researchers in 1965 that the companyhad spent about
$75 million of its own moneyduring a three-year period on projects
aimed solely at enabling the companyto bid on defense and space contracts.
A number of companies, including one of the largest_ told us in
interviews that N_'s patent policies affect the timing of research.
These companies say they postpone, rather than refuse, work under contract
with NASA. They have their scientists and engineers do enough research
before accepting a NASAdevelopment contract, so as to make sure that
all important inventions would be reduced to practice.
During interviews with patent counsel in someof NASA'sleading
centers we learned of corporations that will not undertake any R & D at
all for government unless they acquire patent rights. Oneattorney told
us of a large chemical companythat would not do research for NASA.
Another rememberedfour or five isolated cases of ostensible refusals
to bid without assurance of advancewaivers.
All in all, we have the distinct impression that NASA's patent
policies--the image rather than the reality--can have had only the slightest
adverse effect on the procurement of research and development.
144
A companion question to that of possible refusals to bid is the
effect of patent policies on the quality of research and development.
We are obviously not able to judge the quality of the R & D done for
NASA. And to establish a relation between the quality and patent
policies boggles our imaginations. Wehave, however, noticed the list
of "one hundred most significant products" published each Decembersince
1963 by the journal Industrial Research. A distinguished committee
selects the i00 products from among thousands; criteria are uniqueness,
usefulness, and importance. For the three years, 1963, 1964 and 1965,
the companies with the largest number of significant new products were
leading NASA contractors. Companies with 5 or more significant new
products, in descending order, are: General Electric, Westinghouse,
RCA, GT & E, Honeywell, Perkin Elmer, Beckman Instruments, AT & T,
Control Data, IBM, and Varian Associates.
Findings
i. Judged by any relevant standard--numbers of contracts, of
contractors, of disclosures--NASA has received few petitions for waiver
and few requests for advance waivers.
2. NASA is slow in acting on petitions. The average time from
petition to grant or denial is about i0 months.
3. The Inventions and Contributions Board has been liberal in
granting waivers. Under the 1959 Regulations, 9 of i0 petitions were
granted. Under the more stringent 1964 Regulations, nearly 7 of I0
petitions were granted.
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4. The universities and nonprofit organization are at a dis-
advantage under the 1964 Regulations and appear to be under the 1966
Regulations.
5. The Inventions and Contributions Board has been defining
"field of technology" narrowly, thus increasing the burden of proof
upon contractors.
6. Publication of inventions in the TUPprogram conflicts with
the purpose of the waiver program.
7. Amongcontractors there prevails widespread, though not
universal, misunderstanding and ignorance of NASA'swaiver program and
the regulations.
8. Petitions have been few because of the low commercial
potential of the inventions from NASA-financed research, and because of
the misunderstanding of the waiver program.
9. There seemsto be only the slightest adverse effect of NASA's
patent policies on its procurement of R & D.
Chapter 6
Results under the Waiver Policy
The National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration had granted
waivers on 182 individual inventions by December31, 1965. Because it
is relatively new the results of the waiver policy cannot be finally
appraised and evaluated once and for all. The number of waivers is so
small that one problem of policy--the impact of waivers on the concen-
tration of economic power--will have to be handled by pretending that
the number is large enough so that the direction of the impact can be
seen. On the other hand, the number is not so small as to give mis-
leading results for another issue of policy--utilization of the inven-
tions.
The Waiver Questionnaire
Our sources of information on the waived inventions are the
files of the Inventions and Contributions Board, the responses to the
questionnaire we sent in January, 1966, to all organizations and persons
holding waivers at the end of 1965, interviews with patent attorneys of
34 leading NASAcontractors, and discussions with patent attorneys in
NASAheadquarters and in its leading centers.
Like the licensee questionnaire, the responses to the waiver
questionnaire make it an almost unqualified success. The rate of
response was muchhigher than is usual for a questionnaire of this kind.
Questionnaires on 149 of 154 waivers, held by 56 of 60 business firms,
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were returned. All of the 8 universities and nonprofit organizations
gave us replies for their 25 inventions. Three of the 5 persons replied.
The four business firms that did not reply by July 15, 1965,
include one aerospace companywhose outright refusal we had almost
expected. One of the patent attorneys in the samecompanywas however
kind enough to grant an interview. Another missing questionnaire will
probably reach us after this report will have been submitted. In
general, the questionnaires were carefully and conscientiously filled
out. Most of the replies were internally consistent. One of the
computer companies, however, gave us no more information about its
several waived inventions than that they are available for licensing.
This, said the company, meansthat the inventions "are in commercial
use." Wedisagree.
Utilization of the Waived Inventions
Commercial use
The rate of commercial use of the waived inventions is in line
with the expected rate we described in Chapter 2. The rule that one
half of one per cent of inventions are commercially used applies also
to NASA. With 4,700 contractor disclosures, the rule gives 23 inven-
tions in commercial use. The replies to the waiver questionnaire show
I
that 21 of the inventions are in the stream of commerce. This is
IBecause the 4,700 disclosures probably include several hundred
merely reportable items, the rate of use of the waived inventions might
be well above one half of one per cent of the disclosures that are
true inventions.
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11.5 per cent of the total of waivers granted as of the end of 1965.
Table 6--1 shows the distribution of the waived inventions held
by business firms and nonprofit organizations. Two inventions, both
in commercial use, held by individuals are not included in the table.
Hence the total of 21. One of the waivers held by an individual is
on an invention which, according to him, is being manufactured by a
companythat seemsto have learned of the invention from a NASA
Technical Report. In correspondence with us, the inventor gave the
distinct impression that he believes he has been deprived of what is
rightfully his. If this is so, his experience is another possible
example of the clash between the waiver policy and the policy of
publication. Wetouched upon this matter in the preceding chapter.
In the count of 21 inventions in actual commercial use, GCA
Corporation's gauge counts as one invention, although NASArecords
show two waiver case numbers. Wedo this because GCAhas informed us
that the earlier invention (W-_09) has been superseded. We list
MeDonneil's tools as four ir_entions. In its Patent Program (pp. 21 ff),
NASA gives eight "case histories of waivers." They cover 13 waiver
case numbers. One of the eight waived inventions in the case histories
does not meet our definition of commercial use: No sales had yet been
made of the dry tape battery being developed and promoted by Monsanto
Research Corporation.
Table 6--2 lists the contractors with inventions in commercial
use. Remember that one is "being manufactured" by a firm that has had
no negotiations, so far as we know, with the inventor who holds the
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Table 6--1
Commercial Use and Potential of Waived
Inventions by Groups of Contractors
end of 1965
Use
Waived Inventions Held By
Aerospace Other Large Other Universities
Companies Companies Companies and Nonprofit Total
Commercially used 8 i 9 i 19
Commercially available 0 0 i 0 i
High potential 4 5 5 2 16
Moderate potential 3 8 7 5 23
Low potential 25 26 16 13 80
No potential 8 i I0 3 22
Other 6 2 4 I 13
Total 54 43 52 25 174
Note: This table accounts for 174 of 179 waived inventions held by business
firms and nonprofit organizations. Waivers held by 2 individuals are excluded
from this table. "Other large companies" are in The Fortune Directory for 1965.
"Other companies" are not in this Directory. "Other" use includes inventions
under secrecy orders or abandoned or withdrawn or not allowed.
Source: Replies to Waiver Questionnaire.
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Table 6--2
Waived Inventions in Commercial Use
end of 1965
Contractor
Aerojet-General Corp.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
Ball Brothers Research Corp.
Bell Aerosystems Co.
California Institute of Technology
DeBell & Richardson
DeBell & Richardson
Douglas Aircraft Co.
GCACorporation
Gulton Industries, Inc.
Harvard University (Professor Ingrano)
JamesE. Lovelock
Foreign rights
McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
McDomiell Aircraft Corp.
Peninsular ChemResearch,Inc.
Invention
Attitude control system
for sounding rockets
Moisture removal system
for fuel cell
Temperature monitor
Catalyst bed
Seismometer
Hollow filament form_ for
winding composite structures
Solid filament forms for
winding composite structures
Drill (bit)
High vacuum cold cathode
ionization gauge
Dampedacce!erometer
Ferroelectric bolometer
Cross-section detector
for gas chromatography
Tube cleaning tool
Tube cut-off tool
Tube-end deburring tool
Brazed fluid system
Process for synthesis
(of i, 2-diflouroethylene)
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Table 6--2: Continued
Contractor
United Aircraft Corp.
Varian Associates
Varian Associates
Varian Associates
Engineering Physics Co.a
Invention
Heat transfer garment
(cooling or heating)
Electrodeless discharge lamp
Electrodeless discharge lamp
apparatus
Optical magnetometer
Magnetic flowmeter apparatusa
aCommercially available.
Source: Responses to Waiver Questionnaire.
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waiver.
Weshall have more to report later on these inventions, on
development effort, on income from them, and on markets. In the mean-
time we shall pursue the subject of utilization.
Commercial potential
Since it often takes time to develop an invention for the market
place and since NASA's waiver program is relatively new, we sought
through our questionnaire to elicit information about waived inventions
with commercial potential. We have had to rely on contractors' opin-
ions, which probably tend on such a matter to be optimistic. In
Chapter 4 we give our definitions of high, moderate, and low commercial
potential.
The last column of Table 6--1 gives the distribution of the waived
inventions according to the degree of their commercial potential.
Table 6--3 has a list of waived inventions with high commercial potential.
Table 6--4 shows the expected kinds of future commercial use.
Benefits even without commercial potential
Many of the waived inventions had some glimmering of commercial
potential at the time of petition. But later they lost it. Table 6--5
shows why.
NASA's waiver program can confer benefits even if the initial
promise of commercial potential vanishes. Duke University told us that
a waiver granted on an invention, which now has no commercial use that
can be foreseen, was instrumental in helping a new company get started
in Durham, North Carolina. The co-inventor, a former graduate student
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Table 6--3
Waived Inventions with High Commercial Potential
end of 1965
Contractor
Aerospace ResearchAssociation
California Institute of Technology
California Institute of Technology
Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.
Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc.
General DynamicsCorp.
General Electric Co.
Monsanto Co.
North American Aviation, Inc.
North American Aviation, Inc.
G. T. Schjeldahl Co.
Shell Development Co.
Sperry RandCorp.
United Aircraft Corp.
United Aircraft Corp.
EIMAC,Division of Varian Associates
Invention
Energy absorbing device
Portable planetarium
Accelerometer
Film reader
Developer-Processor
Distributed constant pulse
line
Nonlinear circuit
Preparation method for
crystal electronic material
Three axis optical alignment
unit
LOX"Safe" penetrant
Adhesive removal process
Hydrazine decomposition
Recording apparatus
Space suit water boiler and
control
Thermal garment
Ceramic-to-Metal seal
155
Table 6--4
Kinds of Expected Future Commercial Use of
Waived Inventions
Expected Use a
Inventions
with Replies
Inventions
with "Yes" Per Cent
Replies with '"fes"
In own manufacturing
In own research
Sold as a new product
Sold as a component of
own product
Sold as a component of
other company's product
Sold as a part of service
91 42 46.2
71 46 64.8
84 34 40.5
77 40 51.9
72 27 37.5
65 10 15.4
aSome i_entions are expected to have more than one kind of
future use.
Source: Replies to Waiver Questionnaire, Part IV, Questions 4 and 5.
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Table 6--5
Reasons for Lack of Commercial Potential
of Thirty-seven Waived Inventions
I
l
l
Reasons Given by Contractors Number Per Cent
Development cost too high
Development showed flaws
Invention already obsolete
Superior substitutes available
Expected market failed to materialize
Technology too sophisticated
Too few claims allowed by Patent Office
Other
Total
9 15.4
3 5.2
7 12. i
i0 17.2
9 15.5
8 13.8
4 6.9
8 13.8
58 i00.0
Note: Two or more reasons apply to some of the inventions.
Source: Replies to Waiver Questionnaire, Part V, Question 2.
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at Duke, is now president of the company which performs research for
private industry and for NASA. Though the benefits from this waived
invention are "indirect," they are "important."
Other indirect benefits expected by contractors are summarized
in Table 6--6.
Government use
About 60 per cent of the waived inventions are reported as
having some use by or for the government. This is brought out in
_.k1_ 6--7 =_ all ,o_ _nnw--w_thout the examination in depth that we
could not undertake--there may be some benefit here to NASA from its
waiver policy. The possible Benefit we have in mind is small, but it
is ignored in most discussions of patent policy. Assume that because
he has a waiver, a contractor puts more effort into the invention,
improving it more than if there were no waiver. If this assumption is
correct for a few of the inventions with government use, it then follows
that NASA's technical programs have been benefited.
Development Effort
One of the justifications for permitting industry to acquire the
principal rights to inventions from government-funded R & D is that the
inventions need further development. That development entails expense
and effort made under risks that are reduced but not eliminated by the
temporary patent monopoly.
The question of fact is how often and how much industry spends
its own money on developing the inventions it gets from government work.
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Table 6--6
Expected Benefits Other than Commercial
Potential from Waived Inventions
Numberof Per Cent
Benefits to Contractors Replies of Total
Expanding company's commandover
area of technology
Increasing protection of existing
product or product line
Prestige for the inventor and for
the company
Increase company's patent portfolio,
to show competenceto secure
government contracts
Other
Total
16 26.2
9 14.8
16 26.2
15 24.6
5 8.2
61 i00.0
Note: Since an invention can yield more than one benefit, the
number of replies exceeds the numberof inventions, which is 28.
Source: Replies to Waiver Questionnaire, Part V, Question 3.
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Table 6--7
Government Use of Waived Inventions
Use Number
Inventions with no government use
Inventions with government use
Kind of government use (some inventions
have more than one use):
Contractor R & D for NASA
Use in NASA laboratories
Use by other contractors
Component delivered or sold to NASA
Component delivered or sold to other
government agency
Product or process delivered or sold
to NASA
Product or process delivered or sold
to other government agency
61
116
33
28
1
49
37
Source: Replies to Waiver Questionnaire, Part I, Question 2.
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A good empirical answer to this question could contribute much to future
modifications of high policy on the dispositions of patent rights.
In the meantimewe have a fairly good answer to the question,
for the small group of contractors who hold waivers from NASA. Table
6--8 summarizesthe replies to our question about actual and expected
development expense. Table 6--8 must be distinguished from Table 5--3
in Chapter 5. Table 5--3 showsexpenditures by petitioners on fields
of research broader than the inventions. In contrast, Table 6--8
covers only the expenses of individual inventions.
In compiling Table 6--8 we had to take "moderate" and "substan-
tial" at face value. Perhaps a few inventions were put in the wrong
place. That, however, does not matter much, because the chief message
conveyed by a glance at the table is that, at first sight, one-third of
the inventions have, or are expected to have, little or no development
expense.
This ratio of one-third needs interpretation, because it pertains
to usable replies only. To give an example of an unusable reply: One
of the aerospace companies reported for 5 of its waived inventions,
which we classified as having low commercial potential, that "no further
development expense is anticipated." Wecannot be sure if that company
had ever spent any funds at all on the 5 inventions. The strong like-
lihood is that these and dozens of other waived inventions simply have
a bleak future.
Thus, the 34 inventions with little or no reported development
expense should be comparedwith the total. Then their ratio shrinks
to a little less than one-fifth.
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Table 6--8
Development Expense and Effort Incurred
or Expected for Waived Inventions
(92 usable replies)
Inventions with little or no incurred
Number Per Cent
or expected development expense.
(Criteria: Less than $5,000 expense,
"one man-year," "minimal," "low,"
"fully developed," "not large,"
"developed during the performance of
the NASA contract," "costs incurred
before the NASA contract.")
Inventions with moderate incurred or
expected development expense.
(Criteria: $5,000--$50,000 expense,
"several man-years," "two man-years,"
"moderate.")
Inventions with substantial incurred or
expected de-.ol-_m=nt -wpense.
(Criteria: Over $50,000 expense, "much
time and effort," "substantial.")
Other inventions. (Criteria : "Govern-
ment is funding further development,"
"development of the system rather than
the invention itself.")
Total
34 37.0
27 29.3
28 30.4
3 3.3
92 i00.0
Source: Replies to Question 3 of Part IV of Waiver Questionnaire.
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The following statements are a little impressionistic but are
closer, weare certain, to the whole truth:
i. Of the inventions waived by December31, 1965, just
less than one-fifth needed little or no development.
2. A little less than one-third required extensive development.
3. The remaining one-half were found not to be worth any
development effort.
Value of Waivers
Weshall now face the problem of the value of the waivers to NASA's
contractors. That problem is a small part of the larger problem of the
value acquired by industry when the government permits contractors to
acquire title to inventions emerging from government-sponsored research.
The value of anything traded in a market or subject to bargaining
is what is paid for it. Wherebargaining is fairly complex, with many
things for the buyer and the seller to negotiate, there are usually
several trade-offs and compromisesbefore a final settlement is reached.
Oncea business firm acquires a bundle of rights that cannot feasibly
be further sold or exchanged, the value of that bundle consists of its
expected future net earnings discounted to the present. If business
firms thought that the patent rights in R & D contracts were valuable,
they would be willing to pay for them. And if the government had the
samethought, it would either sell these rights or adjust the terms of
the contracts so as to accomplish the same thing.
So far as we can tell, the values of patent rights are rarely if
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ever negotiated. But if they were valuable, why not? Whywould not a
contractor accept a reduction in fee, in exchange for patent rights, if
he could expect future profits muchlarger than the cut in the fee?
And why would not the government offer patent rights in exchange for a
lower fee?
Value of advance waivers
Patent attorneys at NASA field centers have told us that patent
rights, i.e., Section IV waivers, are never negotiated. In fact, they
seemed to think our question about this was a little odd. in addition
to the absence of negotiation, few contractors for NASA even ask for
patent rights. At Goddard, advance waivers have been requested for only
one or two per cent of all contracts executed. At Lewis, 23 requests
for Section IV waivers were made on 290 contracts, in the period from
August, 1964, to December, 1965. This is less than i0 per cent. At
other centers, where figures like these are not readily available, the
answer is about the same--very few requests for the nonnegotiated
patent rights. From October, 1964 to the end of 1965, over 9,400 NASA
R & D contracts (prime and first and second tier subcontracts) were
executed. There were 224 requests for advance waivers.
Any commercial right that businessmen will not ask for, when
they can, possesses hardly any value to them. A right they ask for,
but will not sacrifice money to get, cannot be worth very much. Many
requests for advance waivers have been denied. Few denials have been
appealed. Again, if the rights were valuable, contractors would under-
take the expense of appeal.
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For a contractor to acquire patent rights in an R & D contract
is like getting a lottery ticket in a lottery with an unknown number
of prizes of unknown value, awarded at unknown dates in the future.
Value of waivers on individual inventions
The value of the waivers granted by NASA is the present value Of
the streams of future net profits attributable to the waivers. Where
the holders of the waivers have licensed others, the value to the
holders is the present value of the flows of future income from licensing.
So defined, the value in 1966, of the waivers can only be guessed
at. Any guess must stumble on the uncertainties of future markets and
future changes in the technologies in which the waived inventions fall.
Shifts in future markets and technologies can make any of the waivers
worthless. Some of them have already become so, having been abandoned
and returned to NASA.
Table 6--9 presents the information made available to us on gross
sales revenue and development expense. Presumably, though not neces-
sarily, the gross sales revenues include profits. What these might be,
we do not know. If a high ratio of profits to sales is assumed, say,
i0 per cent, then for the five inventions in Table 6--9 with dollar
figures, it is obvious that development expense has so far exceeded
profits.
For only three inventions, where dollar figures are available,
have gross sales revenues exceeded development expenses. It seems that
for the other inventions in commercial use development expense probably
also has so far exceeded gross revenue. If those answering the
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Table 6--9
Development Expenseand Gross Sales
Revenuefor Waived Inventions
to end of 1965
Waiver Case Development Gross Sales
Number Expense Revenue Remarks
l_;entions for which dollar figures are available:
109, 167 $ 25,000 $270,000
219 5,000 20,000
162 25,000 7,200
102 I0,000 25,000
196 25,000 20,000
expense incurred by
licensee.
Subtotal $ 90,000 $342,200
Inventions in commercial use with incomplete dollar figures:
293
206, 207, 208,
232
282, 283, 320
222
172
158, 189, 317
276
231
"slight"
"moderate"
"moderate"
"substantial"
$ 50,000
not available
"slight"
"moderate"
$ 3,299
"small"
"s light"
"confidential"
"2 units sold"
not available
"not known"
none--but reduc-
tion in costs
licensed abroad
Subtotal $ 50,000 $ 3,299
147
Subtotal
Inventions commercially available:
$ 55,000 --
$ 55,000 --
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Table 6--9: Continued
Waiver Case Development Gross Sales
Number Expense Revenue Remarks
Inventions with high or moderate commercial potential,
for which dollar figures are available
216 $ i00,000
312 1,000
307 1,500
311 I00,000
365 ii,000
230 245,000
229 265,000
295 15,000
114 37,000
249 150,000
200 500
"business development
effort"
"business development
effort"
"expected future
development expense
is $20,000"
"business development
effort"
Subtotal $ 926,000 0
Grand Total $1,121,000 $345,499
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questionnaires were consistent in their use of language, this ought
to follow, because a moderate amount of money should be more than a
slight amount.
To the end of 1965, the companies with waivers granted by NASA
had spent on development of the inventions about three times as much
as they had received from the sale of products embodying the inventions.
The data in Table 6--9 on development expense, we are fairly sure,
contain some exaggeration. We were as careful as we could be in
excluding the spending of government funds by contractors. The possible
exaggeration comes from two sources. One is the natural tendency for
anyone to overstate his costs. The other and more serious possibility
is that some contractors probably report their development expense for
a whole field of technology rather than for the particular inventions
that come along. We noticed this when we were examining the waiver
files of the Inventions and Contributions Board.
In particular, waivers 229 and 230 account for nearly half the
dollar figure for development expense.
Three of the inventions from the information available to us,
only three--seem to have probabilities of yielding fairly large gross
incomes in the future. By large we mean more than $I00,000 annually.
These inventions are Caltech's portable planetarium, GCA Corporation's
gauge, and Engineering Physics' flowmeter. The potential beneficiaries
of the fairly large incomes are a university and two small businesses,
one of them quite small.
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To sumup on the value of the waivers on individual inventions:
I. To the end of 1965, the value was almost certainly
negative. Expense seemsto have exceededrevenue.
2. But expense is incurred in the expectation of profit.
Weare unable to pinpoint the expense that could be attributed directly
to the waived inventions. Wecan only guess that the value of the
waivers on the individual inventions, i.e., the expected profits
discounted to the present, is a few tens of thousands of dollars. And
in an enterprise economyit is expected profits that move inventions
into the stream of commerce.
The Distribution of Waivers AmongContractors
A few contractors hold several waivers each; most contractors
with waivers have just one each. Here is the question of the distri-
bution, or concentration, of waivers amongcontractors. Have "too many"
waivers been granted to "too few" contractors?
This is one question, to which we shall give an answer. A
related though different question is whether NASA's waiver policy has
added to "the concentration of economicpower" in the American economy.
That question we shall handle separately.
By December31, 1965, waivers had been granted on 182 inventions
to 73 petitioners. Of these, 5 were persons and 68 were organizations.
Of these in turn, 8 were universities and 60 were business firms.
Table 6--10 displays the ranking of the waiver holders as of
December31, 1965. Table 6--11 shows the distribution in each year
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Table 6--10
Ranking of Organizations and Persons Holding Waivers
as of December31, 1965
Contractors
No Amer Aviation
Cal tech
TRW
IBM
McDonnell Aircraft
Geophysics
United Aircraft
Ampex
Sperry Rand
Varian Assoc
G. E.
So Res Inst
Ball Bros
Barnes Engineering
Collins Radio
Duke Univ
Douglas Aircraft
Electro Optical
General Mills
Livingston Elec
Monsanto
Peninsular ChemRe s
Stanford Res
Aerojet General
Beckman Instr
Chicago Aerial
DeBell & Richardson
GT &E
Hughes Aircraft
Koll sman Instr
Midwest Res Inst
Nat'l Res
Princeton Univ
Radiation Instr
Westinghouse
Aerospace Res
Air Prods & Chems
Number of
Waivers Granted
16
9
9
8
8
7
7
5
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
i
i
Contractors
Number of
Waivers Granted
Allis Chalmers
Bell Aircraft
Bendix
Brown Univ (Prof. Dobbins)
Cook Elec
Curtiss-Wright
Electrochimica
Electro Radiation
Engineering Physics
Farrand Optical
Fenwal
Franklin Inst
Garrett
General Dynamics
Gulton Indus
Harvard (Prof. Ingrano)
Hazeltine
Honeywell
Internat'l Elec
Kaman Aircraft
Kinelogic
Kulite-Tungsten
A. D. Little
Litton
J. A. Lovelock
MB Assoc
Midland-Ross
Wm. R. Moss
No Amer Phillips
Northrop
Republic Aviation
G. T. Schjeldahl
Z. G. Shawhan
Shell Development
Univ of Caiif
Yardney Elec
I
I
1
i
1
1
i
i
I
I
i
i
I
i
i
i
i
1
i
i
I
i
1
1
i
i
I
i
I
I
I
i
i
i
I
!
Source: ICB files, NASA.
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Table 6--11
Waivers to Business Firms
1960 to 1964a
Numberof Numberof
Year Waivers Granteda Firms Distribution
1960 8 5
1961 12 ii
1962 34 19
1963 37 19
1964 57 34
4 waivers to GCA; i each
to 4 firms
2 waivers to IBM; I each
to I0 firms
4 waivers to No. Amer.
Av.; 3 each to Ampex,
General Mills, and
McDonnell; 2 each to 6
firms; i each to 9 firms
7 waivers to No. Amer.
Av.; 5 to TRW,3 each to
Douglas, Electro-Optical,
and IBM; 2 each to 2 firms;
i each to 12 firms
6 waivers to United A/C;
4 to Sperry Rand; 3 each to
Livingston Electric, No.
Amer. Av., and Peninsular
ChemResearch;2 each to 9
firms; i each to 20 firms
awaivers granted are here included in the year of petition. Total of 148
waivers were granted to business firms who petitioned in the period 1960-1964.
1965 is excluded becausemanypetitions were still pending. Blanket and class
waivers are excluded.
Source: ICB files, NASA.
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from 1960 to 1964; in this table, waivers granted are included in the
year of petition.
We shall confine our analysis to the distribution, or concen-
tration, of waivers amongthe contractors that are business firms. The
5 persons got one waiver each. The 8 universities and nonprofit
organizations were granted 25. No one, except for someacademicians
and perhaps the National Science Foundation, is interested in concen-
tration amongthe universities, and least of all in the concentration
of waivers amongthem.
In Chapter 3 we measure the concentration of disclosures by
using conventional concentration ratios and a Pareto distribution.
Neither device can give a meaningful description of the distribution
of waivers amongbusiness firms. The Pareto method would give bad
results because of the small numberof business firms and because of
the long string of firms with one waiver each. Even concentration
ratios give distorted results when there is a small numberof firms.
To illustrate: If NASAin somemonth were to grant i0 waivers to I0
firms, the conventional concentration ratio for the first 4 firms says
that concentration is 40 (per cent). This of course is as absurd as it
is wrong. Obviously, it is better to say that I0 per cent of the firms
are granted I0 per cent of the waivers. Thus to comparethe small
group of contractors holding waivers with other and larger groups of
contractors, the percentage method is satisfactory.
The waivers granted to business firms by NASAare less unequally
distributed than business contractors' other activities with NASA.
i °
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The first I0 per cent of contractors have well over 90 per cent of
dollar amounts of prime contracts from NASA. The first i0 per cent of
the business-firm contractors account for 78 per cent of the disclosures
made by business firms. In contrast, the first i0 per cent of the firms
receiving waivers have been granted 36 per cent of the waivers going
to business firms.
Another contrast is with the distribution of patents to industry
under the license policy in the period before the Presidential Memo-
randum of 1963. As a result of statistical studies we had previously
conducted, we know that patents acquired under the license policy by
contractors performing R & D for the federal government are less concen-
trated than the R & D. 2 The first i0 per cent of the R & D contractors
acquired about 50 per cent of the patents resulting from the license
policy.
It follows, therefore, that NASA has not, at least to the end of
1965, been unduly concentrating its waivers among the very few. It
should not be forgotten that concentration exists just about everywhere
and in most activities. There are more inventions than inventors;
dozens of patents are held by each of a few inventors. A minority of
scholars publishes the majority of scholarly papers. We do not think
that NASA has granted too many waivers to too few contractors.
2Watson and Holman, "Concentration of Patents from Government-
Financed Research in Industry," Review of Economics and Statistics,
forthcoming.
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In Chapter 5 we discuss the probable causes of the relatively
small numberof waiver petitions that NASAhas received. Oneof the
main causes is the misunderstanding amongcontractors as to how the
waiver policy actually works. That misunderstanding is more prevalent,
we have found, amongthe medium-sized and the smaller contractors. If
NASAwould dispell most of the misunderstanding while creating the
proper image of its patent policies, one of the results would be more
petitions from the medium-sized and smaller contractors. By no means
would there be a flood, but there ought to be more. From the patent
attorneys of the large contractors the flow of petitions can be
expected to continue about as it has in the past.
If, then, we are right in thinking that a better image for NASA
would stimulate more contractors other than the largest to send in
petitions, the distribution of waivers should becomesomewhatless
concentrated than it is, though, to repeat, the distribution is not
very muchconcentrated as it stands.
Concentration of Economic Power
Oneof the issues of discussion and controversy about govern-
ment patent policies generally is whether, by permitting business firms
to acquire patent rights, the policies contribute to concentration in
industry. Weshall try to measurethe impact, even though it is almost
infinitesimally small, of NASA'swaivers on concentration in industry.
By convention, "concentration" meanseither the share of the
largest I00 or 200 corporations of total assets (or employment, etc.)
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in the manufacturing industries, or the share of the largest 4 or 8 or
etc., firms in the assets (or sales or employment, etc.) in particular
industries.
Economicconcentration, or the "problem" of big business, has
been an issue of domestic politics during the last century. The issue,
of course, has taken manyshapes. The postwar version of the issue,
it might be generally agreed, is the market power of large corporations.
But along with that market power goes the contribution of many large
corporations to the advancementof technology. National policy moves
in directions that are not parallel. On the one hand, the antitrust
agencies keep their vigil over competition, watching in particular for
mergers that might throttle competition. On the other hand, agencies
with billions of dollars of research funds continue to pour most of
their moneyinto relatively few large corporations. Just 20 companies
account for two-thirds of all of the research and development dollars
spent in industry on work for the government.
This is not the place to probe into these matters. It suffices
here to point to federal procurement, including NASA's, as a cause
working to maintain or to increase the existing concentration in sev-
eral industries. The question here is patent policy.
The few dozen waivers granted by NASAcan have no visible
effect on concentration in industry. It is ridiculous to suppose that
this could be so. Nonetheless, NASAcan receive criticism each time it
waives an invention to a large and prominent company. Not that a parti-
cular waiver makesmuchdifference, so runs the standard criticism, but
175
that it is wrong in principle to let large companies acquire patent
rights from research paid for by the government. There is an incipient
threat to competition.
Did the license policy result in increased concentration?
Before undertaking this evaluation of NASA's patent policies, we
had already analyzed the issue on concentration from the operation of
the license policy in the period to the end of 1962. The supposed
creation of undue concentration of economic power, to some observers,
was one of the strongest objections to the license policy. The objec-
tion was raised repeatedly by attorneys general, by some legislators,
and by a few economists. In 1947, one of the recommendations of the
Attorney General's exhaustive study 3 of government patent practices
and policies was this:
Where patentable inventions are made in the course of
performing a Government-financed contract for research
and development, the public interest requires that all
rights to such inventions be assigned to the Government
and not left to the private ownership of the contractor.
Public control will assure free and equal availability
of the inventions to American industry and science; will
eliminate any competitive advantage to the contractor
chosen to perform the research work; will avoid undue
concentration of power in the hands of a few large corpo-
rations; will tend to increase and diversify available
research facilities within the United States to the
advantage of the Government and the national economy;
and will thus strengthe_ ou! American _ystem of free,
competitive enterprise.- /--ouritalics/
3Department of Justice, Investigations of Government Patent
Practices and Policies: Report and Recommendations of the Attorney
General to the President, 3 vols., 1947.
41bid., I, p. 37.
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The 1956 Report5 of the Attorney General was more cautious. This
Report was in compliance with a provision of the Defense Production Act
of 1950which directed the Attorney General to report on possible
"undue concentration of economic power" ensuing from defense procure-
ment. Here of course is the familiar and still unresolved problem of
national economic policy--how to maintain effective competition while
utilizing the talents of big business for both research and production.
The Attorney General observed in 1956 that a "disproportionate share''6
of federal R & D funds goes to the largest firms and that they benefit
from the profits on the research, from subsequent procurement contracts,
from commercial applications of government-financed research, from the
resultant acquisition and training of scientific personnel, from the
acquisition of technical information, and from the acquisition of
patents.7 This last advantage to firms doing R & D for the government
received in 1956 the most attention as a source of increased concen-
tration. But the patent data available in 1956were scattered and
spotty. Oneof the indications of patent concentration that the
Attorney General mentioned was the fact that only 15 companies accounted
for 52 per cent of 6,788 patent applications resulting from R & D
conducted for the Department of Defense in the five-year period ending
5Report of the Attorney General Pursuant to Section 708 (e) of
the Defense Production Act of 1950_ as Amended. November 9, 1956.
61bi___dd.,mimeographed version, p. 32.
71bld., pp. 19-28.
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June 30, 1956.8 But because of the unavailability of good and compre-
hensive data, the Attorney General did not take a firm stand. Hewas
careful to point to the obvious, namely, that more R & D funds should
go to small firms.
In a forthcoming article in the Harvard Review of Economics and
Statistics, we show in a statistical analysis of thousands of patents
from government-financed R & D, that concentration of these patents
among large corporations actually declined in the late 1950s and was
significantly less than the concentration of R & D.
The impact of NASA's waivers
What is the impact of NASA's waivers on the concentration of
economic power in American industry? The immediate and realistic answer
is wholly obvious--the impact is virtually zero. That fact, however,
does not stop or deflect the criticism that NASA strengthens the power
of big business when it gives a few waivers to a few large companies.
Hence we must pursue this matter further.
Concentrated economic power has many dimensions, which include
assets, employment, sales (market shares), and patents. We choose
patents as the relevant dimension. Table 6--12 gives the patent port-
folios of the groups of business firms granted waivers by NASA. Inspec-
tion of the table shows plainly how utterly negligible is the accretion
to patent portfolios from the grants of waivers. Some small fraction
of the inventions covered by waivers will never issue as patents
anyway. Besides that, the values of the inventions have to be taken
into account, in all likelihood, the average waived invention has a
much lower value than the average patent from commercial research.
81bi____dd.,p. 40.
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Table 6--12
Patent Portfolios of Groups of Business
Firms Granted Waivers
Groups Waivers
No. Per Cent No.
Patent Portfolio
Total Fed. Fin. R & D
Per Cent No. Per Cent
Large Aerospace Companies 55
Other Large Companies 43
Other Companies 54
Total 152
36 13,240 17 2,652 34
28 58,469 77 5,083 64
36 4,717 6 174 2
i00 76,426 I00 7,909 I00
Note: Waivers granted on individual inventions to the end of 1965. Total
patent portfolios are 17-year totals to the end of 1962. "Fed. Fin. R & D" means
the patents (17-year total) acquired to the end of 1962 by these companies from
R & D contracts with the federal government.
Sources: ICB files, NASA. U.S. Patent Office.
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It maybe of someinterest to know the namesof the contractors
in the three groups of firms included in Table 6--12. Wenow list the
names.
The large aerospace companies are: Aerojet General, Bendix,
Curtiss-Wright, Douglas Aircraft, Republic Aviation (subsidiary of
Fairchild Hiller), Garrett, General Dynamics, Hughes Aircraft, Kaman
Aircraft, McDonnell Aircraft, North American Aviation, Northrop, Bell
Aircraft (subsidiary of Textron), TRW Inc., and United Aircraft.
The other large companies (not aerospace and in 1965 Fortune
Directory) are: Air Products & Chemicals, Allis-Chalmers, Ampex,
Collins Radio, General Electric, General Mills, General Telephone &
Electronics, Honeywell, International Business Machines, International
Electric (subsidiary of International Telephone & Telegraph), Litton
Industries, Monsanto Research, National Research Corporation, Shell
Development, Sperry Rand, and Westinghouse Electric.
The other companies (not aerospace and not in 1965 Fortune
Directory) are mainly medium-sized and small firms. They are:
Aerospace Research Associates, Ball Brothers Research, Barnes Engineering,
Beckman Instruments, Chicago Aerial Industries, Cook Electric, DeBell &
Richardson, Electrochimica, Electro Optical Systems, Engineering Physics,
Farrand Optical, Fenwal, GCA Corporation, Gulton Industries, Hazeltine,
Kinelogic, Kollsman Instrument (subsidiary of Standard Kollsman Indus-
tries), Kulite Tungsten, A. D. Little, inc., Livingston Electronic (sub-
sidiary of G. & W. H. Carson), MB Associates, Midland-Ross, North Amer-
ican Phillips, Peninsular ChemResearch, Radiation Instrument Development
Labs, G. T. Schjeldahl, and Varian Associates.
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Whose patent portfolios has NASA fattened most?
The 152 waivers granted to business firms will, as we have clearly
said, cause scarcely a ripple in the patent portfolios of these con-
tractors. Of course, there are one or two exceptions, namely the very
smallest contractors. On the other hand, not all of the 152 will issue
as patents; several have already been abandoned.
It seems to be agreed that NASA's total R & D programs will pro-
bably not expand much in the foreseeable future. The reporting require-
ments will probably bring in more disclosures than arrived in 1964, and
1965. But there seems to be no reason to expect much of an increase in
petitions for waiver, even if the waiver regulations were to be admin-
istered more liberally. To get perspective on the impact of the waivers
on contractors' patent portfolios, we shall have to exercise a little
arithmetical imagination.
Imagine that the number of waivers is ten times as large as it
was at the end of 1965. With the numbers of waivers for the three groups
of contracotrs from Table 6--12 and with the combined portfolios of these
same groups from the same table, the results of the calculations are
these :
-- the aerospace companies' portfolios would be
increased by about 4 per cent,
-- the other large companies' portfolios would be
increased by less than one-tenth of one per cent, and
-- the group of the medium-sized and small
companies would have patent portfolios about ii per cent
larger.
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The direction, or tendency, of the waiver policy is therefore
to fatten the portfolios of the smaller companies relatively more.
As we said, not all of the waivers result in issued patents.
Besides that, one more remark needs to be added here. The probability
that a waived invention will be commercially used is about 0.Ii; that,
at least, is the experience to date. But the probability that a
private patented invention is commercially used is muchhigher. The
estimates from empirical studies in the postwar period are in the
neighborhood of 0.5. About the samefigure, as an average, was given
us by the contractors who responded to our waiver questionnaire.
These facts must also be weighed in considering the inventions acquired
under the waiver policy. 9
9Another part of our examination of the "impact" of NASA's
waivers on the concentration of patents was a look at the corporations
with portfolios larger than 1,000 patents. There were 53 of such
corporations in 1962, the latest year for which we have portfolio data.
Their portfolios are 37 per cent of all the patents assigned to dom-
estic corporations. The same53 companies include 17 which hold 28
per cent of NASA'swaivers.
Of the 53 firms with more than 1,000 patents, ii have had no
contracts with NASA. Another 16 have had cumulative contracts of less
than $i million each. These 27 are mainly oil companies. The com-
panies with really large (over 2,000) patent portfolios holding waivers
on individual inventions are General Electric, Westinghouse, Bendix,
Monsanto, IBM, Shell, Sperry Rand, General Telephone and Electronics,
and Honeywell. In the samegroup, but with class or blanket waivers
only, are AT & T, RCA, and Union Carbide.
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Danger of Monopoly?
The question of the concentration of economicpower is one
economists would call a macro question, i.e., it has to do with the
whole economyor with substantial parts of it. Weturn now to the
micro problem, i.e., to the possibility that the waiver policy of NASA
has resulted or could result in monopolistic exploitation of the buyers
of products that are waived inventions or that contain them as components.
By way of preliminary, we have somecommentsto makeon the thesis
that, whenever the government permits contractors to acquire title to
inventions, "the public pays twice." The public (taxpayers) pays to
have the invention madeand when it is marketed the public (consumers?
or business firms? or both?) pays again for the invention, the price
being monopolistic, and therefore "high". The samethesis holds that
whengovernment takes title, the public (which is now the government)
gets what it pays for. And when the invention is marketed, necessarily
by a licensee of the government, the price is not monopolistic.
The thesis is false. What the public pays for first is to have
research done. If the purpose of the research in the contract is to
create new products or methods for commercial use, title goes to the
government anyway (Presidential Memorandum,Section l(a)(1) ). But if
the research is of the type in 99 per cent of all of that financed by
the federal government, inventions are unplanned, unpredictable bypro-
ducts. The contractor never pays, by taking a lower fee, for the
prospect of getting them. If he did, the public would makea negative
payment. To the government the only cost, a negligible one, is the
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diversion of the efforts of the inventor from his main job of getting
on with turning out the hardware the government wants.
If the invention is commercially sold, somebodybuys it. Here
now is the public paying for the invention, but just once. Inventions
whose title is with the government include somethat require further
development. If exclusive licenses are hard to comeby, as they are,
few business firms have the urge to develop and market such inventions.
Thus with government ownership of inventions, the public might never
have the opportunity to pay even once.
Whenthe public does pay, is the price high and profitable to the
seller? Is the consumerexploited?
The seller of a patented product does indeed have a perfectly
lawful monopoly. But this kind of monopoly position is worthless if
no one wants the product; no one wants 9 out of i0 patented inventions
from government research enough to pay anything for them. If there are
in fact buyers for the product, the price they are willing to pay could
be, as it often is, just adequate to cover the unit cost of the product.
Such a price could hardly be called profitable, nor could it be said
that the buyers are exploited. Most of the inventions from government
research that are in actual commercial use seemto be of this sort.
Then again it can occur that the demandfor a patented product is great,
that buyers are eager to pay prices that happen to be well above the
costs per unit. Here then is the patent system in operation with a
184
i0
seller making profits from his temporary monopoly. It is precisely
the prospect of such profits that gives the incentive to develop
inventions. All of the evidence available, however, does not showany
example of a business firm's earning substantial profits by selling
anything incorporating an invention from government-financed research.
Weturn now to the markets for the inventions waived by NASA.
Markets for the waived inventions now in commercial use
Some of the waived inventions now in commercial use are sold to
research organizations or for use in research activities. Aerojet-
General's attitude control system (W-222, foreign rights only) has a
market among space research organizations in other countries. Allis-
Chalmers offers its moisture removal device for a fuel cell mainly to
academic laboratories; the company is said to be selling its device at
a minimum profit so as to disseminate fuel cell technology as widely as
possible. Since 1952, Allis-Chalmers has spent over $3 million of its
own funds on research in fuel cells. Government funding of such
research apparently did not begin until 1962. The waived invention of
Peninsular ChemResearch is a chemical process, whose market is in
research in polymers; sales by early in 1966, had been very small.
lOThe G. T. Schjehldahl Company was denied an advance waiver on
the ground that it would have a dominant position in a field of tech-
nology funded by the government. Schjehldahl is a small company, with
fewer than 900 employees in 1965. The company has know-how in the
design and manufacture of inflatable structures. One of the ingredients
of economic growth is the temporary monopoly position of the small com-
pany ahead of others in some branch of technology.
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Other waived inventions are instruments, or controls, or tools
that are being sold to other business firms. McDonnell Aircraft has a
package of portable tools for brazing. They have been licensed to Aero-
quip Corporation which has already madea few sales, and which expects
a large market in the sale of the tools to airlines for the repair of
jet engines. The licensee of Caltech's seismometer had sold 12 of these
instruments by the end of 1965, and had lowered the price from over
$i,000 each to less than $600. The highest volume of sales seemsto
have been achieved by GCACorporation. Buyers of GCA's pressure gauge
have included Bendix, General Dynamics, General Electric, IBM, Lockheed,
Union Carbide, Westinghouse, and Stanford University.
Twoof the inventions seemto have futures as possible consumer
goods. Oneis United Aircraft's heat transfer garment which can keep
a mancomfortable when he has to work in extremes of heat or cold.
United Aircraft has reported a few sales of "cooled suits for auto-
racing and flight personnel." The companyexpects moderate sales in
the future for use by "flight personnel, undersea divers, and personnel
in heat treatment departments in the primary metals industries." Such
uses would not of course make the garments a consumergood. They could
be a consumergood if they were bought by people engaging in amateur
automobile racing, if there is such a thing. The other possible con-
sumer good is Varian Associates' magnetometerwhich incorporates inven-
tions covered by two waivers. A skier would wear a small magnet on his
belt. If he would fall victim to an avalanche, rescuers could find him
by using one of Varian's magnetometers. They have already been employed
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by archeologists examining the ruins of an ancient city in Greece.
Wecannot see that anybody is being exploited as a buyer of any
of the products incorporating inventions waived by NASA. No consumer
goods seemto have been sold so far (early 1966). The few thousand
dollars worth of sales have been madeby business firms to one another.
None of the inventions could ever be called major; all are minor
improvements for which substitutes are available. The buyers of GCA
Corporation's gauge are business firms that ought to be able to take
care of themselves.
The Possibility of Misuse
Any patent can be managedin such a way as to violate the anti-
trust laws. This is true of the patents acquired by business firms to
which NASAhas waived its rights to title. The only question for us
here is to draw attention to the probabilities of misuse. Of the inven-
tions to which NASAhad waived its rights by the end of 1965, 98 were
held by aerospace and by other large companies; see Table 6--12. The
aerospace companieshave long had a cross-licensing agreement. Most
of the other large companies are subject to court decrees under which
they must license all or most of their patents. Misuse of patents is
a complex subject; we hazard the guess that existing licensing arrange-
ments go far to render unlikely the misuse of patents by the large
companies holding waivers from NASA.
There are two more groups of waiver holders. Onegroup consists
of universities and nonprofit organizations. It is not impossible for
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a foundation of a university to handle patents in violation of the
antitrust laws, as history plainly shows. That violation, however,
continues to be a mild embarrassmentto university patent officers.
Here we venture to say that another breach of the antitrust laws by a
university or other nonprofit organization is a most unlikely occur-
rence. The medium-sized and small firms are the fourth group of con-
tractors holding waivers. With them also the possibility of misuse
seemsfaint.
The new sentence (1245. i09(7)"'koj ) in _=_L............IQ_ P_nt Waiver
Regulations shows NASA's recognition of the possibility of misuse.
A waiver can be voided if the patent is held to have been used in
violation of the antitrust laws "in an unappealed or unappealable
judgement." By the time this would happen, the harm, such as it might
be, would long since have been done.
F ind ing s
i. Of the 181 waived inventions, 21 or about ii per cent, are
in commercial use.
2. There is good evidence that an additional 16 waived inven-
tions have high commercial potential.
3. Two-thirds of the waived inventions are used by or for the
government.
4. The value of the patent rights in the average R & D contract
is so low that it is not negotiated.
5. The value of the rights transferred to industry by NASA's
waiver program is very low. To the end of 1965, the companies holding
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waivers had spent more on development than they had received in
sales revenue.
6. Two small business firms and a university hold the waivers
to the inventions with the greatest promise of future income.
7. The patent rights acquired by industry from NASA-financed
research are too insignificant to have any visible effect on existing
concentration in industry.
8. Whenthe trends in the granting of waivers are assumedto
be magnified, the effect is to increase the patent portfolios of
medium-sized and small firms relatively more.
9. The waived inventions in actual commercial use are components
of products sold to other business firms. The danger of monopolistic
"exploitation" seemsfaint.
I0. Any patent can be misused. There is no reason to suppose
the danger is greater for a patent originating from NASAresearch.
I
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Chapter 7
Evaluation
Here we bring together our findings of fact and the results of
our analyses in an evaluation of the patent policies of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The criteria of evaluation are
those of the effective patent policies described in the first chapter.
Costs and Effectiveness
Government programs are now being put under the scrutiny of cost-
effectiveness analyses. After giving the matter much thought, we have
come to the conclusion that the cost of a formal cost-effectiveness
analysis for government patent policies would exceed its effectiveness'.
It would not be at all difficult to construct a model, complete
with equations and symbols, for the cost-effectiveness of patent
policies. But any such model would lack substance and operational
value. I One of the problems is costs. What are the costs of NASA's
patent policies? These could be the dollar costs to NASA, the costs
to contractors, to industry generally, and to "society" ("social costs").
It would be no small amount of work to estimate the costs to NASA of
patent prosecution and of administering the waiver policy; patent
icf., Bruno Fritsch, Helmut Krauch and Richard A. Tybout,
"Classification of Social Costs and Social Benefits in Research and
Development," in Richard A. Tybout, ed., Economics of Research and
Development (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965), pp. 258-267.
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counsel in NASAspend part of their time on patent activities other
than these. In any event, somepart of the cost of the patent opera-
tion is agency overhead that would be incurred whatever the patent
policy might be. On the other hand, it should not be hard to estimate
the incremental cost of monitoring closely the activities of thousands
of contractors and subcontractors. Whether it would be worthwhile
making such an estimate is a different matter. The task of estimating
the costs of NASA'spatent policies to contractors is muchmore for-
midable. Here we do not have in mind such trivial things as the costs
of reporting and petitioning. Rather, the relevant costs are the fore-
gone values of the missed opportunities and the costs of uncertainties.
The costs to industry generally and to "society" are remote and hard
to see.
Effectiveness is a different matter. Wehave already defined it
and discussed it in Chapter i and we shall cope with it again. The
trouble is that effectiveness comesin several dimensions (quantities
and qualities of disclosures, incentives, rates of utilization, dollars
of investment, transfers of technology, procurement of R & D, and
effects on competition). They cannot be reduced to a commondenominator.
Nonetheless, it is possible to make somestatements about gains in
effectiveness and their costs.
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Unknownsand Unknowables
Any evaluation of the patent policies of a federal agency must
face the fact that somethings are inevitably unknownand others are
unknowable.
Amongthe unknownsis the utilization of inventions in the future.
The history of invention shows that typically manyyears elapse between
the making of major inventions and their employmentin innovations,
i.e., in new industries or in the manufacture and sale of radically
new products. One study2 of the interval of time between invention and
innovation for 35 different products and processes gives the average
interval as 13.6 years. These are major inventions, causing revolu-
tionary changes in ways of doing things. There are wide deviations
from the average. A few major inventions are put on the market within
a year or two. On the other hand, the onrush of technology causes some
major inventions to becomequickly obsolete, in at least someof their
uses; the transistor is an example.
None of the inventions coming out of the NASAprograms could be
called a major invention. Thosenow in co_ercial use are all minor
devices or improvements. Oneor two belong to a group of inventions
associated with what might in the future turn out to be a major innova-
tion--fuel cells. Still, a major invention is nearly always recognized
°
_John L. Enos, "Invention and innovation in the Petroleum
Refining Industry," in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate
and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 307, 308.
192
as such only after its success is demonstrated. Thus, no one can know
with certainty whether one or more of the inventions, past and future,
from NASA'sprograms will be major inventions.
No business firm has earned substantial profits by acquiring
patent rights from R & D funded by NASAor by any other government
agency. All the evidence available supports this statement. But here
too is an unknown. Though it is good the evidence is not complete.
For all we know, somebusiness firm might have been able to conceal
from public knowledge the large profits it has been making from one of
these inventions. Werecognize this only as a possibility. Weknow of
nothing like this amongNASA's contractors. Still another possible
unknownis misuse of a patent.
Amongthe unknowables to be recognized in an evaluation of patent
policy are the "lost" inventions. They would be a problem only if it
were believed that a few of them were potentially valuable and that it
is a pity that they were lost. Inventions can be lost anywhere--by the
inventors who for one reason or another do not communicate them, by
patent attorneys and others who do not recognize them and by managers
of patent portfolios in industry and government who do not see their
potentials. Inventions can also be lost in a flood of disclosures that
overwhelms a small patent staff. All this of course is speculation.
The relevant question is whether NASA's patent policies to date have
increased or decreased the probabilities of losing good inventions.
Wedo not know the answer.
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Another unknowable is full knowledge of all aspects of incentives.
Wehave in mind here in particular the incentives of inventors and the
role (a small one?) that patent policies play in companies' decisions
to bid on contracts for R & D for the government.
Disclosure of Inventions
Weshall now give our evaluation of NASA'spatent policies.
It is paradoxical that the rate of invention disclosure to NASA
is --1__=..^1_.L=_=_v_j1_v.,.... Ao_p__.........._h_ fact that NASAhas put so mucheffort
into getting reports of new technology. In part, the low rate is
explainable on grounds other than patent policy. To somesmall extent,
however, the generally unfavorable image of NASA's patent policies
must result in reluctant compliance with the reporting requirements.
More serious seemsto be the fact that only 300 contractors have made
any disclosures at all. Wehave no way of knowing how manymore con-
tractors "should" have been disclosing inventions. Wedo believe,
however, that if we had been able to obtain a view of R & D activities
amongNASA's contractors we could have madea good guess. Another of
our findings is that few disclosures have been coming from subcontractors
who are not also prime contractors.
There are three sides to the problem of disclosures. One is
getting more disclosures from contractors already submitting them. The
second is getting disclosures from the contractors who so far have
remained beyond the reach of the monitoring mechanism. The third is the
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problem of getting really good disclosures from contractors. The first
two sides present no real difficulty. It is simply a matter of spending
more moneyon monitoring and on coping with a larger flood of paper.
In our opinion the additional costs of such an effort would exceed the
value of the additional benefits.
The third side of the disclosure problem is the important one.
Werepeat what we said in Chapter 3: As matters stand, contractors
are obligated to report what is there, that is, what is new in, say,
their engineers' notebooks. The contractors directly affected by the
program for the reporting of new technology will have supervisors
extract more from the notebooks. But in all this, there exist no
mechanismsfor motivating engineers and scientists to create better
inventions. If these mechanismsare present anywhere in the labora-
tories of contractors doing work for NASA,we have not heard of them.
By mechanismswe meansets of recognition and reward strong enough to
raise the level--the quality, not the numbers--of inventions. Of
course, someinventors will keep on inventing anyway; but the successful
ones of this type are not likely to remain long on government work.
Amongthe thousands of talented scientists and engineers who are on
NASAwork there must be somewhose creativity can be sparked. The cost
of establishing and operating, in cooperation with contractors, a new
system of incentives would be much less than the cost of thoroughly
monitoring several hundred contractors. The carrot here is cheaper
than the stick, and should be more effective.
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Utilization of Inventions
The rate of commercial utilization of the inventions from NASA-
sponsored research is about what can be expected in the light of the
experience of other federal agencies. About two-thirds of both the
licensed and the waived inventions are used by or for the government.
In general, the firms originating inventions are those that can com-
mercially exploit them. The exception of course occurs in the licensing
programs of the universities and nonprofit organizations. In NASA's own
licensing program, four of the five commercially used inventions are
being exploited by the firms where they were made. Thoughnot yet in
actual use, several of the licensed and waived inventions appear to
have high commercial potential.
The Inventions and Contributions Board has proceeded with caution
in its careful interpretations of the Patent Waiver Regulations. It
has been liberal in granting waivers--9 of I0 petitions under the 1959
regulations and nearly 7 of i0 under the somewhatmore stringent 1964
regulations. But NASAhas received relatively few petitions for waiver
on individual inventions and very few requests for advancewaivers.
The causes are the low commercial potential of most inventions, the
widespread misunderstanding and ignorance of the waiver program (NASA's
"image" again) and NASA's slowness in acting on petitions. The average
time from petition to grant or denial is nearly ii months. A flaw in
the Presidential Memorandumof 1963, which NASAstrictly follows, puts
the universities and nonprofit organizations at a disadvantage under
the 1964 and 1966 regulations.
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What can NASAdo to foster increased utilization of the inventions
it owns and waives? Not much. NASA's is a passive or permissive role;
initiative and action must come from business firms. NASAcan, however,
widen the field for initiative and action.
The cost of an aggressive licensing program would far exceed any
possible gain in effectiveness. What could be done, however, at a zero
cost of funds and personnel, is to grant more negotiated exclusive
licenses and to grant them earlier than two years after patent issue.
Inventions that are candidates for possible exclusive licenses are
made public anyway at the time of patent application. The time of
pendency in the Patent Office ought to be long enough to meet the
spirit of the regulations for exclusive licenses.
In cost-effectiveness analysis, one of the main points is to
analyze alternatives. In its waiver program the only important alter-
natives open to NASA are to be stricter or more liberal in granting
waivers.
In a tighter waiver policy, more rigorous interpretations of the
regulations would be applied. More requests for advance waivers would
be denied; fewer petitions for waivers on individual inventions would
be granted. There would not be the slightest difficulty in applying the
more stringent interpretations. The effect would be, in a little while,
a slowdown in the flow of requests and petitions. There might also be
a smaller volume of disclosures. Contractors not subject to close
monitoring would not find as many inventions to disclose. The percentage
of waived inventions that would get into the stream of commerce might
rise, but the absolute number would almost certainly fall.
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By a more liberal waiver policy we meanone where decisions come
much faster than they have been coming and one where interpretations
are less strict than they have been. Wedo not meanthat any and all
requests and petitions should be rubber stampedwithout scrutiny.
After all, there would still be the occasional inventions that would be
classed as "public health and welfare." And although none has come
along yet, NASAmust remain alert to the possibility of the revolutionary
invention that, by more or less general agreement, should be exploited
by the federal goverr_ent rather th=_ by a business firm. A more
liberal waiver policy could come from broader definitions of "field of
technology" and by making it a little easier for contractors to show
that waiver of title is a "necessary incentive." This in fact has already
been done; the 1966 regulations put a smaller burden on the contractor
than did the 1964 regulations.
Until 1966, there had been more than a casual lack of uniformity
among the field centers in acting on requests for advance waivers. One
center denied all requests. Under the 1966 regulations, headquarters
will decide. But since the centers will still have to do the preliminary
work on requests, headquarters should establish uniform policies and
provide guidance on matters such as "field of technology."
A more liberal waiver policy with much quicker decisions would
result in more requests and petitions. There would be no flood, only
a larger trickle. The percentage rate of commercial utilization would
likely remain steady or even fall a little. But the absolute number of
inventions in commerce ought to be greater.
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The cost in resources of a faster working, more liberal waiver
policy would be very small, perhaps even close to zero. In our opinion
the gain in effectiveness would be small, but in all probability, in
excess of the cost.
Encouragementof Development of Inventions
Experience to the end of 1965 shows that somewhatless than
one-fifth of the waived inventions require little or no development
effort, that about one-third need relatively substantial development
expense, and that the remainder have such dubious futures that no money
has been or will be spent on them. NASA's licensees have also spent a
little on further development of inventions.
So far as we know, the data in Chapters 4 and 5 on development
expense are the first to be gathered in an investigation of government
patent policies. Wecannot be sure, however, that the microcosm of
the licensees and of the contractors holding waivers from NASAis repre-
sentative of government contractors generally. But it is clear that
development expenses, both for inventions in use and for those where
expectations are high, are in fact being incurred. This is all to the
good. Becausedevelopment is so closely coupled with utilization, actual
and potential, we need not go farther here. What we just said about
gains in effectiveness in utilization applies to the encouragementof
the development of inventions.
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Transfer of Technology
Sometransfer of technology has been taking place through NASA's
licensing program and through the licensing activities of a few of the
contractors who hold waivers. The Technology Utilization Program has
disseminated knowledge of the features of several hundred inventions in
the disclosure stream. On occasion, however, TUP's overenthusiasm can
block, rather than push, the use of an invention.
The greatest obstacle to the transfer of technology is the almost
universal segregation of government-financed research and development.
Wehave seen little evidence of overt mechanismsfor moving inventions
from government laboratories to commercial divisions. There is of
course some, and perhaps growing, communication between the two worlds,
but not so muchas there probably could be. The pattern of segregation
took shape before NASAcame into existence; amongthe causes were
security regulations and economies of scale. There seemsto be nothing
that patent policy can do to break downthis obstacle. That effort
would require a mammothreorganization of the entire R & D complex.
Best Contractors
A title-policy agency, as NASAis considered to be, faces the
problem of not being able to get bids from the best qualified potential
contractors. Werecognize the fact that this question might be a chimera
rather than a real problem. Sensitive for both government and industry,
this issue has comeup in public discussions in the past.
20O
About three-quarters of the contractors holding waivers from NASA
told us in answers to our questionnaire that they had never declined to
bid on any other NASA contract because of the agency's patent policies.
The other one quarter said in effect that they would decline if they
thought that a NASA contract would imperil a commercial position.
Granting that they might do so, we think that the potential loss to NASA
is exceedingly small, simply because most of NASA's research is so far
removed from lines of commerce. A few contractors say that NASA's
patent policies cause them to postpone involvement with NASA; they do
and pay for the research themselves, acquiring the inventions they expect;
after this they take a development contract from NASA. But the provision
for advance waivers has increased the willingness of such contractors
to bid on R & D contracts.
Protection in Procurement
There is no problem here--nothing for us to evaluate. NASA either
owns or has a royalty-free license on every invention from its research.
In procuring equipment embodying one or more of these inventions, NASA
is fully protected.
Protection of Health and Welfare
NASA's entire patent program is alert to the need to protect the
public health and welfare fe.g., safety). To date (1966), only one or
two patented inventions resulting from NASA's research are related to
public health; they are not of major importal_ce. For waived inventions,
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NASA'sMarch-in-Rights are another and probably unnecessary degree of
precaution.
Avoidance of Concentration and Monopoly
Like the other major federal agencies, NASAawards the bulk of
its R & D funds to a relatively few large corporations. The effect is
to contribute to the maintenance of the existing pattern of concentra-
tion in industry. In its waiver policy NASAhas transferred patent
rights to somelarge corporations, as well as to small ones and nonprofit
organizations. The value of these patent rights is very low; to the end
of 1965, the companies holding waivers had spent more on development
than they had received in sales revenue. The waived inventions with
the greatest promise of future incomebelong to two small business firms
and a university.
The patent rights acquired by industry from NASA'swaiver program
have an infinitesimal impact on the existing concentration of patents.
The direction of this impact is to increase the patent portfolios of
the medium-sized and smaller firms relatively more than those of aero-
space and other large companies. Small though it is, the effect of the
waiver program, then, is to moveaway from rather than toward greater
concentration. And we can see not the slightest evidence of undue
monopolization.
NASAis fully aware of its obligations to support national goals
of economic policy. The licensing and waiver regulations, both as they
stand and as they are administered, advance technology while preventing
any serious threat to competition.
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A SummingUp
On disclosures, NASA'saccomplishments have been disappointing;
we think that something can be done. On utilization the record has been
fairly good; only a small improvement seemspossible. On the development
of inventions, the accomplishments of contractors and licensees seemto
be good; here too the possibilities for improvementare not large.
There has been a little transfer of technology through licensing; patent
policy cannot do muchhere. In protecting NASA's interests in procure-
ment, all is in order. Similarly there is no problem with health and
welfare; NASAis alert in maintaining the safeguards. In granting
waivers, NASAis not adding to existing concentration of economic
power; the tendency of the waiver program is to benefit medium-sized
and smaller firms relatively more. The danger of undue monopolization
is invisible.
Recommendations
i. NASAshould take the steps to create a better image of its
patent policies.
2. With a new system of incentives, worked out in cooperation
with contractors, NASAshould spark the creativity of contractors'
employees. The goal should be better, rather than more, invention
disclosures.
3. NASAshould establish more liberal provisions for exclusive
licenses.
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4. In its waiver program, NASAshould speed action on petitions,
should interpret its regulations a little more liberally, and should
ensure uniformity amongits field centers.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PROPERTYRIGHTS
IN INVENTIONS PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
AERONAUTICSAND SPACEACT OF 1958
David E. Aaronson*
I NT RODUCT I ON
If legislative intent has meaning for the
interpretative process it means not a collec-
tion of subjective wishes, hopes, and prejudices
of individuals, but rather the objective foot-
prints left on the trail of legislative enact-
ment. Legislative intent can't be _idreamed-
up." It can be speculated about; but it can
be _ only by factual inquiry into the
history of the enactment of the statute, the
background circumstances which brought the
problem before the legislature, the legislative
committee reports, the statements of the i_/
committee chairman, and the course of enactment.
A plethora of literature has been contributed on the
subject of Federal government patent policy. The question
of how to allocate the ownership rights to inventions made
under contracts for government-sponsored research has
occupied an important place in this literature, has been the
i/
*The author is a student in the Graduate Council in
Economics at The George Washington University. He is
also a member of the District of Columbia Bar. Mr.
Aaronson received his B.A. (1961) and M.A. (1964) in
Economics at the George Washington University. He re-
ceived his LL.B. from The Harvard Law School (1964).
He was an E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow at The George-
town Graduate Law Center, where he received his LL.M.
(1965) .
Sutherland, J.G., Statutes and Statutory Construction,
Vol II, (3rd Ed. by Frank K. Horack, Jr., 1943) at 322.
subject of continuing controversy, and has recently been
the subject of Congressional hearings.
Yet, prior to the enactment of The National Aero-
nautics and Space Act of 1958, 2-/ little public comment was
offered by Congressmen and other interested persons on this
question relative to research to be contracted by the new
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Subsequent
to the enactment of this statute, however, this question has
received the continuing attention of Congress and others
interested in the patent policies of NASA. Discussions of
the NASA patent policies have sometimes included comments
about the legislative history of the property rights in in-
ventions provisions.
These references to the legislative history may be
usually placed in one of three categories: First, comments
that since little or no legislative history exists, nothing
definite may be concluded about the intent of Congress;
72 Stat. 435, 42 U.S.C. 2451 (1958).
herein as the Space Act.
Often referred to
Often referred to as NASA.
See Caruso, Lawrence R., "A Study In Decision-Making:
The Patent Policies of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration," 7 Howard Law Journal (1961) 93,
one of the few published scholarly articles dealing
with the legislative history. On page i00, he states:
(continued)
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Second, comments equivalent to assumptions about the
apparent intent of Congress;5-/ Third, comments equivalent
to speculations, based on some evidence, about the intent
of Congress. Surprisingly, the available literature re-
veals few examples of attempts to discover the intent of
Congress on a particular question based on a thorough factual
examination of the legislative history of the Space Act
patent provisions. 6-/
The major purpose of this study is to make an objec-
tive and thorough examination of the legislative history of
s_/
6_/
"The legislative history of the Space Act of 1958
fails to state any reasons for the inclusion of the
special patent provisions. Indeed, it is difficult
even to speculate on the reasons for the NASA patent
provisions because the legislative history of the
Space Act includes so very little on this point," cit-
ing O'Brien & Parker, "Property Rights in Inventions
Under The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,"
19 Federal Bar Journal (1959) 255, 260 and Federal
Patent Policy at 49 (Machinery and Allied Products
Institute, and Council for Technological Advancement,
1960) .
See Gordon, Benjamin, "Government Patent Policy and
the New Mercantilism," 25 Federal Bar Journal (1965)
24,25.
See Caruso, Lawrence, R., op. ci____t,supra, note 4;
Maltby, Wilson R., "The National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 Patent Provisions," 27 George Washington
Law Review (1958-1959) 49; O'Brien, G.D., and
Parker, Gayle, "Property Rights In Inventions Under
The National Aeronautics And Space Act Of 1958," 19
Federal Bar Journal (1959) 255; Parker, Gayle, "Com-
parison of the Patent Provisions of The NASA Act and
-3-
the property rights in inventions provisions of the Space
Act. Other complementary provisions of the Space Act are
also considered. A subsidiary purpose is to attempt to
answer the following question: What intent did Congress ex-
press, if any, relative to how the Administrator of NASA
should exercise the discretionary authority of Subsections
305 (a) and (f) of the Space Act to prescribe regulations,
and pursuant thereto, decide whether to waive all or part
of the rights acquired by NASA to the inventions of its con-
tractors and subcontractors? Sections 305(a) and (f)
constitute the statutory basis for NASA's waiver policies.
This question was selected because of its relevance to other
research work on NASA's waiver policies, and because it is
an important question on which differences of opinion have
been expressed.
A careful attempt has been made to approach this
study in an objective manner. Much factual information is
presented in the form of direct quotations. This method
preserves the speaker's own emphasis and the context in
which his statement was made. It minimizes a major poten-
tial source of inaccuracy and may also provide the reader
with a sense of the realism and dynamics of what happened
AEC Act," 3 Patent, Trademark, and Copyriqht Journal
of Research and Education (1959) 303.
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that could not be given through concise summaries. It is
recognized that value judgments are implicit in the task of
selecting, presenting, and interpreting evidence. Informa-
tion has been selected and presented with the objective of
providing the reader with as complete a picture as possible
of what happened. When inferences have been drawn from the
evidence, an attempt has been made to state them explicitly.
An additional element of disinterested reasoning and judg-
ment is required to answer the subsidiary question posed
above. The reasons for arriving at an answer to this ques-
tion are explicitly set forth in the final section of this
paper. The validity of the examination of the legislative
history of the property rights in inventions provisions of
the Space Act is in no way dependent upon the acceptance of
this answer.
As indicated above, Congress delegated discretionary
power under Subsections 305(a) and (f) to the Administrator
of NASA to formulate a waiver policy. A mere reading of
the language of this statute, which is set forth in the
following section of this paper, suggests that Congress may
have permitted a choice _Long a variety of possible waiver
policies. Let us hypothesize that among the possible
choices, five general types of waiver policies, covering
-5-
the entire range of choice, may be distinguished. Any
particular waiver policy will tend to approximate one of
the following general cases:
Policy No. I. An All-Government policy. After title
is initially taken under Subsection 305(a), it should
always remain in the United States. The Administra-
tor should never exercise his discretionary power
under Subsection 305(f) to waive title.
Policy No. II. A Favor-The-Government policy.
After title is initially taken under Subsection 305
(a), it should usually remain in the United States.
The Administrator should only waive title under Sub-
section 305(f) in unusual or exceptional circum-
stances upon the request of the contractor. 7-/
Policy No. III. A Flexible or Balance-The-Interests
policy. After title is initially taken under Sub-
section 305(a), upon request of the contractor, it
should be waived or retained according to which
alternative best advances the "interests of the United
States" based on an evaluation of the intersts of the
parties involved for each invention or class of in-
ventions.
Policy No. IV. A Favor-The-Contractor policy. After
title is initially taken under Subsection 305(a), it
should usually be waived upon the request of a con-
tractor. The Administrator should only deny waiver
under Subsection 305(f) in unusual or exceptional
circumstances.
Policy No. V. An All-Contractor policy. After
title is initially taken under Subsection 305(a),
title should always be waived upon the request of a
contractor. The Administrator should never exercise
his authority under Subsection (f) to retain title,
unless the contractor subsequently retransfers his
rights to the invention.
See, supra, note 5, for a recent article in which this
policy is stated to be policy apparently intended by
Congress.
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oThe above five general types of waiver policies are
theoretically possible ways in which the Administrator
could exercise his authority under Subsections 305(a) and
(f). Yet, a careful reading of the language of these sub-
sections strongly suggests, if not compels, the conclusion
that if the Administrator were to attempt to pursue a
policy approximating either Policies No. I or V, he would
be exercising his authority contrary to the intent of
Congress.
A careful reading of these statutory provisions does
not, however, appear to exclude a waiver policy approximat-
ing either Policies II, III, or IV. It is necessary to go
behind the language of these provisions and to examine their
legislative history to determine whether Congress intended
to limit the Administrator's range of choice among these
three general policy types.
Three possible conclusions may result from such an
examination. First, Congress may have expressed no inten-
tion which would limit the Administrator in formulating a
waiver policy falling somewhere within this range. Second,
Congress may have expressed an intention to reject one or
more of these general policy types. Third, Congress may
have expressed a positive preference for one or more of
these general policy types. The method of answering the
-7-
question posed earlier in this section is to test these
hypotheses in light of the factual information revealed by
an examination of the legislative history.
This report is organized into seven sections followed
by a section summarizing the findings and stating the
principal conclusions. The seven sections are as follows:
I. Section 305 of the Space Act and Related Provisions;
II. The President's Message and Committee Hearings on H.R.
11881 and S. 3609; III. Enactment of Patent Provisions in
the House; IV. Deletion of Senate Patent Provisions by
Floor Amendment; V. The Recommendations and Report of the
Natcher Patent Subcommittee; VI. Informal Pre-Conference
Discussions, the Conference Meeting, and the Conference Re-
port; VII. Floor Discussion and Final Passage.
A time table of the legislative process is now pre-
sented in order to enable the reader to follow more easily
the subsequent discussion. All of the major legislative
decisions were made within a time period between February
and July, 1958. The table is as follows:
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Table No. I
LEGISLATIVE TIME TABLE
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT OF 1958
Legislative Action TakenDate
All Dates in 1958
February 6th
March 5th
April 2nd
April 14th
April 15th through May 12th
May 6th through May 15th
May 24th
June 2nd
June llth
Creation of Senate Special
Committee on Space and
Astronautics.
Creation of House Select
Committee on Astronautics
and Space Exploration.
The President's Message recom-
mending the creation of a new,
independent agency.
The Administration's Bill in-
troduced into the House (H.R.
11881) and the Senate (S. 3609)
with no patent provisions.
Public Hearings held by House
Select Committee.
Public Hearings held by Senate
Special Committee.
House Select Committee reported
out new bill (H.R. 12575) with
patent provisions after meeting
in executive session.
House unanimously passed H.R.
12575 with patent provisions
unchanged.
Senate Special Committee re-
ported out amended bill (S.
3609) with patent provisions
-9-
June 16th
June 18th
Late June or early July
The Second Week of July
July 15th
July 16th
July 29th
almost identical to the
House provisions.
Deletion of Senate patent pro-
visions by Floor Amendment.
Senate passed bill with no
patent provisions. Senate asked
for Conference.
House agrees to Conference.
Recommendations and Report
submitted by Natcher Patent
Subcommittee.
Informal Pre-Conference dis-
cussions, negotiations, and
drafting of final patent pro-
visions by staff members.
Conference Meeting adopted new
patent provisions and resolved
differences between House and
Senate bills.
Discussion and passage by House
and Senate of bill reported
out of Conference with patent
provisions unchanged.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
signed H.R. 12575 as Public Law
85-568, enacting into law The
National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958.
Source: Based on information reported in this study.
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It is hoped that this report, as an historical
study, may be of interest as an end in itself. It is
hoped, too, that it may be useful to policy makers, not
only because of the question relating to waiver policy,
but as a source of information to which other questions may
be referred.
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I. SECTION 305 OF THE SPACE ACT AND RELATEDPROVISIONS
Section 305 of the Space Act is the principal section
governing the policy of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration toward inventions conceived or developed as a
result of its contracts with private parties.
Section 305 provides as follows:
Sec. 305. (a) Whenever any invention is made
in the performance of any work under any contract
of the Administration, and the Administrator de-
termines that--
(i) the person who made the invention was em-
ployed or assigned to perform research, develop-
ment, or exploration work and the invention is re-
lated to the work he was employed or assigned to
perform, or that it was within the scope of his
employment duties, whether or not it was made dur-
ing working hours, or with a contribution by the
Government of the use of Government facilities,
equipment, materials, allocated funds, information
proprietary to the Government, or services of
Government employees during working hours; or
(2) the person who made the invention was not
employed or assigned to perform research, develop-
ment, or exploration work, but the invention is
nevertheless related to the contract, or to the
work or duties he was employed or assigned to per-
form, and was made during working hours, or with a
contribution from the Government of the sort re-
ferred to in clause (i),
such invention shall be the exclusive property of
the United States, and if such invention is
patentable a patent therefore shall be issued to
the United States upon application made by the
Administrator, unless the Administrator waives all
or any part of the rights of the United States to
such invention in conformity with the provisions
of subsection (f) of this section.
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(b) Each contract entered into by the Adminis-
trator with any party for the performance of any
work shall contain effective provisions under
which such party shall furnish promptly to the
Administrator a written report containing full
and complete technical information concerning any
invention, discovery, improvement, or innovation
which may be made in the performance of any such
work.
(c) No patent may be issued to any applicant other
than the Administrator for any invention which
appears to the Commissioner of Patents to have
significant utility in the conduct of aeronauti-
cal and space activities unless the applicant
files with the Commissioner, with the application
or within thirty days after request therefor by
the Commissioner, a written statement executed
under oath setting forth the full facts concern-
ing the circumstances under which such invention
was made and stating the relationship (if any) of
such invention to the performance of any work
under any contract of the _Lt_**_: ....__v... ___
of each such statement and the application to
which it relates shall be transmitted forthwith
by the Commissioner to the Administrator.
(d) Upon any application as to which any such
statement has been transmitted to the Adminis-
trator, the Commissioner may, if the invention is
patentable, issue a patent to the applicant un-
less the Administrator, within ninety days after
receipt of such application and statement, requests
that such patent be issued to him on behalf of the
United States. If, within such time, the Adminis-
trator files such a request with the Commissioner,
the Commissioner shall transmit notice thereof to
the applicant, and shall issue such patent to the
Administrator unless the applicant within thirty
days after receipt of such notice requests a hear-
ing before a Board of Patent Interferences on the
question whether the Administrator is entitled
under this section to receive such patent. The
Board may hear and determine, in accordance with
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rules and procedures established for interference
cases, the question so presented, and its deter-
mination shall be subject to appeal by the appli-
cant or by the Administrator to the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in accordance with pro-
cedures governing appeals from decisions of the
Board of Patent Interferences in other proceedings.
(e) Whenever any patent has been issued to any
applicant in conformity with subsection (d), and
the Administrator thereafter has reason to believe
that the statement filed by the applicant in con-
nection therewith contained any false representa-
tion of any material fact, the Administrator within
five years after the date of issuance of such
patent may file with the Commissioner a request for
the transfer to the Administrator of title to such
patent on the records of the Commissioner. Notice
of any such request shall be transmitted by the
Commissioner to the owner of record of such patent,
and title to such patent shall be so transferred
to the Administrator unless within thirty days
after receipt of such notice such owner of record
requests a hearing before a Board of Patent Inter-
ferences on the question whether any such false
representation was contained in such statement.
Such question shall be heard and determined, and
determination thereof shall be subject to review,
in the manner prescribed by subsection (d) for
questions arising thereunder. No request made by
the Administrator under this subsection for the
transfer of title to any patent, and no prosecu-
tion for the violation of criminal statute, shall
be barred for any failure of the Administrator to
make a request under subsection (d) for the issuance
of such patent to him, or by any notice previously
given by the Administrator stating that he had no
objection to the issuance of such patent to the
applicant therefor.
(f) Under such regulations in conformity with
this subsection as the Administrator shall pre-
scribe, he may waive all or any part of the rights
of the United States under this section with re-
spect to any invention or class of inventions made
ii
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or which may be made by any person or class of
persons in the performance of any work required
by any contract of the Administration if the
Administrator determines that the interests of the
United States will be served thereby. Any such
waiver may be made upon such terms and under such
conditions as the Administrator shall determine to
be required for the protection of the interests of
the United States. Each such waiver made with re-
spect to any invention shall be subject to the
reservation by the Administrator of an irrevocable,
nonexclusive, nontransferrable, royalty-free license
for the practice of such invention throughout the
world by or on behalf of the United States or any
foreign government pursuant to any treaty or agree-
ment with the United States. Each proposal for
any waiver under this subsection shall be referred
to an Inventions and Contributions Board which
shall be established by the Administrator within
the Administration. Such Board shall accord to
each interested party an opportunity for hearing,
and shall transmit to the Administrator its find-
-= _ ,.,_ _As_ect to such proposal and
its recommendation for action to be taken with re-
spect thereto.
(g) The Administrator shall determine, and pro-
mulgate regulations specifying, the terms and
conditions upon which licenses will be granted by
the Administration for the practice by any person
(other than an agency of the Unite d States) of any
invention for which the Administrator holds a
patent on behalf of the United States.
(h) The Administrator is authorized to take all
suitable and necessary steps to protect any in-
vention or discovery to which he has title, and
to require that contractors or persons who retain
title to inventions or discoveries under this
section protect the inventions or discoveries to
which the Administration has or may acquire a
license of use.
(i) The Administration shall be considered a
defense agency of the United States for the pur-
pose of chapter 17 of title 35 of the United
States Code.
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(j) As used in this section--
(i) the term "person" means any in-
dividual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, institution, or other entity;
(2) the term "contract" means any actual
or proposed contract, agreement understand-
ing, or other arrangement, and includes any
assignment, substitution of parties, or sub-
contract executed or entered into thereunder;
and
(3) the term "made" when used in re-
lation to any invention, means the conception
or first actual reduction to practice of such
invention.
Two other sections of the NASA Act are closely related to Sec-
tion 305. Section 203 (b) (3) provides authority to acquire
and dispose of property, including patents, as follows:
(3) to acquire (by purchase, lease, con-
demnation, or otherwise), construct, improve,
repair, operate, and maintain laboratories,
research and testing sites and facilities,
aeronautical and space vehicles, quarters
and related accommodations for employees and
dependents of employees of the Administration,
and such other real and personal property (in-
cludinq patents), or any interest therein,
as the Administration deems necessary within
and outside the continental United States; to
lease to others such real and personal pro-
perty; to sell and otherwise dispose of real
and personal property (includinq patents and
riqhts thereunder) in accordance with the
provisions of the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act of 1949, as amended
(40 U.S.C. 471et seq.) ; and to provide by con-
tract or otherwise for cafeterias and other
necessary facilities for the welfare of em-
ployees of the Administration at its installa-
tions and purchase and maintain equipment
therefor;8__/ (Emphasis added)
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Section 306 provides for making awards for scientific and
technical contributions, as follows:
Sec. 306. (a) Subject to the provisions of
this section, the Administrator is authorized,
upon his own initiative or upon application of
any person, to make a monetary award, in such
amount and upon such terms as he shall determine
to be warranted, to any person (as defined by
section 305) for any scientific or technical
contribution to the Administration which is de-
termined by the Administrator to have significant
value in the conduct of areonautical and space
activities. Each application made for any such
award shall be __-_.... _ __......_he Tnventions and
Contributions Board established under section 305
of this Act. Such Board shall accord to each
such applicant an opportunity for hearing upon
such application, and shall transmit to the
Administrator its recommendation as to the terms
of the award, if any, to be made to such appli-
cant for such contribution. In determining the
terms and conditions of any award the Administr=-
tor shall take into account --
(I) the value of the contribution to the
United States;
(2) the aggregate amount of any sums
which have been expended by the applicant for
the development of such contribution;
(3) the amount of any compensation (other
than salary received for services rendered as
an officer or employee of the Government)
previously received by the applicant for or on
account of the use of such contribution by
the United States; and
(4) such other factors as the A__ministra-
tion shall determine to be material.
8_/ (From p. 16) Authority to lease buildings in the
District of Columbia was added to Sec. 203 (b) (3) by Public
Law 86-20 (73 Star. 21), May 13, 1959.
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(b) If more than one applicant under sub-
section (a) claims an interest in the same con-
tribution, the Administrator shall ascertain and
determine the respective interests of such
applicants, and shall apportion any award to be
made with respect to such contribution among such
applicants in such proportions as he shall de-
termine to be equitable. No award may be made
under subsection (a) with respect to any contri-
but ion
(1) unless the applicant surrenders, by
such means as the Administrator shall de-
termine to be effective, all claims which
such applicant may have to receive any compen-
sation (other than the award made under this
section) for the use of such contribution or
any element thereof at any time by or on be-
half of the United States, or by or on behalf
of any foreign government pursuant to any
treaty or agreement with the United States,
within the United States or at any other
place;
(2) in any amount exceeding $i00,000, un-
less the Administrator has transmitted to the
appropriate committees of the Congress a full
and complete report concerning the amount and
terms of, and the basis for, such proposed
award, and thirty calendar days of regular
session of the Congress have expired after re-
ceipt of such report by such committees.9_/
The above provisions, part of H.R. 12575, were signed
into law by President Eisenhower on July 29, 1958, marking
Another related section is Sec. 303, "Access to Informa-
tion," which provides that information obtained or de-
veloped by the Administrator in the performance of his
functions shall be made available for public inspection,
except when such information is classified or authorized
or required by Federal statute to be withheld. This sec-
tion makes most technical information publicly available.
Sec. 305 was drafted in a manner to assure that the man-
date of this section would not be defeated.
104 Co__. Re____c.15,610.
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the final official act in our story of the legislative
history. The major dramatis personae, as far as the official
record is concerned, in the United States House of Representa-
tives, were: Representatives John W. McCormack, Overton
Brooks, Brooks Hays, Leo W. O'Brien, Lee Metcalf, Gordon L.
McDonough, James G. Fulton, Kenneth B. Keating, Gerald R.
Ford, Jr.; in the United States Senate, the correspond-
ing figures were: Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard B.
Russell, Theodore F. Green, John L. McClellan, Warren G.
Magnuson, Styles Bridges, Alexander Wiley, Bourke B. Kicken-
looper, Leverett Saltonstall. 12-_/
Designated as "Managers on the Part of the House,"
Conference Report, Report No; 2166 (85th Cong., 2nd
Sess. July 15, 1958) at 14.
Designated as "Managers on the Part of the Senate,"
Ibid.
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II. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGEAND COMMITTEEHEARINGS ON
H.R. 11881 AND S. 3609.
Perhaps, our story begins officially on April 2,
1958, when the President of the United States transmitted to
the Congress a special message recommending the establish-
ment of a new, independent Federal agency, The National Aero-
nautics and Space Agency. The message recommended that this
Agency should be given broad powers to be responsible for
programs concerned with problems of space technology, space
science and civil space exploration, and to continue the
aeronautical research programs of the National Advisory
13/Committee for Aeronautics.-- President Eisenhower stated:
I recommend that aeronautical and space science
activities sponsored by the United States be con-
ducted under the direction of a civilian agency,
except for those projects primarily associated
with military requirements...
13/ House Document No. 365, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., April 2,
1958.
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA),
the predecessor to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), was established in 1915 to "super-
vise and direct the scientific study of the problems of
flight, with a view to their practical solution.., and
to direct and conduct research and experiments in aero-
nautics." 38 Stat. 930, 50 U.S.C. 151 (1915). unlike
NASA, which is primarily a contracting agency, NACA's
research work was conducted primarily by its own em-
ployees, numbering about 8,000 scientists, engineers
and supporting personnel shortly before the Space Act
was passed.
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I am, therefore, recommending that the respon-
sibility for administering the civilian space science
and exploration program be lodged in a new National
Aeronautics and Space Agency, into which the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics would be absorbed.
Hence, in addition to directing the Nation's civilian
space program, the new Agency would continue to per-
form the important aeronautical research functions
presently carried on by the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics ....
The National Aeronautics and Space Agency should
be given that authority which it will need to ad-
minister successfully the new programs under conditions
that ca_nnot now be fully foreseen.14___/
Prior to this message, hearings on the Nation's satellite
and missile programs were conducted from November 25, 1957 to
January 23, 1958, by the Preparedness Investigation Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. These
hearings began less than two months after the launching of
the first earth satellite, Sputnik I, by the Soviet Union on
October 4, 1957. Congress had begun to respond to a
crisis. The Soviet Union had dramatically demonstrated that
i_/ Id. at 2.
Spherical in shape with a diameter of 22.8 inches, this
184 pound satellite, Sputnik I, circled the world in an
initial time of 96.2 minutes. Its altitude ranged from
145 to 560 miles. It carried two radio transmittors.
On November 3, 1957, Sputnik II, carring a dog, Laika,
was launched by the Soviet Union. According to the Tass
announcements, the "containers with apparatus" of this
rocket-shaped satellite weighed 1,120 pounds, and it
contained "instruments for studying solar radiation in
-21-
the United States had fallen behind in long range missiles.
Fears were widely expressed that the conquest of space might
provide a decisive means of military victory. Rep. Mc-
Cormack's opening remarks to the House before the final vote
on July 16, 1958, which is quoted in the last section of this
paper, illustrates the atmosphere of urgency prevailing in
Congress. The legislative actions resulting in the passage
of the Space Act must be considered against this background.
A Special Committee on Space and Astronautics was
the short wave ultraviolet and X-ray regions of the
spectrum, instruments for cosmic ray studies, instru-
ments for studying the temperature and pressure, an air-
tight container with an experimental animal, an air con-
ditioning system, food and instruments for studying life
processes in the conditions of cosmic space, measuring
instruments for transmitting the results of scientific
measurements to the earth, two radio transmitters." It
had an initial orbit time of 103.7 minutes and a maximum
altitude of 1,056 miles.
On December 6, 1957, a mechanical failure in the pro-
pulsion system of a Vanguard rocket caused it to burst
into flames two seconds _ter it was fired in an attempt
by the Navy to launch a 6.4 inch test satellite.
On December 14, 1957, Major General John B. Medaris,
Commander of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, testify-
ing before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-
committee, stated: "Because I have no responsibility to
carry this out, I think I can say in open meeting that
it is my personal opinion unless this country can
command 1 million pounds of thrust by 1961, we will not
be in pace.., we will not be in the race."
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established by the Senate on February 6, 1958. A
corresponding committee, the Select Committee on Astro-
nautics and Space Exploration was created by the House of
Representatives on March 5, 1958.17-// The designated chair-
men of these two committees were Senator Lyndon B. Johnson
and Representative John W. McCormack, respectively.
The Administration's bill was introduced in the
House, as H.R. 11881, by Rep. McCormack on April 14, 1958,
and was introduced on the same day in identical form in the
16__/
17/
On January 31, 1958, the first American satellite, Ex -
plorer I, was launched by the Army using a modified
Jupiter-C rocket. Weighing 30.8 pounds, the satellite
and final stage rocket was 80 inches long and 6 inches
in diameter. It carried ii pounds of instruments for
gathering data on skin and internal temperature, cosmic
dust erosion, and cosmic rays. It carried two radio
transmitters. It reached a maximum altitude of 1,587
miles.
House Report No. 1758, 85th Congress, 2d Session (1958)
at 217-219, 222.
Senate Resolution 256, 85th Congress, 2d Sess., February
6, 1958.
House Resolution 496, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., March 5,
1958. The selection of the majority leader, the
minority leader, and members from the key standing
committees to serve on this special committee was de-
scribed by a Congressman as an "unprecedented action".
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Senate, as S. 3609, by Senators Johnson and Bridges.
These bills were referred to the newly created special
House and Senate committees. This was twelve days after
the President's Message.
No provisions relating to the determination of
property rights in inventions from government-sponsored re-
search with private parties and for awards for scientific
and technical contributions were included in these bills,
nor were they mentioned in the President's Message.
Both committees soon began to hold hearings on the
respective bills. The Senate Special Committee on Space
and Astronautics, which heard testimony from May 6 through
May 15, 1959, was the setting for a three-way conversation be-
tween Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Mr. Paul G. Dembling,
General Counsel of the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics (NACA), and Dr. James H. Doolittle, chairman of the
H.R. 11881, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., 104 Con_. Rec. 6325,
a bill to provide for research into problems of flight
within and outside the earth's atmosphere, and for
other purposes.
S. 3609, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., 104 Conq. Re___cc.6288.
Also, on April 14, 1958, five other bills, identical
to H.R. 11881 were introduced in the House: H.R.
11882 (Rep. Arends), H.R. 11887 (Rep. Haskell), H.R.
11888 (Rep. Keating), H.R. 11961 (Rep. Frelinghuysen),
and H.R. 11964 (Rep. Fulton).
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National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) :
Senator Anderson: Was there any provision made
in this legislation with reference to
patents?
Mr. Dembling: No, sir.
Senator Anderson: Was there a long, hard and
bitter fight, in your opinion, over the
question of patents when the Atomic
Energy Act was adopted? Do you recall?
Dr. Doolittle: I do not recall.
Senator Anderson: The very author of that bill,
Senator Hickenlooper, would recognize
that there was a fight over the patent
section, because there was a feeling that
somebody ought to protect the public
rights on these patents. Now, this bill
is completely silent on that, is it not?
Dr. Doolittle: Yes, it is. 2-_/
i_ 9/
2O__/
The administration's bill wa_s drafted in the Bureau of
the Budget at the request of the President. Mr. Dembling
was one of the principal drafters of this bill.
Hearings on S. 3609 before the Senate Special Committee
on Space and Astronautics, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., (Part I)
at 27,28.
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Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald A. Quarles, was
later questioned by Senators Anderson and Johnson as follows:
(Senator Anderson) Now, let me ask you this. Is
there any provision in this bill with
reference to patents?
Mr. Quarles: I think there is no specific pro-
vision in this bill for patents.
Senator Anderson: No. So that whoever developed
the project could patent it and claim it
and keep it as his own; one of these
private groups.
Mr. Quarles: Well, I don't think I would like to
agree with that, but you are in a much
better position to have an opinion about
that than I am, Senator.
Senator Anderson: Only because the burnt child
fears the fire, and we went through this
in Atomic Energy Commission for a long,
long time. Would it not be well to try
to protect it as we get underway, perhaps?
Mr. Quarles: Well, I think we have been assum-
ing in the Department of Defense that the
work that this agency would carry on with
Government funds and for the Government
-26-
would carry with it the same kind of
patent provisions that our own work
carries with it, and this is well
established by law and practice, and I
had assumed that the same practice would
apply to the new agency. I will assume
it not as a lawyer, however.
Senator Johnson: Thank you, Senator Anderson.
Mr. Secretary, I notice your reply to
Senator Anderson's question on the lack
of adequate patent protection so far as
the statute is concerned is based on
what you assumed would be the case. Would
you ask the counsel to prepare for the
committee a memorandum on what is the
case as they understand it, together with
any recommendations in that field that the
Department might be inclined to make?
Mr. Quarles: I would be glad to do so, Mr.
Chairman. 2-!/
In response to Senator Johnson's request, Mr. Quarles sub-
mitted a statement on May 19, 1958, providing as follows:
21/ I__d. at 78-79.
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With respect to patents, the proposed new
agency would be governed by existing laws and
regulations.
As to Government employees, which would of
course include employees of the proposed agency,
Executive Order 10096... relating to patent
policy is applicable. By this order, the Govern-
ment obtains title when, under the policy enuncia-
ted in the order, the Government has a paramount
interest; but where the equities of the employee
are greater than those of the Government, the em-
ployee retains the title but Government receives
an irrevocable royalty-free license for its own
use. We have found in the Department of Defense
that a license to the Government preserves all
necessary rights; and leaving title with the em-
ployee so that he can receive any benefits from
nongovernmental commercial use provides an incen-
tive to employees to make inventions.
As to contractors, the Department of Defense
in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations...
requires the inclusion in contracts for research
and development of a patent-rights clause which
permits the contractor to retain the title to the
invention but gives the Government an irrevocable
royalty-free license throughout the world. Again,
as noted in the employee's inventions this pro-
vides the Government all the rights it needs and
leaves an incentive to the contractor.
With respect to secrecy of patents, the Patent
Secrecy Act (35 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), provides ade-
quate authority to withhold the issuing of patents
falling within the classified area.
We are advised that the NACA policy and pro-
cedures on patent matters are similar to those of
the Department of Defense. The above authority
and procedures have provided an adequate basis
for the handling of patent matters relating to De-
partment of Defense problems not only in the area
of advanced research and missilry but in other im-
portant areas [as] well. Therefore, it would
-28-
I
i
appear that special patent provisions are not
required in the proposed legislation.2__/
The above statement and preceding excerpts are the
primary references made to the question of ownership to
rights of inventions during the Senate hearings.
Little discussion of patent policy appeared in the
more lengthy hearings before the House Select Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration, April 15 through May 12,
1958, which resulted in 1542 pages of published testimony
and exhibits, z-_/ The most detailed discussion of patent
policy was the testimony of Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director, the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, April 22, 1958,
who described the application of Executive Order 10096, re-
ferred to in Mr. Quarles' statement, as follows:
NACA regulations require that all employee
inventions be reported, with full information con-
cerning the circumstances under which they were
I__d. at 97-98. Executive Order 10096, cited in Mr.
Quarles' statement, was issued on January 23, 1950. It
provided for a uniform patent policy for Government de-
partments and agencies for inventions made by Government
employees. The Executive Order did not cover government
contractors. It directed each _ ..... m_,_ to. ...... agency issue
such regulations as were necessary to carry out the order.
A new Government Patents Board was established.
Hearings on H.R. 11881 before the House Select Committee
on Astronautics and Space Exploration, 85th Cong. 2d
Sess., (1958).
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made. If patent protection is deemed advisable
and a prior art search confirms the existence of
patentable novelty, a determination regarding
the disposition of the rights to the invention
is made by NACA, in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Executive order. If title, or all
rights are to be left with the inventor, the con-
currence of the Chairman of the Government Patents
Board must be obtained. The employee may appeal
to the Chairman of the GOvernment Patents Board
from a decision made by NACA. The decisio_ of the
Chairman upon any such appeal is final. _4/
Rear Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, Assistant Chief, Bureau
of Ships, For Nuclear Propulsion, Department of the Navy,
testified before the House Committee on April 18, 1958. In
response to a request by Rep. McCormack, he submitted a
letter on May 7, 1958, stating his views on patent policy,
as follows:
Dear Mr. McCormack: At the time of my
testimony on April 18, 1958, before your committee
you asked that I submit comments for the record on
patent provisions for outer space legislation.
Of course I lack the expertness to recommend
specific legislative language, but I would like to
make some general observations. I believe that
one can distinguish clearly between patent rights
arising from discoveries made with the expendi-
ture of public money and those which are developed
privately. In the case of inventions conceived
during the course of a Government contract or
similar relationship, strong provision should be
Hearings on H.R. 11881 before the House Select Committee
on Astronautics and Space Exploration, 85th Cong. 2d
Sess., (1958) at 440. A statement of NACA patent regula-
tions appears in the Hearings at 452 et.seq.
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made for the patent rights to be vested in the
Government. A provision such as this does not
freeze patents because the Government has con-
tinuously licensed others to use such patents
in the interest of the country as a whole.
Whenever a private party conceives of an in-
vention or discovery and no Federal funds are in-
volved in the work, he has a rather sacred
constitutional right to the exclusive use of his
invention or discovery. I do not think that writ-
ing a provision in outer space legislation which
would award the Government title to patents de-
veloped with the use of Government funds would,
in any way, infringe upon this right.
Perhaps some may think that this over-
simplifies the matter but I have long felt that
patent provisions of the many laws surrounding
Government research work could be simplified to a
greater extent.
I do feel strongly that no provision of the
law setting up the space agency should ever be
construed to confer on any individual a right
which could in any way impede or restrict the use
of relevant technology by our Government for do-
mestic or for international purposes. An un-
equivocal statement to this effect in the law
would be an earnest [sic] of our intention to
help other nations.
25/
I hope these comments are of help to you.
Only after the close of the above hearings, the House
committee in executive session determined that a patent
25/ __id- at 237. Concerning =_LL_;--.Rickover's __ t _
"a rather sacred constitutional right," Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides..." TO promote the progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries;"
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26/
provision should be included in the bill _ The basis for
this determination and the discussions that took place are
not officially recorded. On May 24, 1958, the full House
27/
committee reported a new bill, H.R. 12575,-- to replace H.R.
11881, which, in addition to other changes, contained a
8/2
patent provision, Section 407q--" It provides as follows:
Sec. 407. (a) Any invention or discovery
made or conceived under any contract, sub-
contract, arrangement, or other relationship
with the Administrator, regardless of whether
the contract or arrangement involved the ex-
penditure of funds by the Administrator, shall
be deemed to have been made or cenceived by
the Administration, except that the Administra-
tor may waive the Administration's claim to any
such invention or discovery under such circum-
stances as the Administrator may deem
appropriate.
(b) In any case where the Administrator
waives the Administration's claim to an invention
or discovery as authorized by subsection (a), the
Administrator shall retain the full right to use
such invention or discovery in carrying out his
functions under this Act and to license other
26/ See "Proposed Revision to the Patent Section, National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958," Report of the
Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific Inventions of
the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House
of Representatives, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960) at i.
H. Report No. 1770
The House patent provision in H.R. 12575 isreferred
to in preliminary drafts and in most subsequent
references as Sec. 407, although it actually bore the
label, "Sec. 50Z" when printed in The Conqressional
Record, House Report No. 1770 (May 24, 1958). For con-
venience it is referred to as Sec. 407 in this paper.
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persons on such terms and conditions as he may
deem appropriate to use such invention or dis-
covery in the conduct of any activities
authorized by or under this Act. In any such
case the Administrator may provide for the pay-
ment by the Administration or by the other per-
sons licensed under this subsection, for the
use of the invention or discovery, of a reason-
able royalty fee determined by the Administrator
in accordance with such standards and procedures
as he may by regulation establish.
(c) In any case where the Administrator does
not waive the Administration's claim to an inven-
tion or discovery which is deemed to have been
made or conceived by the Administration under
subsection (a), the Administrator may grant to
the persons who made or conceived the invention
or discovery, as compensation therefor, a cash
award in an amount determined by the Administra-
tor in accordance with such standards and rpro-
cedures as he may by regulation establish.
The March 8, 1960 report of Representative Erwin
Mitchell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Patents and Scientific
Inventions of the House Committee on Science and Astronau-
tics, stated that the above Section 407 was patterned "after
certain sections of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 as
amended. _-q/ Corroboration for this statement results from an
29/
30/
Section 407, H.R. 12575, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., 104 Conq.
Rec. 9091.
See Parker, Gayle, "Comparison of the Patent Provisions
of the NASA Act and AEC Act," 3 The Patent r Trademark,
and Copyriqht Journal of Research and Education (Fall
1959) 303; O'Brien and Parker, "Property Rights in In-
ventions Under the National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958," 19 The Federal Bar Journal (July 1959) 255.
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examination of the language of The Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, which, in part, provides as follows:
Any invention or discovery, useful in the pro-
duction or utilization of special nuclear
material or atomic energy, made or conceived
under any contract, subcontract, arrangement, or
other relationship with the Commission, regard-
less of whether the contract or arrangement in-
volved the expenditure of funds by the Commission,
shall be deemed to have been made or conceived by
the Commission, except that the Commission may
waive its claim to any such invention or discovery
if made or conceived by any person at or in con-
nection with any laboratory under the jurisdiction
of the Commission as provided in section 33, or
under such other circumstances as the commission
may deem appropriate.31/
The language quoted above is remarkably similar and in some
respects identical to the language of Sec. 407(a).
While there is no official record or published report
of the executive session, at which the House Select
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration added a
patent section to the Administration's bill, some interesting
facts are revealed from the working drafts of the committee. _
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 152, 68 Stat. 919, 42
U.S.C. 2011-2281. Section 151 provides that under
certain circumstances the government must take title with
no waiver provision.
The drafts are from the official files of the legisla-
tive history of The National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958.
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Eleven working drafts were examined, arranged in
chronological order, and assigned numbers, Exhibit No. i, 2,
etc. Exhibit No. i, which has handwritten on the first
page the words, "Master Copy," bears the date, "April 1958."
The other Exhibits are dated as follows: No. 2 - April 18,
1958; No. 3 - April 30, 1958; No. 4 - May i, 1958; No. 5 -
May 9 , 1958; No. 6 - May 9, 1958; No. 7 - May 13, 1958;
No. 8 - May 14, 1958; No. 9 - May 16, 1958; No. i0 - May
19, 1958; No. 11 _.. 99 lq_R _ mentioned above, the
House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration
reported out the new patent provisions on May 24, 1958.
Exhibit No. i, which is a Xerox copy of a working
draft, bearing only the date "April , 1958, " is more
specifically identified by the handwritten words, "Master
Copy, " and the handwritten initials, "LEF" on the first
page, and the handwritten letters, "24090" and'X6373" also
on the first page. Its patent section, Section 605, is as
follows -
DOCUMENTNO. I
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BILLS - BEN -. 26
dh'ectly involves the (lommission or in which the ('ommis:
slon is dh'ectly interested.
PATENT RIG ITS
SI,:c. (;()5. (a) Eacll contract or other arrangement exe-
cuted pursuant to this Act which rehltcs to sch, ntific research
shall contain provisions govcrnhlg the (lisl)osltiOll of invert-
lions produced thcremlder in a manner calculated to 1)rotcct
the 1)ubli( ' interest and the equities ()_ thv individual or or-.
gallizati()n with which tlm contract or i)tl!el" arrangement i.'i
executed" Provided, how('ccc, That mqhing in this Act shall
I
!
11% construed to authori_e the Col.nlnlbsh)ll t() enter into any
!
i
k,ontra('tmd or other ammgclncnt il!c()nsi_tt'nt with any pro-.
yision of law affc('ting the i,suunet_ _)r usv tff patents.
(b) No officcr or Cml)loyee of the Commissioll shall
ac(luh'e , retahb or trm!sft'r any rights, m!dt'r t!w patent law,
of the United Statts or otherwise, in auy mvt,utmn which
he may make or 1)r()ducc in conlmcth)n wlth l_crforming his
assigned a(.tiviti('s and wlfieh is directly rcl_ted to the subject
matter thcrcof: Procidcd, ho,,_cr, Tlmt this subsc('tioll shall
not l}c construed t()1}rcvcnt any offic¢,r or (,nqdoyee of the
Commission tr_)_n executing any apldi('atio_ for patent on
rely su('l_ inv(.nli_ t'_)r the purposc (ff nssigning the same to
the G_)v('rllllWld or ils IlOlnil_eC in ll(,(!Ol'(hlll('c with ,'s:u.ch
rules and rcgub_lio_s _s the, General Mmmgcr of the (iota-
mission may establi._h.
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Of interest in reading Section 605 of the above
working draft is a comparison to the patent provision of
the National Science Foundation Act of 1950, which provides,
in part, as follows :
(a) Each contract or other arrangement
executed pursuant to this chapter which relates
to scientific research shall contain provisions
governing the disposition of inventions pro-
duced thereunder in a manner calculated to pro-
tect the public interest and the equities of
the individual or organization with which the
contract or other arrangement is executed...
(b) No officer or employee of the Founda-
tion shall acquire, retain, or transfer any
rights, under the patent laws of the United
States, or otherwise, in any invention which
he may make or produce in connection with per-
forming his assigned activities and which is 33_/
directly related to the subject matter thereof...
A comparison of the language of these two provisions
demonstrates that in many respects the language is identical.
There may have been dissatisfaction with the above
provisions, as evidenced by the handwritten notes in the
margin of the working draft, stating "substitute underscored
material on p 38-9 of AEC, without waiver authority; show
(Section 605(a)) as alternative (a) ." However, it is
probable that no patent provision was clearly favored at
33___/ The National Science Foundation Act of 1950, 64 Stat.
154, 42 U.S.C. Section 1871.
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this stage and that alternative patent provisions, derived
from The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and from The National
Science Foundation Act of 1950, were suggested to be listed
so that House Committee members, after consideration of both
provisions, could make a decision at a later date.
Exhibit numbers 3,4,5,6, dated April 30 through May 9,
1958, set out the patent provision in alternative terms, one
reflecting the patent provision in The Atomic Energy Act and
the other reflecting the patent provision in The National
Science Foundation Act. Exhibit numbers 7,8,9, are similar
to Exhibit numbers 3,4,5,6, with respect to the patent pro-
vision and, in addition, contain "staff explanation and
comments." Exhibit No. 9, dated May 16, 1958, may be used
to illustrate the contents of these exhibits and it is inter-
esting, also, because of a handwritten note in the margin.
It is as follows:
DOCUMENTNO. II
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TEXT OF COMMI'ITEE PRINT
1 ADVISORY COMMITTEES
2 SEC. 507. The members of the General Advisory Corn-
3 mittee established pursuant to section 204, and the nmmbers
4 of such other scientific and technical committees as the Ad-
5 ministrator may establish to carry out his fun('tions under this
6 Act, may serve as such without regard to the provisions of
7 sections 281, 283, 284, or 434 of title 18 of the United
$
8 States Code or section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5
9 U.S.C., sec. 99), except insofar as such sections may pro-
10 hibit any such member from receiving compensation in re-
11 spect of any particular matter which dh'ectly involves the
12 Administrator or in which the Administrator is directly
13 interested.
14
PATENT RIGHTS
15 SEC. 508. Any invention o1" discovery made or con-
16 ceived under any contract, subcontract, arrangement, or
17 other relationship with the Administrator, regardless of
18 whether the contract or arrangement involved the expendi-
19 ture of funds by the Administrator, shall be deemed to have
20 been made or conceived by the Administration.
21 [Alternative section 508
22 [SEc. 508. (a) Each contract or other arrangement
23 executed pursuant to this Act which relates to scientific re-
24 search shall contain provisions governing the disposition of
25 inventions produced thereunder in a manner calculated to
t
/ .s ,,J
t_ b?", _a c..,.o-
V .J
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TEXT OF COMMITTEE PRINT
1 protect the public interest and the equities of the individual
2 or organization with which the contract or other arrange-
3 ment is executed; but nothing in this Act shall be construed
4 to authorize the Administrator to enter into any contractual
5 or other arrangement inconsistent with any provision of law
6 affecting the issuance or use of patents.
7 [ (b) No officer or employee of the Administration shall
8 acquire, retain, or transfer any rights, under the patent laws
9 of the United States or otherwise, in any invention which
10 he may make or produce in connection with performing his
11 assigned activities and which is directly related to the subject
12 matter thereof; but this subsection shall not be construed to
13 prevent any officer or employee of the Administration from
14 executing any application for a patent on any such inventidn
15 for tile purpose of assiglling tile same to tile Federal Govern-
16 ment or its nominee in accordance with such rules and reg-
17 ulations as the Administrator may establish.-I
]8 CO,_IPTR.OLLER GENER, AL AUI)IT OF CONTRACTS NEGOTIATED
]9 WITHOUT ADVERTISING
20 SEt,. 5()9. A_,y cq)ntra_'t with the Adminislr_ltor negotiated
21 without advertising shall include a _'lause to the effect that
22 the Comptroller General of the United States or any of his
23 duly authorized representatives shall, during the performance
24 of such contract and until the expiration of three years after
acce.s to and the right to25 final payment thereunder, have ' s.
-37b-
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I
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In Exhibit No. 9 (Document No. II herein) the hand-
written note in the margin next to the first alternative
statement of the patent provision, which is based on The
Atomic Energy Act, reads as follows:
What if K (contract) is w/ DOD (Department
of Defense)? Use this alternative, plus (i)
waiver and procedure; (2) reasonable monetary
award for inventions.34___/
The "staff explanation and comments," which are not
reproduced above_ that accompany the first alternative state-
ment are as follows:
Same as in Atomic Energy Act, except (i) does
not permit the Administrator to waive his claim
to an invention or discovery, and (2) does not
prescribe the procedures governing the issuance
of patents. The Administrator would have no
discretion to permit an employee or contractor
to retain the patent on his invention or
discovery.
Views and Recommendations of Witnesses: Bill
should make it mandatory that anything discovered
by any person while working for the Government
belongs to the United States (Rickover)35___/
34__/Exhibit No. 9, "Bill Establishing a National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration with Staff Explana-
tion and Comments: Printed for the use of the Select
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration,"
Section 508 (May 16, 1958) at 42.
Ibid.
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The "staff explanation and comments" accompanying
the second alternative statement (Section 508(a)), are as
fol lows :
Substantially same as in National Science
Foundation Act. Would permit a contractor of
the Administration to retain the patent on his
invention or discoverv in a proper case.36/
It appears from the handwritten note in the margin
that a decision was made after May 16, 1958, to use an
approach based on The Atomic Energy Act rather than on The
National Science Foundation Act. Whether this decision re-
sulted from a full committee vote, instructions from a
committee member or from a staff member, or in some other
manner, is not known.
Exhibit No. i0, dated May 19, 1958, includes a patent
provision based on the approach of The Atomic Energy Act.
There is no alternative section. Exhibit No. Ii, dated
May 22, 1958, includes a patent provision identical to Sec-
tion 407, as reported out of the House Select Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration, as part of the new bill,
H.R. 12575, on May 94, 1958.
36/ Ibid.
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III. ENACTMENTOF PATENT PROVISIONS IN THE HOUSE.
On June 2, 1958, H.R. 12575 was called up on the
floor of the House for debate and vote. Rep. Thornberry, at
the direction of the House Rules Committee, introduced House
Resolution 577, which formally permitted consideration of
H.R. 12575, and also, provided that general debate on the
bill would be limited to two hours. The resolution was
agreed to.
Rep. McCormack made the opening statement on the bill.
The following comments are from his statement:
Mr. Chairman, the bill before the House to-
day is probably one of the most important bills
that has ever come before the Congress. It is
a bill establishing an agency, the agency of
our Government which will have facing it
problems, duties, and responsibilities of ex-
ploring outer space, so called, and making
discoveries for the benefit of man, an agency
that will be civilian in nature and headed by a
single administrator.
..o.
H.R. 12575 is a new bill, unanimously adopted
by the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space
Exploration, to take the place of the original
administration proposal, which I introduced as
H.R. 11881, to establish a civilian space agency.
There is no need to stress here that the
prompt enactment of this measure is required in
the national interest. The artificial satellites
whirling above our heads have kindled the
imagination of mankind. The challenge and the
opportunity are limitless. In its interim re-
port, the committee spelled out the dimensions
-40-
of this opportunity for science and technology;
for military uses; for economic growth - both
the immediate stimulus to production and em-
ployment and, even more important, the ultimate
economic benefits of technological progress;
for peaceful competition with the Communist
world; and, above all, for the human adventure
in a largely unknown universe.37___/
Most of the two hours of debate was of a general nature, as
illustrated by the above excerpts from Rep. McCormack's
statement. The patent provisions were a minor aspect of the
bill, and official comment was not directed toward them. At
the conclusions of the discussion, H.R. 12575 was unanimously
38/
passed--
Subsequently, representatives of industry and of the
legal profession displayed a marked interest in the patent
provision. There was much dissatisfaction with Section
407.
A very critical statement was adopted by the American
38__/
104 Conq. Re_____c.9916-9917 (1958)
I__d. at 9941 (1958)
Supra, note 23, at 2.
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Patent Law Association (APLA) and was submitted to the United
States Senate on June 3, 1958, recommending an alternative
provision to this section. Their statement is interesting
as an example of the nature of the criticism directed against
Section 407, with arguments addressed to the procedure under
which it was adopted as well as to its substance. 4__ The
statement, in part, is as follows:
The American Patent Law Association is quite
concerned with the patent provisions included
under Section 407 of H.R. 12575 as it was sent
to the Senate on June 3, 1958. Further the
American Patent Law Association is concerned
that, insofar as indicated by Report 1770 of
the House Select Committee on Astronautics and
Space Exploration, no consideration was given
to these provisions during the public hearings.
The report merely summarizes the content of
each of the Subsections without commenting or
indicating that any consideration of the signifi-
cance and effect of these provisions was under-
taken by hhe Committee. The attention of the
House in passing this legislation was undoubtedly
directed to the broad aspects of outer space,
which was the subject of the extensive hearings,
and the vote by no means indicates consideration
or support by the vast majority of the House
members with respect to the patent provisions.
It should be noted that the bill upon which
the hearings were held, H.R. 11881, the companion
bill to S. 3609, contained absolutely no patent
41/ The statement is interesting, also, because some of the
differences between the final patent provision, Sec. 305,
as adopted in the Space Act, supra, and Sec. 407 of H.R.
12575, supra, seem to reflect acceptance of arguments of
this type.
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provisions. Section 407 was added in the re-
written bill after the hearings and no oppor-
tunity was provided for interested persons or
organizations such as APLA to make their views
known. (Emphasis in the statement)
oee
Considering more specifically the patent
provisions of the subject bill, Subsection(a) is
essentially the same as the first sentence of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The APLA has
consistently taken a position in opposition to
this provision of the Atomic Energy Act. Even
the author of this provision has indicated his
dissatisfaction with it and, prior to his
resignation from the Congress, was contemplating
at least amendment thereof, (citation omitted)
ooo
Aside from the basic considerations outlined
above, APLA points out that Section 407(a) em-
ploys the very generalized language found so con-
fusing and undesirable in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, namely, "arrangement or other relation
with the Administrator, regardless of whether the
contract or arrangement involved expenditure of
funds by the Administrator." This language, like
that of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, is suffi-
cient to embrace the assumption by the new
National Aeronautics and Space Administration of
rights to an invention which may be made as a re-
sult of such relationships as mere renting of
facilities or the taking of a license under patents
owned by the Administration.
The APLA is also understandably concerned with
the provision of Section 407(b) of H.R. 12575,
under which, as the Association understands it,
the Administrator, even where he waived the
Administration's claims to an invention or
discovery, would retain the right to license others
to use the invention on such terms as the Adminis-
trator decides, including the establishing by him
of what he considers a reasonably royalty. This
license would apparently not be limited to use for
the Government but merely on the very generalized
-43-
42__/
basis "in the conduct of any activity authorized
by or under this Act." It is believed that the
retention of a non-exclusive license by the
Government to make or have made for governmental
purposes should fully satisfy all requirements
of the Government in this area. This may per-
haps be the intention of the provisions, but, if
so, we suggest it be revised in accordance with
present Department of Defense practice to make
this clear.
... At a minimum the APLA feels that no pro-
visions of the magnitude of those in Section 407
of H.R. 12575 should be enacted without the most
serious consideration being given by the Congress.
Since it is apparent that these provisions have
been g_L_1"" subo_in_d_ if not entirely over-
looked, in the consideration of the major items
of providing for the establishment of the pro-
posed National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, it is submitted that, if speedy enactment
of this legislation is considered of the essence,
Section 407 be eliminated entirely therefrom and
that separate legislation on this subject, if
ultimately considered necessary, be enacted only
after the Congress has had an opportunity to re-
ceive extensive comments from interested indivi-
duals and organizations and to consider in full
the significance of such provisions.4__/
"Statement by the American Patent Law Association,
Re: H.R. 12575 (As Sent to the Senate on June 3,
1958)." (mimeographed)
The date this document bears, June 3, 1958, is proba-
bly erroneously stated. The first paragraph of this
document refers to the same date. Also, it is un-
likely that such a resolution could be drafted,
agreed to, and submitted to the Senate the day after
House passage of H.R. 12575.
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IV. DELETION OF THE SENATE PATENT PROVISIONS BY FLOOR
AMENDMENT.
The same day the American Patent Law statement was
released, June 3, 1958, H.R. 12575 was referred to the Senate
Special Committee on Space and Astronautics. On June ii,
1958, the Senate Committee reported out an amended S. 3609,
which, in addition to other changes, included a patent pro-
vision almost identical to that of Sec. 407 in H.R. 12575.
Section 303 of S. 3609, as reported out of the Committee, in-
cluded three sections, as follows:
Sec. 303(a) Any invention or discovery made
or conceived under any contract, subcontract,
arrangement, or other relationship with the
Agency, regardless of whether the contract or
arrangement involved the expenditure of funds by
the Agency, shall be deemed to have been made or
conceived by the Agency, except that the Direc-
tor may waive the claim of the United States to
any such invention or discovery under such cir-
cumstances as he may deem appropriate.
(b) In any case in which the Director waives
the claim of the United States to an invention
or discovery as authorized by subsection (a), he
shall retain on behalf of the United States the
full right to use such invention or discovery in
carrying out any functions under this act and to
license other persons, on such terms and condi-
tions as the Director may deem appropriate, to
use such invention or discovery in the conduct of
any activities authorized by or under this act.
In any such case the Director may provide for the
I
I
I
43__/Senate Report No. 1701, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.,
1958) •
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(June ii,
%pa_ent by the Agency or by persons licensed
under this subsection, for the use of the in-
vention or discovery, of a reasonable royalty
fee determined by the Director in accordance
with such standards and procedures as he may
establish by regulation.
(c) In any case in which the Director does
not waive the claim of the United States to an
invention or discovery which is deemed to have
been made or conceived by the Agency under sub-
section (a), the Director may grant to the per-
son who made or conceived the invention or dis-
covery, as compensation therefor, a cash award
in an amount determined by the Director in
accordance with such standards and procedures
as he may by regulation establish.44__/
On June 16, 1958, the amended S. 3609 was debated in
the United States Senate. An amendment was offered by
Senator Lyndon Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Special
Committee on Astronautical and Space Exploration to delete
Section 303. The explicit reason in support of this amend-"
ment was to provide leeway to permit the subject of a patent
provision to be resolved in Conference. The debate included
the following discussion in relation to the patent provision,
as quoted from The Cgn_ressional Record:
44__/i04 Conq. Re____cc.11291-11292 (June 16, 1958) reprints the
above quoted material.
104 Con_. Rec. _oo 1_n_ (Iq_8)
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Mr. Johnson of Texas ....
I might add that the Senate bill includes
a patent rights section which is
practically identical with the section in
the House bill. I shall offer an amend-
ment which provides that that section be
deleted in order that the subject of
patent rights may be in conference, be-
cause some Senators feel that it should
be in conference.
Mr. Bridges: What did the Senator from Texas
say he would propose to have deleted?
Mr. Johnson of Texas: The patent rights section.
The Senate bill contains a provision (Sec.
303) which is practically identical with
the section in the House bill. Some of
our friends on the committee, as the
Senator may recall - at least one member
of the committee - asked for time for
further study. In order to give him that
opportunity, and still to enable the
Senate to act on the bill and send it to
conference, it is proposed to delete the
-47-
patent rights section, because the House
bill will contain that section. Then the
whole subject will be in conference, and
the conferees can attempt to evolve a sec-
tion which will be satisfactory to both
sides.
e • e
Mr. Anderson: Mr. President, will the Senator
yield?
Mr. Johnson of Texas: I yield.
Mr. Anderson: That would not mean, however, that
the action of the Senate would be regarded
as desiring to leave the patent section
out of the bill, would it?
Mr. Johnson of Texas: Not at all. It is simply
proposed to have the provision in the
conference, so that it can be adjusted
and framed in language which will be most
desirable.
Mr. Anderson: I have received telegrams concern-
ing the patent section. I do not think
much of them. But I think it would be
well to have the section in conference,
so that it can be adjusted.
-48-
Mr. Johnson of Texas: That is the procedure
which we expect to follow. I am grate-
ful to the Senator from New Hampshire [sic.]
(from New Mexico) for his statement.
gee
Mr. Johnson of Texas: The committee bill
states clearly that it is the fundamental
policy of our country that aeronautical
and space activities should be dedicated
to peaceful purposes and the benefit of all
mankind. We can today see only a short
distance into the future, and we can only
speculate upon a few of the ultimate bene-
fits which the space age can bring to the
people of the world.
We know that there will be tremendous
gains in the economic and physical well-
being of people brought about by discoveries
in the areas of weather prediction and con-
trol, communications, medical science, and
transportation.
There is a provision in the bill
directing the civilian space agency to
-49-
make publicly available all technical in-
formation which the security interests of
the country will permit. We also recom-
mend the enactment of patent provisions
like those contained in the House bill.
These provisions are intended to provide
protection to the interests of the Govern-
ment and at the same time permit ample re-
wards and inducements to inventors to in-
sure their maximum effort. The patent pro-
visions are similar to those in the Atomic
Energy Act, and to the regulations used
now by the Department of Defense and the
National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics.
The Committee reported in accordance
Equating Section 303 with the patent provisions in the
Atomic Energy Act an___dthe patent provisions in the
regulations used by the Department of Defense (Armed
Services Procurement Regulation, Section 9-107) may be
merely an oversight or it may suggest that little atten-
tion was given to the patent section by the Senate
Committee. Compare the description of the Department
of Defense patent practice as stated by Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Donald A. Quarles, supra, with the Atomic
Energy Act provision, supra.
-50-
with the statement I have just made;
but in view of the desire of several
able members of the committee to give
further study to the House section and
because unanimous consent would be re-
quired to write any new language into
the bill if the Senate adopted the identi-
cal language of the House bill, I offer
an amendment and ask that it be read.
The amendment strikes the patent section
from the Senate bill in order that the
House patent section will be in conference.
Then whatever the conferees may agree
upon can be done.
oO.
The Presiding Officer: The question is on
agreeing to the amendment of the Senator
from Texas, to strike out the patent
rights section of the bill.
Mr. Anderson: Mr President --
Mr. Johnson of Texas: I yield to my friend, the
Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. Anderson: The House provision is not identi-
cal with the Senate provision, is it?
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Mr. Johnson of Texas: I am informed it is
practically identical. It is nearly
enough identical so that the Members who
have raised the question are fearful that
in the conference we would not have
sufficient leeway if this provision were
included in the Senate bill.
Mr. Anderson: The telegrams which were received
stated that this provision would permit
the agency to obtain patents. The Atomic
Energy Commission has obtained thousands
of patents, and I know of nothing wrong
with that arrangement.
I am only trying to get the Senator
from Texas to establish whether this will
be done without prejudice to the general
idea---
Mr. Johnson of Texas: Again, I assure the
Senator from New Mexico that it is my
understanding that the patent rights pro-
visions now in the Senate bill, which the
amendment seeks to strike out, are
similar to those in the Atomic Energy Act.
-52-
But some of our friends on the committee
who have deep interest in this field and
who have great knowledge of it believe
that since the provisions in the two bills
are practically identical, in the con-
ference we would not have sufficient leeway
if, following further study, it was felt
that the provision should be changed.
So if the amendment is agreed to,
we then could accept the provision of
the House bill, which is the same as the
one which now would be stricken; or we
could broaden it in accordance with the
judgment of the conferees.
e • .
The Presiding Officer: The question is on agree-
ing to the amendment of the Senator from
Texas.
The amendment was agreed to.
coo
Mr. Bricker...
e • •
When the meeting was held to write
up the bill I was in the frame of mind
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that I did not wish haste to create delay,
and at the time of the hearing I objected
to some of the provisions of the patent
section. I did likewise today.
I know of no field of the law in which
there is more complication, in which there
is more detail and classification of the
various provisions of the law, or in which
there is more highly specialized activity
than in the field of patent law. I be-
lieve that other lawyer Members of the
Senate will confirm what I say when I state
that very few general practitioners are in
a position to criticize the patent pro-
visions of the bill, or to make construc-
tive suggestions, without a thorough con-
sideration of the various provisions.
As a result of that feeling, and of the
opposition which I have heard from patent
lawyers in various parts of the country, I
asked the distinguished ch_irman, the
Senator from Texas (Mr. Johnson) if he
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would not delete that section, so that
there might be an opportunity in con-
ference to consider the objections which
have been made, and perhaps devise a more
constructive provision.
It is different from the atomic
energy section. It varies somewhat from
the law of the country with regard to the
ordinary relationship between the indivi-
dual employee and his employer. A new
trail is being blazed in connection with
the relations between the Government and
scientists employed by it, on the subject
of patents.
oo.
Mr. Saltonstall: Is not the relationship of a
man who may discover something new in
space research, on which he can obtain a
patent, different from that in civilian
research activities? Almost assuredly he
will be an employee of some Government
agency or engaged in work supported or di-
rected by a Government agency when he makes
-55-
his discovery.
Mr. Bricker: That is altogether true. Yet the
relationship of an employee of the Govern-
ment, as it affects his creation or inven-
tion, and the obtaining of a patent for
his creative work, is vitally important.
It is possible that the bill adequately
covers the situation; but what I wish to
do, if possible, is to protect the Govern-
ment in all its rights which arise by
reason of the expenditure of Government
money. Yet, in doing so, I do not wish in
any way to inhibit the creative urge on
the part of the scientists to do something
which may ultimately result in some benefit
to him.
The chairman of the Armed Services
Committee knows that several years ago we
made provision for the payment of approxi-
mately a quarter of a million dollars to
certain scientists who had invented or
created one of the atomic energy schemes,
-56-
and has obtained a patent on it. As a
result, they were rewarded. I want a man
who works on his own to have an opportunity
for such reward, even though his work may
be related to some Government activities
in the space field.
On June 16, 1958, the same day the patent section,
Section 303, of S. 3609 was deleted, the Senate passed H.R.
12575, after substituting the language of amended S. 3609 for
the House text.48--_/
104 Con q. Re____c.11292-11294, 11304-11305
Id. at 11306 (1958).
(1958).
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V_ THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE NATCHER PATENT
SUBCOMMITTEE.
As a result of the marked interest in the patent
provision, following the passage of H.R. 12575 in the House
on June 2, 1958, and dissatisfaction with Section 407, as
illustrated by the statement of The American Patent Law
Association, Rep. John McCormack, Chairman of the Select
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, appointed a
patent subcommittee to review the question pr _A-_vL_^_v any
House-Senate conference.
Rep. William H. Natcher of Kentucky was appointed
chairman of the patent subcommittee. Other members were:
Representatives Brooks Hays, Arkansas; Lee Metcalf, Montana;
Leslie C. Arends, Illinois; Gordon L. McDonough, California;
Kenneth B. Keating, New York. The subcommittee and its
staff discussed the problems involved with many interested
parties, both Government and private, for several weeks.
On the basis of its investigation the patent sub-
committee recommended a revised patent section and a report
to be considered in conference and submitted it to the full
49__/ Supra, note 2G, at 2.
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committee.
follows :
Their recommended patent provision is as
Substitute For Section 407 of H.R. 12575--
Property Rights in Inventions
Sec. 407. (a) Whenever the Administrator de-
termines that an invention or discovery was con-
ceived, reduced to practice, developed, or other-
wise made under, pursuant to, or as a result of
any contract, subcontract, or other arrangement
entered into, with, or on behalf of the Adminis-
tration, the Administrator shall determine,
under subsection (b), whether he is entitled to
all right, title, and interest in and to such
invention or discovery. In the event he deter-
mines that he is not entitled to all right,
title, and interest in and to such an invention
or discovery he shall require the person who con-
ceived, reduced to practice, developed, or other-
wise made the invention or discovery (or his suc-
cessor in interest) to grant to him a nonexclusive,
irrevocable, royalty-free, worldwide license to
make, use, and dispose of the invention or dis-
covery, or to have the invention or discovery made,
used, or disposed of, for governmental purposes.
(b) The Administrator shall be entitled to,
and may require the assignment to him of all
right, title, and interest in and to an inven-
tion or discovery referred to in the first
sentence if he finds that--
(1) the person who conceived, reduced
to practice, developed, or otherwise made
the invention or discovery was employed or
assigned to perform research, development,
or exploration work and the invention or
discovery is directly related to the work he
was employed or assigned to perform, or that
it was within the scope of his employment
so/ "Report of the Patent Subcommittee, House Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration, Re: Section 407,
H.R. 12575," (mimeographed, n.d.), (often referred to
herein as the Natcher Report.)
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duties whether or not it was made during
working hours, or with a contribution by
the Government of the use of Government
facilities, equipment, materials, allocated
funds, information proprietary to the
Government or services of Government em-..
ployees during working hours, or
(2) the person who conceived, reduced
to practice, developed, or otherwise made
the invention or discovery was not employed
or assigned to perform research, develop-
ment, or exploration work, but the invention
or discovery is nevertheless directly re-
lated to the contract or to the work or
duties he was employed or assigned to perform
and was made during working hours, or with a
contribution =_ t_ _,A_nment of the sort
referred to in clause (I).
(c) The Administration shall be considered
a defense agency of the United States for the
purpose of chapter 17 of title 35 of the United
States Code.
(d) The Administrator may acquire, purchase,
and hold patents and other property rights in in-
ventions and discoveries, and he may use, lease,
license (exclusively or nonexclusively), grant,
exchange, sell, and otherwise dispose of the
whole or any part of an invention or discovery
to which he retains title under this section.
As herein provided, the Administrator may, in
cases where he has a right to title under this
section accept a license in lieu thereof when
such action is deemed by him to be in the
national interest.
(e) The Administrator is authorized to
take all suitable and necessary steps to pro-
tect any invention or discovery to which he has
title and to require that contractors or per-
sons who retain title to inventions or discoveries
under this section protect the inventions or
discoveries to which the Administration acquires
a license to use.
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(f) To enable him to carry out his duties
under this Act, the Administrator, under regula-
tions to be prescribed by him, may require all
parties who have entered into contracts, sub-
contracts, or other arrangements with or on
behalf of the Administration, to disclose all
necessary technical data and other pertinent and
followup information relating to inventions and
discoveries made by them or their employees.
Such regulations shall require the contractor to
make disclosure in writing of each invention or
discovery to which subsection (a) may apply
promptly after its conception or first actual
reduction to practice. Any person who shall re-
duce to practice any patentable invention or
discovery and who is or has within six months
been employed under or pursuant to any contract,
subcontract, or other arrangement involving re-
search, development, or exploration, shall be
deemed prima facie to have conceived, reduced to
practice, developed, or otherwise made such in-
vention within the meaning of this section.
(g) In any case in which the Administrator
retains title to an invention or discovery under
this section, he may grant to the individual or
individuals who conceived, reduced to practice,
developed, or otherwise made the invention or
discovery an incentive cash award in an amount
determined by the Administrator in accordance
with such standards and procedures as he may by
regulation establish. Notwithstanding any agree-
ment to the contrary entered into as a condition
of or incident to his employment, such individual
may not be required to pay such award over to
his employer or other person.
(h) There is hereby established within the
Administration an Inventions Review Board which
shall consist of three members appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Members of the Board, while attend-
conferences and meetings of the Board, shall be
entitled to receive compensation at a rate to
be fixed by the Administrator, but not exceeding
-61-
$75 per diem, and while away from their homes or
regular places of business they may be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, as authorized by law for persons in
the Government service employed intermittently.
Members of the Board may serve as such without
regard to the provisions of section 281, 283, or
284 of title 18 of the United States Code, ex-
cept insofar as such sections may prohibit mem-
bers from receiving compensation in respect of
any particular matter which directly involves
the Administrator or in which the Administration
is directly interested.
(i) Any interested person who is dissatis-
fied with the Administrator's action under sub-
section (a) or (b), may appeal to the Inventions
Review Board within 90 days from the date of
such action. The Board shall hear and decide
the issues presented in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act. Any interested
person who is dissatisfied with the decision of
the Board under the preceding sentence may appeal
such decision to the United States District Court
for the district in which he resides. The
summons and notice of appeal may be served at
any place in the United States. Such appeal shall
be governed by the provisions of Section i0 of
the Administrative Procedure Act, and, for the
purposes of that Act, the decision of the Inven-
tions Review Board shall constitute the final
agency action with respect to the issues involved
in the appeal. The judgment of the court shall
be subject to review by the appropriate United
States Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
the United States as provided in section 1291 and
1254 of title 28 of the United States Code.51___/
5i_/ "Substitute For Section 407 of H.R. 12575 - Property
Rights In Inventions," Patent Subcommittee, Select
Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, as
quoted in op. cite, note 26 , su_, at 2-4.
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Accompanying their recommended patent provisions,
the patent subcommittee submitted a report which was not
published, has not been reprinted in the available litera-
ture, and, surprisingly, has been rarely mentioned in
published references to the legislative history. The re-
port is eight double-spaced pages. Since one of the major
conclusions of this study is that this report is crucial
to an understanding of the legislative history of the
patent provisions, and since its significance has been
largely overlooked, a substantial portion of its text will
be quoted. It is entitled, "Report of the Patent Sub-
Committee, House Committee on Astronautics and Space Ex-
ploration, Re: Section 407, H.R. 12575." After quoting
the language of Section 407, the report states as follows:
This section was not in the original bill
recommended by the Administration, on which
hearings were held. The section was added by
the full committee in executive session and
reported as part of H.R. 12575 on May 24.
After the bill was passed by the House but
prior to Senate consideration of a similar sec-
tion of its bill, on the Senate floor on June
ii,52----/ various segments of private industry,
52___/ On this date S. 3609 was reported out of Committee.
See, supra, note 44.
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plus a number of the specialized patent law
organizations, registered objection to the
patent rights section. Their basic thesis
was and is:
(i) Section 407 as it stands is arbi-
trary and restrictive; it will tend to
stifle interest and private endeavor in
the space research and development field.
(2) There is no need for the Government
to retain ownership rights; its interests
will be adequately protected if the pro-
posed agency acquires simply a royalty-
free, non-exclusive license to use the in-
ventions or discoveries _hich result from
its research and development contracts.
(3) There is no need for any patent
provision in the space agency bill since a
license to use may be acquired by regula-
tion and contract.
After due consideration of the problem,
your subcommittee finds itself partially in
agreement with the objection raised in (i)
above. It is not in agreement with (2) and (3).
We recognize that the research and develop-
ment work of the new agency will not be com-
parable, in most respects, to the field of
atomic energy - - and hence that there is no
necessity for a Government monopoly of rights
or interests in all inventions and/or dis-
coveries relating to space exploration. For
this reason we believe section 407 should be
amended.
At the same time your subcommittee believes
there are at least five basic reasons for plac-
ing title to space inventions in the Government
under certain conditions. These reasons are:
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(A) While the nature of developments to
come out of space research in the future
are unknown we do know that some discoveries
are likely to be unprecedentedly powerful
and significant. In certain instances it
may be imperative that the Government have
ownership rights from the beginning. This
need may be as great as in the case of
atomic energy, or even more so.
(B) It may be highly inequitable and con-
trary to our traditional competitive system
to permit a single private party to patent
an invention developed with taxpayers money
in cases where the invention proves to have
unusual commercial value or answers some
universal human need.
(C) The right to title would carry with
it, in essential cases, the ability to ex-
clude others from the field for reasons of
security or of public health and safety.
(D) Title to the invention would be-
stow on the Government an ability to use
such rights for protective or bargaining
purposes.
(E) Government ownership could be a
source of income, it could also be used as
an offset or counterclaim in infringement
suits against the Government, whereas a
mere license is an unenforceable defense to
an infringement suit.
For such reasons as the foregoing, your sub-
committee is of the opinion that the bill should
contain a patent right provision which will pro-
tect the legitimate interests of the United
States.
When the Senate acted on H.R. 12575 it
eliminated entirely the Patent Right section,
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explaining that its purpose in so doing was to
allow the matter to be reconsidered in con-
ference.
After careful study of the problems in-
volved, and in an effort to balance the re-
quisites of government against the needs of pri-
vate enterprise, your subcommittee presents the
accompanying revised draft of section 407 with
the recommendation that it serve as a guide to
House conferees and as the basis for conference
discussion on H.R. 12575.53__/
The rest of the report is an explanation of the
provisions of their recommended substitute Section 407.
Since some of their proposals are similar, and in certain
instances, identical to the patent provisions ultimately
adopted, it is of interest to consider the official expla-
nation of the patent subcommittee, which is as follows:
EXPLANATION OF THE RECOMMENDED NEW DRAFT OF
SECTION 407
Title - - Since there is no question here of
patent issue or patentability, the Section
title, "Patent Rights," has been changed to the
more correct title of "Property Rights In In-
ventions."
Subsection (a) - - Under the old version, title
to inventions developing from any agency con-
tract, arrangement or "other relationship" auto-
matically vested in the Administrator. The
Administrator could, however, waive the govern-
ment's title if he chose. Under the new version,
the Administrator determines if he is entitled
to ownership of the invention according to
53/ Supra, note 75, at 2-5.
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specified standards. If he is so entitled, he
may claim all ownership rights. If he is not
so entitled, he is required to obtain from the
contractor a royalty-free license to use the
invention for government purposes in any way he
deems appropriate. The new version is not de-
signed to be applicable to inventors or others
directly employed by the Agency as government
employees. The rights of government employees
in such matters are already set forth by
Executive Order. (E.O. 10096, Jan. 23, 1950).
Subsection (b) - - This spells out the two con-
ditions under which the Administrator is en-
titled to claim ownership in inventions. In
essence these are (i) when the inventor is em-
ployed or assigned to do research and develop-
ment on Agency business and the invention is
made as part of his job, regardless of govern-
ment contribution; (2) when the inventor is not
hired to do research and development on Agency
business, but the invention is made in relation
to an agency contract and during working hours -
or with government contribution.
Subsection (c) - - New provision. This brings
the Agency under the patent secrecy provisions
of the U.S. Code. Thus if the Administrator de-
termines there is a need for secrecy on an in-
vention developed under Agency contract he may
request the U.S. Commissioner of Patents to hold
up the patent until security permits its
issuance.
Subsection (d) - - New provision. It gives the
Administrator broad authority to acquire and
dispose of patents and property rights in inven-
tions, or any part thereof, as he sees fit. The
section is added because under existing law the
government - on the theory that its rights or
title in inventions are held on behalf of all
the people of the United States - - can do
little more with a patent than dedicate it to
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4public use. Such limitations would be likely
to hamstring the Agency in many ways. This sub-
section gives the Administrator the authority
he will need to make effective use of govern-
ment patents or title rights.54___/ It further
authorizes the Administrator to take a license
to an invention, even though he may be en-
titled to ownership, when such action is deemed
appropriate.
Subsection (e) - - New provision. It permits
the Administrator, when necessary, to make sure
that those who contract with him take steps to
protect their inventions by patent or otherwise.
Subsection (f) - - New provision. This gives
the Administrator, at his discretion, authority
to require that those who contract with him
submit all technical data and information con-
cerning inventions and discoveries which may
be necessary to effective implementation of the
national space program. When required, such
regulations shall require prompt disclosure in
writing.
Subsection (g) - - New provision. This
authorizes the Administrator, at his discretion,
to make incentive cash awards to inventors in
cases where the Administrator elects to take
title to an invention developed under Agency
contracts, such awards are to go to the indi-
vidual who conceived the invention and are not
to be claimed by his employer or firm under any
contract of employment.
Subsection (h) and (i) - - New sections. These
set up an Inventions Review Board and provide
for an administrative appeal from the
s4__/ Compare this subsection with Sec. 203(b)(3) of The
NASA Act, supra.
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Administrator's decisions regarding title to
inventions under the act. They permit con-
tractors who are dissatisfied with such de-
cisions to appeal them within 90 days of the
decision and give the Board authority to take
evidence and sustain or overrule the Adminis-
trator. The decisions of the Board, which are
to be made in accordance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, may be appealed further to
the Federal Courts.55__/
ss__/Supra, note 50, at 5 - 8.
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VI. INFORMAL PRE-CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS, THE CONFERENCE
MEETING, AND THE CONFERENCE REPORT.
On June 16, 1958, the same day the Senate passed
H.R. 12575, having deleted the patent section, the Senate
56/
formally asked for a Conference on the bill.-- Two days
later, June 18, 1958, the House officially agreed to a
57/
Conference.-- The Congressmen who were designated as
Managers on the Part of the House and Senate to constitute
the Conference Committee are listed earlier in this paper.
No official record or papers exist relating to the
deliberations of the Conference members and their staff
prior to conference, and virtually no reference is made to
this period in the available literature. The following
persons were interviewed and requested to state, if they
could recall, what happened immediately prior to Conference:
Mr. Spencer Beresford, formerly Special Counsel, House
Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration;
Mr. Herschel F. Clesner, formerly on the staff, Senate
56_/
57/
104, Cong. Rec. 11,306 (1958).
I__d. at ii,606 (1958).
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Judiciary Committee, on loan to the Senate Special Committee
on Space and Astronautics; Mr. John Herberg, formerly of
the Senate Legislative Counsel's Office, on loan to the
Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics; Mr.
Gerald W. Siegel, formerly on the staff of Senator Lyndon
B. Johnson; and Mr. Philip B. Yeager, formerly Special
Consultant, House Select Committee on Astronautics and
58/
Space Exploration.--
Prior to the House-Senate Conference, staff mem-
bers of the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space
Exploration and the Senate Special Committee on Space and
Astronautics discussed the language of the patent pro-
visions. The patent subcommittee's recommendation was
used as a guideline. The Senate members and staff had
taken no fixed position regarding how the patent provision
should be written, unlike the House side which had the
patent subcommittee's proposal.
The drafting of the provisions for an Inventions
and contributions Board, which appears in Sections 305 and
ss__/The present positions of these persons are listed,
supra, in the Acknowledgements.
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306 of the Space Act, resulted from these pre-conference
informal discussions. This idea resulted from a previously
expressed need for a means to provide incentive awards. A
study had been undertaken of all previous legislation with
awards provisions by a Senate staff member.
In an attempt to lessen Senate objections to the
House patent subcommittee's proposals, changes were in-
formally negotiated by Mr. George J. Feldman, Chief
Counsel and Staff Director, House Select Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration; Mr. Philip B. Yeager,
Mr. Herschel F. Clesner, and others immediately prior to
Conference.
The actual language of the patent provisions that was
approved in Conference was written by staff members immedi-
ately prior to the Conference. Mr. Clesner and Mr. Yeager,
independently of each other, recalled that the final version
of Section 305 was a Senate staff draft, except for sub-
sections 305 (a) (i) and (2), which were based upon the
House patent subcommittee's recommendations. Mr. Clesner
stated that the Senate staff draft was used simply because
it was clearer and because the particular draft was the
closest one to the recommendations of the patent subcommittee,
as the Senate members and staff had taken no position on this
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or other working drafts.
One official meeting of the Conference Committee was
held, which was on July 15, 1958. The only official record
of the Conference Committee is the Conference Report, House
6o/
Report No. 2166, dated July 15, 1958.
The influence of the staff members on the content of
Sec. 305 was the subject of comment of the Patent
Section of the American Bar Association, Supplemental
Report of Committee No. 1 - Government Relations to
Patents (ABA, Patent Section, 1958).
the following:
The Report states
On the day before this Conference Report
(Report No. 2166, July 15, 1958, to accompany
H.R. 12575, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.) the Section
Chairman, accompanied by the Chairman of the
Committee on Legislation and the Chairman of
the Committee, conferred with the Legislative
Assistant to the Honorable Lyndon Johnson,
Senate Majority Leader, to outline the position
of the American Bar Association with respect to
analogous provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.
At that conference, the Section representatives
were assured that the Senate conferees were en-
deavoring to have the original House patent
provisions modified to protect inventors and in-
dustry. SO FAR AS CAN BE ASCERTAINED THE PATENT
PROVISIONS OF THE "NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ACT OF 1958" ORIGINATED WITH A MEMBER OF
THE STAFF OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE. To express
the opposition of our Section and the American
Bar Association to this legislation hastily en-
acted without opportunity of hearings, this
Committee recommends the second paragraph of the
resolution... (disapproving the patent provisions).
(Emphasis added)
House Report No. 2166, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 15,
1958).
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The patent provisions were one of several issues
to be resolved at Conference. Senator Saltonstall listed
six major issues, including the question of the patent
policy, that remained to be resolved, as a result of dif-
ferences between the House and Senate bills. The other five
issues were as follows: (i) whether there should be a
Policy Board and an operating agency headed by a single
civilian or merely a one-man agency; (2) whether there
should be a joint committee of Congress or two separate
committees; (3) whether special pay provisions, including
supergrades, should be included; (4) whether a provision for
transfer authority should be included; (5) the question of
the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense on purely de-
fense matters. However, by this time the patent pro-
visions had become a very important issue. Mr. Philip B.
Yeager stated that the question of the patent provisions and
the question whether there should be a joint committee of
Congress were the two issues on which most time was spent
in Conference. The patent sectio_ as Rep. McCormack noted
"Government Assistance to Invention and Research: A
Legislative History," Study of the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on
th9 _udiciary, United States Senate, 86th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1960) at 131, quoting Senator Saltonstall's
statement.
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in a statement quoted below, was the only part of the bill
extensively revised by the Conferees.
As a result of the Conference meeting, the dif-
ferences between the House and Senate bills were resolved.
The patent section agreed to was Section 305 of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The entire discussion
of this patent section in the Conference Report is as
follows:
Patents and invention rights
The House bill contained a section on
"Patent Rights" which in essence provided that -
(i) The United States should receive
title to any invention or discovery made
or conceived under any contract or other
arrangement with the Administration.
(2) The Administrator could waive title
to such discoveries at his discretion, but
in such instances was required to retain
the "full right" to use the invention for
Government purposes. He could further
license other persons to use the invention
on terms and conditions to be promulgated by
him.
(3) The Administrator was authorized, in
cases where title was retained in the Govern-
ment, to make cash compensation awards in
accordance with regulations determined by
him.
The Senate eliminated a similar section en-
tirely in order to permit further consideration
of the problem in conference.
OPERATING ON THE THEORY THAT THE GOVERN-
_ENT'$ INTERESTS MUST BE PROTECTED_ BUT WITH
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THE CONCOMITANT PURPOSE OF PROTECTING PRIVATE
INTERESTS AND OF KEEPING PRIVATE INCENTIVE AND
INITIATIVE AT A HIGH LEVEL a THE COMMITTEE OF
CONFERENCE ADOPTED ENTIRELY NEW PATENT PRO-
VISIONS. (Emphasis added)
Section 305. Property rights in inventions
The section has been renamed "_roperty
Rights In Inventions." Since there are no
questions of technical patentability or patent
issue involved here, the new title is more
accurate.62/
Subsection (a) provides that title to in-
ventions and discoveries made pursuant to or as
the result of contracts with the Administration
shall become the property of the United States
accordinq to a specified standard. (Emphasis
in Report) The two conditions under either of
which the Administrator is entitled to ownership
in inventions are (i) when the inventor is em-
ployed or assigned to do research and develop-
ment on Administration business and the inven-
tion is made as part of hisl job; (2) when the
inventor is not hired to do research and develop-
ment on Administration business, but the inven-
tion is made in relation to a contract with the
Administration either during working hours or
with Government contribution. The Administrator,
however, is authorized to waive all or any part
of the Government's rights of ownership.63__/
63__/
Compare the similarity of the language of this para-
graph with that of the first paragraph in the Natcher
Report's Explanation of the Recommended New Draft of
Section 407, supra.
Compare the similar and, in some respects, identical
language of Sec. 305(a) (i) and (2) and Sec. 407 (b)
(i) and (2) of the Natcher patent subcommittee's "Sub-
stitute For Section 407 of H.R. 12575 - Property Rights
in Inventions." supra.
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Subsection (b) authorizes the Administrator
to require that those contracting with him dis-
close promptly all pertinent technical informa-
tion respecting inventions and innovations made
pursuant to such contracts.64___/
Subsections (c) and (d) provide a means for
the determination, by independent authority sub-
ject to judicial review, of any controversy with
respect to the validity of the Administrator's
claim of title to any invention. Any person
could file with the Commissioner of Patents an
application for a patent supported by a state-
ment of the facts concerning the relationship of
the invention described therein to work per-
formed under Administration contracts. If such
invention were determined by the Commissioner to
be patentable, a patent would be issued to the
applicant in due course unless the Administrator,
within 90 days after receipt of the supporting
statement, made request for the issuance of such
patent to him. If such request were to be made
by the administrator, the applicant would be en-
titled to receive a hearing before a Board of
Patent Interferences in the Patent Office on the
question of the entitlement of the Administrator
to take title to such patent, and the determina-
tion made by such Board would be subject to re-
view by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in accordance with usual procedures for review
of determinations made by such Board in other
proceedings.
Subsection (e) provides means whereby the
Administrator may claim title to any patent
issued to a private party on the ground that such
patent had been procured through a false repre-
sentation made by such part as to material facts
Compare Sec. 305 (b) with Sec. 407 (f) of the Natcher
patent subcommittee's "Substitute For Section 407 of
H.R. 12575 - Property Rights in Inventions," supra.
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concerning the relationship of the invention
described therein to work performed by such
party under an Administration contract. The
issue so presented would be determined
initially by a Board of Patent Interferences in
the Patent Office after hearing, and its de-
termination would be subject to review by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Subsection (f) sets out the conditions
under which the Administrator may waive title to
inventions. THESE ARE THAT THE WAIVER MUST BE
IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT,
UPON WAIVER, THE ADMINISTRATION SHALL ACQUIRE A
LICENSE TO USE TH_ INVENTION FOR GOVERNMENT
PURPOSES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD,
AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, PURSUANT TO PROPER
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY THE UNITED
STATES, MAY BE GIVEN A SIMILAR RIGHT OF USE.
WHERE WAIVER IS BEING CONSIDERED, PROPOSALS FOR
WAIVER ARE SUBMITTED TO AN INVENTIONS AND CON-
TRIBUTIONS BOARD, SET UP WITHIN THE ADMINISTRA-
TION. THE BOARD HEARS ALL INTERESTED PARTIES,
MAKES A RECORD OF FACTS INVOLVED, AND RECOM-
MENDS FINAL ACTION TO THE ADMINISTRATOR. (Em-
phasis added) 65_/
Subsection (g) requires the Administrator
to promulgate regulations specifying the terms
and conditions upon which licenses would be
65/ With regard to the authority to waive rights in an
invention, Sec. 305(f) uses the standard "... if the
Administrator determines that the interests of the
United States will be served thereby"; Sec. 407(a) as
passed by the House in H.R. 12575, uses the standard
"... under such circumstances as the Administrator may
deem appropriate"; the patent subcom_mittee's proposed
substitute Sec. 407(d) uses the standard "... when such
action is deemed by him to be in the national interest."
See pages 15, 32 and 60, supra for these provisions. If
there is any significant difference in these broad tests
for waiver, Sec. 305 is more like the proposed sub-
stitute Sec. 407(d) than the House passed Sec. 407(a).
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granted by the Administration for the practice
of inventions for which the Administration
holds patents.
Subsection (h) permits the Administrator,
when necessary, to make sure that those who con-
tract with him take steps to protect their in-
ventions, by patent or otherwise, and minimizes
the risks resulting from patent interference.
Subsection (i) brings the Administration
under the patent secrecy provision of the United
States Code. Thus the Administrator may re-
quest the Commissioner of Patents to hold up
patents on inventions where a need for secrecy
may exist. 6__/
Subsection (j) contains definitions of
terms used in this section.67_//
In addition to Section 305, the Conference Committee
in Section 203 (b) (3) retained a House provision authoriz-
ing the acquisition, use, and disposal of property, but
added language specifically including patents and patent
rights. Also, in Section 306, the Conference Committee
Sec. 305(i) is worded identically to Sec. 407(c) of the
patent subcommittee's proposed substitute Sec. 407.
Compare then the subsections, supra.
House Report No. 2166, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (July 15,
1958) at 22 - 24.
Supra, note 64, at 19.
-79-
authorized payment of cash awards for scientific and
technical contributions. 6-_/
69__/Sec. 306 is broader in scope than analogous pro-
visions of Sec. 407(g) of the patent subcommittee's
proposed substitute, and of Sec. 407(c) of H.R. 12575.
Compare these sections, supra.
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VII FLOORDISCUSSION AND FINAL PASSAGE.
The day after the Conference Meeting, July 16,
1958, H.R. 12575 was called up in the House of Representa-
tives. The statement of the Managers on the Part of the
70/
House was read.-- The entire portion of this Statement
relating to Section 305 was earlier quoted.
After the above statement was read, the Conference
Report was accepted. Rep. McCormack made the opening
address. His statement is probably the most significant
official statement of the Congressional intent of the
property rights in inventions provisions of the Space Act.
As quoted from The Conqressional Record, his statement be-
gins as follows:
Mr. McCormack: Mr. Speaker, this body is meet-
ing in a time of crisis. The safety of
the Free World hangs on the wisdom of
the leaders of this country and of the
other countries who have the same basic
goals of freedom and human dignity which
motivates the United States ....
i04 Cong. Re___cc.13,978 (1958).
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II know that it is hard for all of us
in the middle of a current crisis demand-
ing immediate solutions (referring to the
Lebanon crisis) to turn our attention to
the approaching shadow of a future crisis.
But I am sure that the majority of the
Members recognize that unless the United
States acts swiftly today to meet the
future crisis of Soviet outer space
supremacy, this country in a very few
years, sooner than most people realize,
will face a crisis of such magnitude as
to make the problems of today seem
picayune.
If the Soviet Union alone develops
its space capabilities, the terrible
possibility is that the United States
and the Free World will eventually come
face to face with an ultimatum for
surrender, with destruction of our peo-
ple and cities the only alternative.
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Freedom, fought for over the centuries,
will have been lost to the first world-
wide tyranny. This we must not let
happen through our failure to heed the
clear warning of today. Five or ten
years from now it will be too late.
The above paragraphs from Rep. McCormack's opening
address on H.R. 12575 illustrate the feelings of urgency in
Congress, set off by the launching of the first earth
satellite, Sputnik I, by the Soviet Union on October 4,
1957, mentioned earlier in this paper.
After discussing the potential for peaceful uses of a
space-development program, Rep. McCormack continued his
address, in part, as follows:
This House and the Senate have shown
they understand both the great blessings
which can flow from space development
and the grim realities of defense. They
showed this by unanimously passing their
respective bills relating to space.
Yesterday the conference committee of the
71___/ I__dd.at 13,985-13,986.
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two Houses met and reconciled the
differences of language between the two
bills. There was never any real
difference as to fundamental purposes...
The unanimous report of the conference
committee and the explanation of the House
managers is before you. When the Con-
gress enacts this bill, it will provide
the Chief Executive with the tools he re-
quires to carry out a well-integrated
space program.
.co
THE PATENT PROVISION OF THE HOUSE BILL
IS THE ONLY PART OF THE BILL EXTENSIVELY
REVISED BY THE CONFEREES. THE SENATE
VERSION CARRIED A PATENT PROVISION
CLOSELY SIMILAR TO THE PROVISION IN THE
HOUSE BILL. THIS WAS DROPPED BY FLOOR
AMENDMENT JUST BEFORE PASSAGE IN THE
SENATE IN ORDER TO ALLOW THIS SECTION TO
GO TO CONFERENCE.
THE REVIEW AND THE REDRAFTING WERE WISE.
THE SELECT COMMITTEE CREATED A SPECIAL
SUBCOMMITTEE TO STUDY THE MATTER a AND
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.AFTER TALKING WITH MANY EXPERTS IN AND
OUT OF GOVERNMENT ARRIVED AT A NEW VER-
SION a DRAWING UPON BOTH SENATE AND HOUSE
SUGGESTIONS. THE ORIGINAL PATENT PRO-
VISION WAS TOO CLOSELY PATTERNED AFTER THE
STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS IN THE ATOMIC
ENERGY ACT WHICH ARE NOT FULLY APPLICABLE
TO THE SPACE FIELD. THE SUBSTITUTE PRO-
VISION AGREED TO BY THE CONFEREES PROTECTS
BOTH THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
AFFORDS ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY TO THE SPACE
ADMINISTRATOR TO LET HIM MEET NEEDS FOR
PRESERVING THE INCENTIVES OF THE INDIVI-
DUALS AND COMPANIES WHOSE EFFORTS IT IS
PUBLIC POLICY TO ENCOURAGE. (Emphasis
Added) V_/
The above sentence stating that "[t]he original patent pro-
vision was too closely patterned after the stringent require-
ments in the Atomic Energy Act which are not fully applicable
to the space field" officially emphasizes one of the princi-
pal conclusions in the Natcher Report. Since this sentence
is immediately preceded in the same paragraph by a reference
72/ I__dd.at 13,986-13,987.
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acknowledging the investigation of the Natcher patent sub-
committee and its recommended substitute provisions, it is
a reasonable, if not compelling, inference that Rep.
McCormack's statement was either based upon, or influenced
by, the Natcher Report.
After Rep. McCormack's address, the next Congressman
to discuss the patent provisions was Rep. Keating. His
comments were the most extensive made on the floor of
Congress.
While reading Rep. Keating's statement, the reader
should compare the similar and in many respects identical,
language of his statement with the language used in the
Natcher Report. For example, Rep. Keating_ list of the
reasons for placing title to space inventions in the Govern-
ment under certain conditions is identical to the list in
the Natcher Report. This statement, as with Rep. McCormick's
statement, shows agreement with the Natcher Report and is
apparently an attempt to make the results of the delibera-
tions of the patent subcommittee public and part of the
official record. His statement is as follows:
Mr. Keating: Mr. Speaker, much discussion is
going on over the patent section to this
bill - and rightly so, for the American
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patent setup is certainly one of the
keystones to our national economic system.
I want to emphasize that the patent
section in this bill has been subjected
to careful scrutiny and study. It repre-
sents, as the statement of managers
suggests, a balancing effort. We felt
we would be derelict in our duty if we
failed to protect the legitimate interests
of government. At the same time we en-
deavored not to remove any incentive from
private enterprise.
We think this section will accomplish
both ends.
After H.R. 12575 passed the House, the
Chairman of our committee appointed a
patent subcommittee to review the entire
matter. It [sic.] [I] was a member of
this subcommittee - which considered ex-
tensively the views of private industry,
the patent law associations and other bar
groups, counsel for the Senate and House
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Judiciary Committees, the patents
section of the Department of Justice and
members of the Government Patents Board.
The Senate committee and its staff made
a similar investigation.
It soon became clear that the Congress
was faced with three major alternatives
in dealing with the patents question.
First. It could drop entirely any
reference to patents or property rights
in inventions. This would leave the
matter mainly up to the Administrator to
handle as he sees fit.
Second. It could follow the policy
employed by various departments of govern-
ment and require that contractors dealing
with the administration and doing its
research and development should give the
Government an irrevocable, nonexclusive,
royalty-free license to use the inven-
tions so developed. My personal inclina-
tion, I might say parenthetically, leaned
in favor of this approach.
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Third. It could give the Government
title to the inventions developed -
either a_tomatically in all cases, or in
certain selected cases with the provisio
that the Government be accorded a license
of use in instances when it did not have -
or want - title.
The objections raised to the original
patent sections of the House and Senate
may be summarized as follows:
First. The sections were arbitrary
and restrictive and would tendto stifle
interestand private endeavor in space
research and development.
Second. There is no need for the
Government to retain ownership rights;
its interests will be adequately protected
if the administration acquires simply a
royalty-free, irrevocable license to use
the inventions which result from the re-
search and development contracts it
sponsors.
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Third. There is no need for any
patent provision, since a license to use
may be acquired by contract or agreement.
After due consideration of the problem,
the committees of both Houses found them-
selves in partial agreement with the ob-
jections raised in the first summary.
They are not in agreement with those
raised in the third summary. I am per-
sonally sympathetic to the contentions
advanced regarding the second summary,
but I feel a reasonably satisfactory re-
sult has been achieved.
The conferees recognized that research
and development in the aeronautical and
space sciences will not be comparable, in
most respects, to that in the field of
atomic energy - and hence that there is no
necessity for a Government monoply of rights
or interests in all inventions and/or dis-
coveries relating to space exploration.
For this reason, it was felt that the
patent section needed amendment.
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And the patent provision in this con-
ference report does not automatically -
as I understand the Atomic Energy Act
does - give all property rights in in-
ventions to the Government.
At the same time there appears to be
a number of vital reasons for placing
title to space inventions in the Govern-
ment under certain conditions. Some of
the reasons are these:
(A) While the nature of developments
come out of space research in the future
are unknown, we do know that some dis-
coveries are likely to be unprecedentedly
powerful and significant. In certain in-
stances it may be imperative that the
Government have ownership rights from the
beginning. This need may be as great as
in the case of atomic energy, or even more
so.
(B) It may be highly inequitable and
contrary to our traditional competative
system to permit a single private party
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to patentan invention developed with tax-
payers' money in cases where the inven-
tion proves to have unusual commercial
value or answers some universal human
need.
(C) The right to title would carry
with it, in essential cases, the ability
to exclude others from the field for reasons
of security or of public health and safety.
(D) Title to the invention would be-
stow on the Government an ability to use
such rights for protective or bargaining
purposes.
(E) Government ownership of patent
rights permits offset or counterclaims in
infringement suits against the Government.
Mr. Speaker, I submit these are sub-
stantial reasons for giving title to the
United States under appropriate circum-
stances.
But I want to emphasize those words
"appropriate circumstances." It is be-
cause the new provision actually does
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set up a reasonable standard for regula-
ting public ownership that I feel it
serves its intended purpose. Under this
bill the United States is entitled to
ownership only in two instances:
First. When the inventor is employed
or assigned to do research and development
in relation to a contract with the new
Space Agency and the invention is made as
part of his job.
Second. When the inventor is not
specifically hired to do research and de-
velopment, but the invention is made in
relation to a contract with the Administra-
tion and is made during working hours or
with a Government contribution of money,
facilities, equipment, and so forth.
In all other circumstances, title to
the invention remains in the inventor or
his employer, depending on their con-
tractual relationship.
This seems to me to be a fair require-
ment on the part of the Government, as
-93-
well as an essential one for the benefit
of private industry.
Let me point out, too, that in this
new version we have provided for appeal
and judicial review in cases where inven-
tors feel their invention is improperly
classified as subject to Government owner-
ship. In such cases they may take their
case to the Board of Patent Interferences
in the Patent Office of the United States,
and the decision of the Board may be re-
viewed by the courts.
We have added a new section which pro-
vides that incentive cash awards may be
given to inventors or firms which make
significant technical contributions to
the national space program.
Note that such awards may go to any
person or any organization, whether or not
the contribution is patentable and whether
or not is made under government contract.
Note also that standards and safeguards
have been provided to guide the Administra-
tor in making such awards and to assure
-94-
they are kept within reason.
In conclusion, it is my feeling that the
conference report in general represents an
_ii_ t ._i,._- to ...... has been a
difficult approach to a very nebulous
area.
We may have to make some changes in the
space program as we have set it up. I
suspect we will, since it is impossible
to see exactly where we are going.
But this act is a good start and I am
confident it will put our space program
on the road.-
The above statement of Rep. Keating is essentially consis-
tent with and an elaboration of the statement of Rep. Mc-
Cormick. Their statements constitute the two most important
declarations of Congressional intent relating to the patent
provisions made on the floor of Congress prior to the
passage of the Space Act.
The same day that the above two statements were made,
July 16, 1958, H.R. 12575 came up for a final vote in the
United States House of Representatives. Other than the above
104 Conq. Re____c.,at 13,987-13,988 (1958).
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two statements, no further explanation of the patent pro-
vision was made. The House then unanimously passed H.R.
12575.
Also, on July 16, 1958, H.R. 12575, as reported out
of the Conference Committee, was called up on the United
States Senate.75-_/During the discussion, which occupied
less than one full page in The Conqressional Record, there
was no statement of legislative intent with reference to the
patent provision. A final vote was taken on the bill and
the Senate unanimously passed H.R. 12575. 77-//
On July 29, 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
signed H.R. 12575 as Public Law 85-568, enacting into law
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. 7-'_/
76/
77___/
Id. at 13,985 (1958).
Id. at 13,936 (1958).
Ibid.
Ibid.
I d. at 15,610 (1958).
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The major purpose of this study was to examine the
legislative hisotry of the property rights in inventions
provisions of the Space Act. Other complementary provisions
were also considered. A subsidiary purpose was to attempt
to answer the following question: What intent did Congress
express, if any, relative to how the Administrator of NASA
should exercise the discretionary authority of Subsections
305 (a) and (f) of the Space Act to prescribe regulations,
and pursuant thereto, decide whether to waive all or part
of the rights acquired by NASA to the inventions of its
contractors and subcontractors?
The existing literature has omitted, in my opinion,
a key link to a proper understanding of the legislative
history. The significance of the Natcher patent subcom-
mittee investigation, its recommendations, and, most im-
portantly, its unpublished report, has not been adequately
recognized. This information permits a clearer understand-
ing of what happened both before and, especially, after the
work of this subcommittee, and, also, a clearer understand-
ing of the intent of'Congress with respect to the question
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posed above. Also, the literature does not include an
examination of the preliminary working drafts from the
official files of the legislative history of the Space Act.
This information reveals indecisiveness in the early stages
of the legislative history about what type of patent pro-
visions, if any, should be included. In addition, very
little reference is made in the literature about what
happened __mmediatelv_ prior to the Conference Meeting. In-
terviews with former staff members provided interesting, al-
though probably not legally significant, information, of the
Pre-conference discussions, negotiations, and drafting, and
particularly, of the role played by staff members.
The story of the legislative history of the property
rights in inventions provisions of the Space Act may be
su/r_arized and conclusions stated by somewhat arbitrarily
dividing the sequence of events into three stages. The
first stage may be termed, Pre-H.R. 12575 or Period of Un-
importance and Indecision. This period began after the
launching of the first earth satellite, Sputnik I, by the
Soviet Union on October 4, 1957, and, perhaps, began offi-
cially on April 2, 1958, with a Presidential Message to
Congress. It ended shortly before May 24, 1958, the date a
new bill, H.R. 12575, was reported out of the House Select
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Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration, following
a decision made in executive session to include a patent
section in the bill. Prior to this date, no patent provi-
sions were officially under consideration in Congress and
little attention was focused upon the question of patent
policy.
The second stage may be termed, H.R. 12575-To-Con-
ference or Period Of Decision Followed By A Period Of In-
vestigation. This period began on May 24, 1958, when H.R.
12575 with the new patent section was reported out of the
House Committee. During this period H.R. 12575 was enacted
by the House on June 2, 1958, with the patent section un-
changed. On July 16, 1958, an almost identical section was
deleted from the Senate bill, S. 3609, by Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson's floor amendment. The Natcher patent subcommittee
was appointed, undertook the most extensive investigation
made of the patent provisions, and submitted a recommended
substitute patent section and an accompanying report. Pre-
Conference discussions, negotiations, and drafting ensued,
bringing this stage to a close before the Conference Meet-
ing on July 15, 1958.
The third stage may be termed, Conference-Debate-
Final Enactment or Period of Decision and Official Comment.
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This period began with the Conference Meeting on July 15,
1958. Subsequently, three major statements of Congressional
intent were delivered, one in writing and the other two
orally, as follows: (i) one paragraph on page twenty-three
of the Conference Report; (2) Rep. John W. McCormack's state-
ment on the House floor on July 16, 1958; (3) Rep. Kenneth
B. Keating's statement on the House floor on July 16, 1958.
The _=_ v _v_ _........ _aken in the House and Senate on July
16, 1958. This stage ended on July 29, 1958, when President
Dwight D. Eisenhower signed H.R. 12575, as Public Law 85-
568, enacting into law The National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958. Following this discussion, a section with
conclusions to the question of the Congressional intent of
the waiver provisions will conclude this paper.
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I • PRE-H.R. 12575 or PERIOD OF UNIMPORTANCE AND
INDECISION.
Congress was called to action in a period of crisis.
The launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, dramatically
demonstrated to the world that the Soviet Union claimed the
first major victory in the space race. It was a blow
to America's national prestige. It illustrated the Soviet
Union's military advantage in the area of long range missiles.
It provoked fears that a decisive military advantage might
be obtained by the first nation to "conquor" outer space.
It raised the possibility of enormous economic advantages in
such areas as communications and weather forecasting from
the peaceful use of outer space. President Eisenhower re-
sponded officially by transmitting a Message to the Congress
on April 2, 1958, recommending the establishment of a new,
independent agency. This agency would be given power and
funds adequate to assume the responsibility for programs re-
lating to space technology, space science, and civil space
exploration, and to absorb the existing National Advisory
Committee of Aeronautics. Twelve days later this Message
was followed by the Administration's bill, drafted in the
_, note 15, at 21.
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Bureau of the Budget and introduced in identical form in
the House, as H.R. 11881, by Rep. John W. McCormack and in
the Senate, as S. 3609, by Senators Lyndon B. Johnson and
8O/
Styles Bridges.
Congress was expected to act quickly. A subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Armed Sercies already had conducted
hearings on the country's satellite and missile programs
from November 25, 1957, to January 23, 1958. Extraordinary
action already had been taken by Congress in creating a
Special Committee on Space and Astronautics in the Senate
on February 6, 1958, headed by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson
and a Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration
in the House on March 5, 1958, headed by Rep. John W. Mc-
81/
Cormack.
At this time the question of patent policy was the
major "sleeper" of the Space Act. Many major policy
questions then appeared to warrant the attention of the
House and Senate special committees and none of them had
anything to do with patent provisions. The President's
Message did not mention this question. The Administration's
80___/ Supra, pages 20-24.
81/ Ibid
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bill included no patent provisions.
Few references were made to patent policy in the pub-
lic hearings before the House Select Committee on Astronau-
tics and Space Exploration from April 15 through May 12,
1958. In the 1542 pages of published testimony and exhibits,
the major discussion of patent policy was by Dr. Hugh L.
Dryden, Director, The National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics, who described NACA's patent practices. Also, Adm.
Hyman G. Rickover, Assistant Chief, Bureau of Ships, For
Nuclear Propulsion, Department of the Navy, submitted a
written statement urging the need for patent provisions that
would protect the rights of the United States in inventions
83y
resulting from government-financed research --
Likewise, few references were made to patent policy
in the public hearings before the Senate Special Committee
on Space and Astronautics from May 6 through May 15, 1958.
Mr. Paul G. Dembling, General Counsel, The National Ad-
visory Committee for Aeronautics, in response to a question
from Senator Clinton P. Anderson, noted that no patent
!
!
Supra, page 24.
Supra, pages 29-31.
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provisions were included in the Administration's bill. Mr.
Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, testified
to the patent policy of the Department of Defense. He recom-
mended that the new agency should follow the patent policy of
his Department, which would not require adding patent pro-
visions to the Administration's bill 8-_/.
While the question of _atent policy was rarely men-
tioned during the public committee hearings, there is clear
evidence that during this period this question wa_. _ c_ered_.......
by House staff members, who were presumably acting according
to instructions. Eleven preliminary working drafts of the
House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration
were examined. These drafts were obtained from the original
files of the legislative history of the Space Act. Among
the proposed changes to the Administration's bill, these
drafts show the addition of a patent section.
Moreover, these drafts show that while the question
of patent policy was considered, indecisiveness prevailed
as to what type of patent policy was desired. The first
draft had a patent section, included in this paper as
Supra, pages 24-29.
Supra, pages 34-39.
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Document No. I, patterned after The National Science Foun-
dation Act of 1950. The next eight drafts included two
patent sections, alternatively stated, one patterned after
The National Science Foundation Act of 1950 and the other
patterned after The Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The ninth
draft, dated May 16, 1958, is the last draft containing the
two patent sections. The tenth draft, dated May 19, 1958,
had only one patent section, the one patterned after The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Therefore, sometime between
May 16 and May 19, 1958, a decision was made, assuming that
patent provisions were to be included, to recommend an
approach patterned after The Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Ibid.
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II. H.R. 12575-TO-CONFERENCE or PERIOD OF DECISION
FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION.
The decision to add a patent section to the Adminstra-
tion's bill and the decision to add a particular section
patterned after The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 were made in
executive session by the House Select Committee on Astronau-
tics and Space Exploration. Available information does not
include a statement of the reasons for making this decision
or a statement of intention or purpose by the Committee.
This patent section became Section 407 of H.R. 12575,
a new bill reported out of the House Select Committee on
Astronautic and Space Exploration on May 24, 1958, to replace
the Administration's bill, H.R. 11881. No statement of in-
tention or explanation relating to Section 407 accompanied
88/
this new bill.-
On June 2, 1958, H.R. 12575 was called up on the
House floor for debate and a vote. A House Rules Committee
resolution limited debate to two hours. The debate was
mostly of a general nature and comments were not directed
87/ Supra, pages 31-34.
88/ Ibid.
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to the patent section. Rep. McCormack's opening statement
urged that prompt enactment of H.R. 12575 was required in
the national interest. H.R. 12575 was unanimously passed.
Representatives of the legal p_9_n =_; of _-
dustry began to display an increasingly intense interest in
the newly enacted Section 407. The American Patent Law
Association's statement is an example of the strong protest
against this section, critizing not merely its content, but
the legislative procedure that was followed.
On June 3, 1958, H.R. 12575 was referred to the
Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics. On June
ii, 1958, this Committee reported out an amended S. 3609,
which included a patent section almost identical to Section
407. On June 16, 1958, this bill was called up on the
Senate floor for debate and a vote.
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson made a motion to delete the
patent section. He explained that his amendment was offered
to allow time for further study requested by Committee
Supra, pages 40-41.
Supra, pages 41-44.
Supra, pages 45-46.
-107-
members and, because the language of the House and Senate
bills was almost identical, to permit the subject to be con-
sidered and resolved in Conference. The amendment was agreed
to, and the Senate passed H.R. 12575, after substituting the
92_/
language of amended S. 3609 for the House text.--
The question of patent policy was now emerging as an
issue of major importance. Rep. John W. McCormack appointed
a patent subcommittee to review the question of patent
policy prior to a Conference Meeting. Rep. William H.
Natcher, of Kentucky, was appointed chairman of this sub-
committee. Other representatives appointed to this subcom-
mittee were: Brooks Hays, Arkansas; Lee Metcalf, Montana;
Leslie C. Arends, Illinois; Gordon L. McDonough, California;
Kenneth B. Keating, New York. The appointment of this sub-
committee reflects the importance of the question of patent
policy and, also, reflects the fact that the question had re-
ceived insufficient attention prior to the passage of H.R.
12575 in the House on June 2, 1958, and in the Senate on
June 16, 1958.
The Natcher patent subcommittee and its staff dis-
cussed the issues involved with many interested parties,
92/
93/
Supra, pages 46-57.
Supra, page 58.
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both Government and private, for several weeks. Its in-
quiry was the most extensive official investigation made of
the patent provisions. As a result of its investigation,
the subcommittee submitted a substitute patent section and
an accompanying unpublished report expressing its intention
94/
or purpose and reasons for recommending changes.-
The report of the Natcher patent subcommittee, which
has been largely neglected in the literature, in my opinion,
is crucial to a correct understanding of the legislative
history. Section 407, patterned after The Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, and unaccompanied by any statement of legislative
intent or purpose, presumably was intended to embody a
legislative purpose similar to the corresponding Section
152 of The Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
A major significance of the Natcher Report is that it
explicitly recognized that the research and development
work of the new Space Agency would be different from the re-
search and development work of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Because of this fact, the subcommittee concluded that the
approach to patent policy of The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
with its emphasis upon the protection of the Government's
interests relative to the interest of private endeavor, was
_, pages 58-69.
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more stringent than necessary in the field of space research
and development. In my opinion, this difference in underly-
ing philosophy is probably more significant than the actual
changes in the wording of the subcommittee's recommended
section, "Substitute For Section 407 of H.R. 12575 - Property
Rights in Inventions," as compared with Section 407 of H.R.
12575. However, this section did contain new subsections
that were not in Section 407, including, inter alia, authori-
zation to require contractors to report technical data re-
lating to inventions, creation of an Inventions Review Board
to which adverse rulings of the Administrator may be appealed,
and criteria to determine the ownership of inventions based
on the relationship of the invention to the duties of the
95/
employee of the contractor.-
Another major significance of the Natcher Report is
that the subcommittee attempted to make concrete the nebu-
lous concept of "national interest". This phrase is the
standard of Section 407 (d) of the recommended substitute
section for determining when the Administrator may waive
title to an invention and retain a license to use the inven-
tion for governmental purposes. The corresponding phrase in
9s__/ Ibi____d_d.
-ii0-
Section 305 (f) of the Space Act is "interests of the
United States." While the patent subcommittee recognized
that the approach of The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was more
stringent than necessary in the field of space research and
development, it also recognized that it was essential to pro-
tect the legitimate interests of the United States. The
subcommittee's purpose was "to balance the requisites of
government against the needs of private enterprise. ''9-_/
The subcommittee attempted to arrive at a balance to these
sometimes conflicting objectives, specifically, by determin-
ing that "... there are at least five basic reasons for
placing title to space inventions in the Government under
certain conditions. These reasons are:
(A) While the nature of developments to come
out of space research in the future are
unknown we do know that some discoveries
are likely to be unprecedentedly powerful
and significant. In certain instances it
may be imperative that the Government
have ownership rights from the beginning.
This need may be as great as in the case
of atomic energy, or even more so.
CB) It may be highly inequitable and contrary
to our traditional competitive system to
permit a single private party to patent an
invention developed with taxpayers' money
in cases where the invention proves to
have unusual commercial value or answers
some universal human need.
Supra, page 66.
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(C) The right to title would carry with it,
in essential cases, the ability to ex-
clude others from the field for reasons
of securit_ or of public health and safety.
(D) Title to the invention would bestow on the
Government an ability to use such rights
for protective or bargaining purposes.
(E) Government ownership could be a source of
income, it could also be uFed as an offset
or counterclaim in infringement suits
against the Government, whereas a mere
license is an unenforceable defense to an
infringement suit." 9___7/
By using the words, "-_=__,_=_ " the_ subcommittee recognized
that other reasons might arise where the "national interest"
would be furthered by retaining all of the rights to an in-
vention in the United States.
After the Natcher subcommittee submitted its recom-
mended substitute section and its accompanying report, and
before the Conference Meeting, staff members of the House
Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration and
the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics
labored over the patent provisions. The subcommittee's
recommendation was used as a guideline. The Senate side had
no fixed position regarding how the patent provisions should
be written, unlike the House side which had the recommenda-
tion of the subcommittee.
Supra, pages 64-65.
pages 70-73.
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The provision for an Inventions and Contributions
Board, which appears in Sections 305 and 306 of the Space
Act, resulted from these informal staff sessions. Pre-
viously, hhe need to provide a monetary incentive to stimu-
late private inventive activities was recognized, and a
Senate staff member had made a study of previous awards
legislation--
In an attempt to lessen Senate objections to the
patent subcommittee's recommendation, changes were infor-
mally negotiated by Mr. George J. Feldman, Chief Counsel
and Staff Director, House Select Committee on Astronatuics
and Space Exploration, Mr Philip B. Yeager, Special Consul-
tant to the House Elect Committee, Mr. Herschel F. Clesner,
a Senate Judiciary Staff member on loan to the Senate
Special Committee on Space andAstronautics, and others, prior
to Conference. The actual language of the patent pro-
visions that was approved in Conference was written by staff
members shortly before the Conference Meeting.
_, pages 71-72.
Su__up_[_,pages 72-73.
_i13_
III. CONFERENCE-DEBATE-FINAL ENACTMENT or PERIOD OF
DECISION AND OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 407 of H.R. 12575, as passed by the House,
on June 2, 1958, was the only part of the bill extensively
z0_!/
revised at the Conference Meeting on July 15, 1958. No
one present in Congress when the Administration's bill was
first introduced could have foreseen that the question of
patent policy would play such an important role in the final
deliberations. While several other differences between the
House and Senate bills were resolved at Conference, the
question of patent policy was one of the most important
z0_ /
issues.
The Conference consisted of those Congressmen designa-
ted as Managers on the Part of the House and Managers on the
Part of the Senate. The Managers on the Part of the House
were Representatives John W. McCormack, Overton Brooks,
Brooks Hays, Leo W. O'Brien, Lee Metcalf, Gordon L. McDonough,
James G. Fulton, Kenneth B. Keating and Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
Supra, page 84.
Supra, page 74.
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The Managers on the Part of the Senate were: Senators
Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard B. Russell, Theodore F. Green,
John L. McClellan, Warren G. Magnuson, Styles Bridges,
.............. _, _u_ B. Hickeniooper, and Leverett Salton-
stall.
Unfortunately, no record exists of the deliberations
of the Conferees. The only official record of this meeting
104_/
is the Conference Report._
The new patent provisions appeared primarily in Sec-
tion 305. The similarity between the ideas and language of
some of the subsections in Section 305 and the recommended
substitute section of the Natcher patent subcommittee is
evident from a comparison of these sections. The criteria
of Subsection 305 (a) for determining whether an invention
made in the performance of work under a NASA contract shall
become the exclusive property of the United States is almost
identical to Subsection 407 (b) of the subcommittee recom-
mended provisions.
However, Subsection 305 (a) states that when these
criteria are met, the Administrator "shall" take title,
Supra, page 19.
Su_u_, pages 73, 75 - 80.
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subject only to the waiver provisions of Subsection 305 (f).
In this respect the Conferees changed Subsection 407 (b)
which provided that when these criteria are met the Adminis-
trator "shall be entitled to, and may require" the assign-
ment of title. Under Subsection 407 (b) the Administrator
would have had the option to take title or not at the very
beginning. Subsection 305 (i) is identical to Subsection
407 (c). Subsection 305 (h) is almost identical to Sub-
section 407 (e). The reference to patents in Subsection 203
(b) (3) of the Space Act was added in Conference and corre-
sponds to the first sentence of Subsection 407(d). Sub-
section 305 (b) is similar to the first two sentences of
Subsection 407 (f). The subcommittee idea of an Inventions
Review Board was rejected in Conference. The procedure on
appeal from an adverse decision of the Administrator was
modified. The idea of an Inventions and Contributions
Board was added in Conference and appears in Section 305 (f)
and Section 306, which provides incentive awards for scien-
10_m/
tific and technical contributions, and not just inventions.
If the Natcher patent subcommittee's recommended
patent section and report had no greater influence on the
105/ Supra, See notes on pages 76-80.
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on the final patent policy than that which has been de-
scribed above, it would have played a most significant role
in the legislative history. However, its influence extends
-__r---_._ _ _,_ enunciated legislative intent or purpose of
the final patent provisions. This influence, in my opinion,
resulted in a more significant underlying change in spirit
than even its influence on the language of the statute.
The impack of the unpublished Natcher report was seen
the next day, June 16, 1958, when H.R. 12575, as reported
out of Conference, was called up in the House and in the
Senate for debate and a final vote. In the House two major
statements of legislative intent or purpose were delivered
on the floor prior to the final vote. The statements were
complementary and uncontradicted by any other remarks. The
statements were made by Rep. John W. McCormack and Rep.
106_/
Kenneth B. Keating.--
bill.
Rep. McCormack made the opening statement on the
Relating to the legislative intent or purpose of the
patent provisions, he stated:
The review and the redrafting were wise.
The select committee created a special sub-
committee to s_udy the matter, and after talk-
ing with many experts in and out of Government
arrived at a new version, drawing upon both
Senate and House suggestions. The original
Supra, pages 81-95.
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patent provision was too closely patterned
after the stringent requirements in the
Atomic Energy Act which are not fully
applicable to the space field. The substi-
tute provision agreed to by the conferees
protects both the interests of the Govern-
ment and affords enough flexibility to the
Space Administrator to let him meet needs
for preserving the incentives of the indivi-
duals and companies whose efforts it is public
policy to encourage.10__/
The sentence stating that "[t]he original patent provision
was too closely patterned after the stringent requirements
in the Atomic Energy Act which are not fully applicable to
the space field" directly reflects the principal conclusion
of the Natcher Report. Additional evidence that Rep.
McCormack's statement was making official the patent philo-
sophy expressed in the Natcher Report is the fact that the
sentence preceding the sentence quoted above directly men-
tions and gives credit to the Natcher patent subcommitte.
Moreover, Rep. McCormack's statement states that it
is in the "interests of the United States" to preserve the
incentives of the individuals and companies dealing with
NASA in addition to the protection of the interests of the
Government. These interests are to be harmonized by dele-
107/ Supra, pages 84-85.
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Rep. John W. McCormack.
the patent subcommittee.
stated:
gating power to the Administrator to deal flexibly with
situations as they arise.
The statement of Rep. Kenneth B. Keating is more
closely tied to the Natcher Report than the statement of
Rep. Keating served as a member of
Referring to the subcommittee, he
I want to emphasize that the patent sec-
tion in this bill has been subjected to care-
ful scrutiny and study. It represents, as
the statement of managers suggests, a balanc-
ing effort. We felt we would be derelict in
our duty if we failed to protect the legiti-
mate interests of government. At the same time
we endeavored not to remove any incentive from
private enterprise.10_
Using the identical language of the Natcher Report, Rep.
Keating restated the five reasons "for placing title to
space inventions in the Government under certain conditions."
As in the Natcher Report, Rep. Keating's statement used a
qualifying word to suggest that other reasons might arise
where the national interest would require taking full title.
The only other official statement of legislative in-
tent or purpose is a paragraph in the Conference Report, re-
ferred to in the paragraph quoted above from Rep. Keating's
109/
Supra, page 87.
Supra, pages 91-92.
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statement. This statement is consistent with the McCormack
and Keating statements and pinpoints the departure in under-
lying philosophy from the original Section 407 of H.R. 12575,
resulting from the patent subcommittee's investigation,
recommended substitute patent section, and report. Prefac-
ing the explanation of Section 305, the statement is as
follows:
Operating on the theory that the Govern-
ment's interests must be protected, but with
the concomitant purpose of protecting private
interests and of keeping private incentive
and initiative at a high level, the committee
of conference adopted entirely new patent
provisions.ll___/
The emphasis of this statement appears to go one step fur-
ther than Rep. McCormack's statement. Rep. McCormack's
statement emphasizes the need for "preserving" the incen-
tives of private endeavor. The Conference Report's state-
ment not only emphasizes maintaining the status u_q_u_q,by
use of the word, "protecting." but also emphasizes the ob-
jective of "keeping private incentive and initiative at a
high level..."
The only three official statements of legislative
intent or purpose relative to the patent provisions that
were made after the Conference Meeting were the McCormack,
Supra, pages 75-76.
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Keating, and Conference Report statements. In the Senate
the entire debate on the Space Act occupied less than one
full page in The Conqressional Record. No reference was
made to the patent provisions.
On July 16, 1958, the Space Act was passed in both
the House and the Senate by unanimous votes. On July 29,
1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed H.R. 12575 as
Public Law 85-568, enacting into law The National Aeronau-
i12_/
tics and Space Act of 1958
iii/ Supra, page 96.
Ibid.
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IV. THE WAIVER POLICY.
What intent did Congress express, if any, relative
to how the Administrator of NASA should exercise the dis-
cretionary authority of Subsections 305 (a) and (f) of the
Space Act to prescribe regulations, and pursuant thereto,
decide whether to waive all or part of the rights acquired
by NASA to the inventions of its contractors and subcon-
tractors?
Subsection 305 (a) of the Space Act provides that
title to inventions made in the performance of work under
NASA contract shall be the exclusive property of the United
States when the criteria specified in Subsections 305 (a)
(i) or 305 (a) (2) are met, unless the Administrator waives
all or any part of the rights in accordance with Subsec-
tion (f).
Subsection 305 (f) provides that under such regula-
tions as the Administrator shall prescribe, he mav waive
all or any part of the rights to any invention or class of
inventions if he determines that the "interests of the
Supra, page 12.
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of the United States" will be served thereby. Any such
waiver may be made upon such terms as the Administrator
shall determine to be required for the protection of the
"interests of the United States." Each waiver shall be
subject to the reservation by the Administrator of an
irrevocable, nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free
license for use by or on behalf of the United States or a
foreign government purusant to a treaty or agreement. Each
proposal for waiver shall be referred to an Inventions and
Contributions Board for a hearing and submission of findings
of fact and a recommendation to the Administrator.
At the beginning of this paper, five general types of
waiver policies were hypothesized covering the entire range
ii5/
of possible choice._ Any given waiver policy would tend
to approximate one of these general types. Two of these
policies were dismissed as contrary to the plain meaning of
the language of Subsections 305 (a) and (f). The other
three policies appear to be permissible ways in which the
Administrator could exercise the discretionary authority
114/ Supra, pages 14-15.
Supra, page 6.
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delegated under Subsections 305 (a) and (f). They are as
follows:
Policy No. II. A Favor-The-Government Policy.
After title is initially taken under Subsec-
tion 305 (a), it should usually remain in the
United States. The Administrator should only
waive title under Subsection 305 (f) in un-
usual or exceptional circumstances upon the
request of the contractor.
Policy No. III. A Flexible or Balance-The-
Interests Policy. After title is initially
taken under Subsection 305 (a), upon request
of the contractor, it should be waived or re-
tained according to which alternative best
advances the "interests of the United States"
based on an evaluation of the interests of the
parties involved for each invention or class
of inventions.
Policy No. IV. A Favor-The-Contractor Policy.
After title is initially taken under Subsec-
tion 305 (a), it should usually be waived upon
the request of the contractor. The Administra-
tor should only deny waiver under Subsection
305 (f) in unusual or exceptional circumstances.
The legislative history of Subsections 305 (a) and 305 (f)
demonstrates that Congress did express a definite preference
for one of the general Policies II, III, and IV. The con-
clusion is that Congress clearly expressed an intention that
the waiver policy should follow an approach approximating
Policy No. iII. Congress intended that a flexible or
balance-the-interests policy should be followed by the Ad-
ministrator to determine when title should be waived.
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With reference to the Natcher Report and Rep.
Kenneth B. Keating's statement, Congress also may have
suggested a method how the Administrator should proceed to
balance the legitimate interests of the government in retain-
ing full title to certain inventions and the sometimes con-
flicting interests of preserving and keeping at a high level
the private incentive and initiative. The approach sug-
gested is one based on the "rule of reason." The five
reasons listed in the Natcher Report and Rep. Kenneth B.
Keating's statement were not intended to be exhaustive, but
suggest that when an invention may be so characterized, full
title should remain in the United States, unless overriding
reasons exist for waiving title to the contractor or sub-
contractor.
The absolute number or proportion of inventions that
the Administrator should waive in any one year was not di-
rectly the concern of Congress. The Flexible or Balance-The-
Interests approach suggests that any such guidelines, if
rigidly adhered to, would be arbitrary. Rather, the concern
of Congress evident throughout the legislative proceedings
may be illustrated by the following statement of the then
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, which was made on the Senate floor
-125-
on June 16, 1958, during the debate on his amendment to de-
lete the patent section from the Senate bill:
... We can today see only a short distance
into the future, and we can only speculate
upon a few of the ultimate benefits which the
space age can bring to the people of the
world.
We know that there will be tremendous
gains in the economic and physical well-being
of people brought about by discoveries in the
areas of weather prediction and control,
communications; medical science, and trans-
portation.ll6_/
This statement shows a concern with the extraordinary in-
vention, not the ordinary, everyday or average invention.
Congress was pioneering into a new area. Major discoveries
and breakthroughs were expected to result from the stimulus
to space research that Congress was providing through the
creation of a new National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion.
The first two reasons in the Natcher Report and in
Rep. Kenneth B. Keating's statement for placing all of the
rights to certain inventions in the government are strong
evidence of this primary concern with inventions poten-
tially having a big impact on the government or on the
economy. While Congress was willing to declare that it is
Supra, page 49.
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the public policy to protect private interests and to keep
private incentive and initiative at a high level, it was not
willing to relinquish rights to important inventions of this
type. However, a reasonable inference is that Congress did
intend that the Administrator would generally exercise his
discretion to waive humdrum, everyday, or ordinary inven-
tions at the request of the contractor o_<subcontractor.
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Appendix B
Disclosures from Contractors to December 31, 1965
Contractors Ranked by Number of Disclosures
Contractor
North American Aviation
United Aircraft Corporation
California Institute of Technology
Westinghouse Electric
Radio Corporation of America
General Electric Co.
Hughes Aircraft Co.
TRW, Inc.
Lockheed Aircraft Co.
General Dynamics
Honeywell, Inc.
International Business Machines
Aerojet General Corp.
Douglas Aircraft Co.
Boeing Co.
McDonnell Aircraft
Chrysler Corp.
Ling-Temco-Vought
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sperry Rand Corp.
MartinMarietta Corp.
Garrett Corp.
_erican Telephone & Telegraph
Electro Optical Systems
Illinois Institute of Technology
Brown Engineering Co.
Grumman Aircraft
Collins Radio Co.
Melpar Inc.
Stanford Research Institute
Bendix Corp.
Monsanto Research Corp.
GCA Corp.
General Motors Corp.
General Telephone and Electronics Corp.
Bec]aman Instruments
David Clark Co., Inc.
Battelle Memorial Institute
Arthur D. Little
Number of
Disclosures
810
386
29o
256
181
180
158
148
ll3
ll0
102
lO0
97
97
9O
73
59
58
44
41
35
34
33
29
27
26
26
25
25
25
24
24
23
23
23
22
2O
18
18
B-2
Contractor
Textron Inc.
Fairchild Hiller
General Precision
Avco Corp.
Ball Brothers Research Corp.
Varian Associates
Aircraft Armaments
Philco Corp.
Northrop Corp.
Perkin-Elmer Corp.
Duke University
Electro-Mechanical Research Inc.
International Telephone & Telegraph
Motorola Inc.
National Research Corp.
Peninsular ChemResearch
American Optical Co.
Borden Co.
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier
Spaco Inc.
Whittaker Corp.
Auto Control Laboratory
Kollsman Instrument
Microwave Electronics Inc.
Ampex Corp.
Barnes Engineering
Consolidated Electrodynamics
Documentation Inc.
B. F. Goodrich Co.
Goodyear Aerospace
Packard-Bell Electronics
Ryan Aeronautical Co.
Thermo Electrical Engineering
Air Reduction Co.
American Machine & Foundry
Clevite Corp.
Computer Control Co.
Engineering Physics
FMC Corp.
General American Transportation
Harshaw Chemical Co.
Marquardt Corp.
Midwest Research Institute
Union Carbide
University of California
Vitro Corporation of America
Number of
Disclosures
18
17
16
15
15
15
14
14
13
12
ii
ii
i0
i0
i0
lO
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
B-S
Contractor
Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
Atlantic Research
Cornell Aeronautical Lab Inc.
Dynatronics, Inc.
Electric Storage Battery
Farrand Optical Co.
General Mills Inc.
Harvey Aluminum
G. T. Schjeldahl Co.
Solid State Radiation
Southern Research Institute
Spacelabs Inc.
Telecomputing Corp.
ThioKol chemical Corp.
University of Arizona
Aeronca Manufactoring Corp.
Air Products & Chemicals
Arrowhead Products
Astro Research Corp.
CBS, Inc.
Chicago Aerial Industries
Curtiss-Wright Corp.
Electronic Communications
General Nuclear Engineering
Geonautics, Inc.
Hazeltine Corp.
HazeltonLabs
Hoffman Electronics
Higgins Laboratory, Inc.
IRCO Corp.
Radiation Systems, Inc.
Raytheon Co.
Scientific Data Systems
Smith Electronics
Southwest Research Institute
Trident Engineering Associates
Yardney Electric Co.
Advanced Kinetics
Applied Psychological Services
Bio Technology Inc.
DeBell & Richardson
Dorne& Margolin
Engelhard Hanovia
Harvard College
Keltec Industries
Kinelogic Corp.
Number of
Disclosures
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
B-4
Contractors
Laboratory for Electronics
Litton Industries
Livingston Electronic
Plasmodyne Corp.
Raymond Engineering Laboratory
Santa Barbara Research Center
Spectra-Physics Inc.
Stanford University
Texas Instruments
Utah Research and Development Co.
University of Minnesota
University of Rochester
Washington Technological Associates, Inc.
Whirlpool Corp.
Abtronics, Inc.
Airborne Instruments Laboratory
American Science and Engineering
Baylor University
Bolt, Beranek and Newman
Columbia University
Comprehensive Designers
Datacraft Inc.
Datametrics Corp.
Dynamic Services, Inc.
Fenwal Electronics
Franklin Institute of the State of Penn.
Georgia Institute of Technology
Giannini Controls
Gulton Industries
Industrial Nucleonics
Institute of Research and Instrumentation
International Latex Co.
Ion Physics Corp.
Labko Scientific Inc.
Leesona Moos Labs.
J. A. Maurer, Inc.
Mechanical Technology
Oak Ridge Technical Enterprises Inc.
Parametrics Inc.
Pennsylvania State University
Princeton University
R & D Consultants, Inc.
Radiation Inc.
Radiation Instrument Development Labs.
Razdow Laboratory
Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute
Research Triangle Institute
Number of
Disclosures
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
B-5
Contractor
Roback Corp.
Rodana Research Corp.
Smithsonian Institute
Spectrolabs
Texas Institute for Rehabilitation
University of Denver
University of Illinois
University of Michigan
University of Pennsylvania
University of Virginia
Vickers Ltd.
Weston Hydraulics, Ltd.
Wilmore Electronics Co., Inc.
Wilmot Castle Co.
Advanced Technology Labs
Aerospace Corp.
Aerospace Research Associates, Inc.
Aero Vac Corp.
Air Preheater Co.
Allied Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
Allied Research Associates, Inc.
American Aerospace Controls, Inc.
American BoschArma Corp.
Applied Physics Corp.
Ardel Corp.
Astro Met Associates, Inc.
Astro-Space Laboratories, Inc.
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp.
Beech Aircraft Corp.
Bionetics Research Labs, Inc.
Block Engineering Co.
Booz-Allen Applied Research
Brandeis University
Branson Instruments, Inc.
Brown University
Bunker-Ramo Corp.
Cadillac Gage Co.
California Computer Products
Carbons, Inc.
Consolidated Controls Corp.
Continental Testing Lab., Inc.
Cook Electric Co.
Cornell University
Cryonetics Corp.
DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd.
Ebasco Services, Inc.
Number of
Disclosures
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
I
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
I
I
i
i
i
i
i
i
I
i
i
i
B-6
Contractor
Ecco High _Tequency Corp.
Electrac, Inc.
Electrochimica Corp.
Electro Radiation, Inc.
Exotech, Inc.
Franklin GN0 Corp.
General Instrument Corp.
General Technologies Corp.
Genisco Data
Gould-National Batteries, Inc.
Hallicrafters Co.
Hayes International Corp.
Heat Technology Laboratories, Inc.
Hittman Associates
International Harvester Co.
Ipsen Industries, Inc.
Isomet Corp.
Jered Industries, Inc.
Johns Hopkins University
Kaman Instruments
Kelsey-Hayes Co.
Bernard Knust Co.
Kulite Tungsten Co.
Lear Siegler, Inc.
Leeds and Northrup Co.
Lexington Laboratories, Inc.
P. R. Mallory Co., Inc.
Mason Rust
MB Associates
Mellon Institute
Metro Physics, Inc.
Midland-Ross Corp.
Miller Research Laboratories
D. B. Milliken Co.
Mt. Vernon Co.
National Engineering Science Co.
National Water Lift Co.
New Hampshire Ball Bearings
New Mexico State University
North American Phillips Co., Inc.
Wayne B. Nottingham
Ohio University
Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation
Palo Alto Medical Research Foundation
Parker Aircraft Co.
Payne and Associates
Number of
Disclosures
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
B-?
Contractor
Perfecting Service Co.
Quanta Laboratories
Radiation Applications, Inc.
Radiation Technology, Inc.
Recognition Equipment, Inc.
Reeves Institute
Resdel Engineering Corp.
Research Inc.
Self Organizing Systems, Inc.
Shell Development Co.
Space Craft Configuration
Space Craft_ Inc.
Space Sciences, Inc.
Spex Industries, Inc.
State University of Iowa
Walter V. Sterling, Inc.
Temple University
Tobe DeutschmannLabs_ Inc.
Trans-Sonics, Inc.
TRG, Control Data Corp.
Tyco Laboratories, Inc.
United Nuclear Corp.
University of Chicago
University of Houston
University of Notre Dame
University of Southern California
Vapor Corp.
Vidya, Inc.
Walter-Brunos Orthopedic, Inc.
Weber Aircraft
Number of
Disclosures
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Appendix C
Petitions for Waiver and Action
to December 31, 1965
Contractor Petitions
Action by
Administrator
Granted Denied
AeroJet General Corp. 2 (i FR) 2 (1 FR)
Aerospace Research Associates 1 1
Air Preheater Co. 1
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. i i
Air Reduction Co. i _2
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 1 1
American Cyansmid Corp. 1 (BW)
.American Standard i (BW)
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. I (CW) i (CW)
Ampex Corp. 5 5
Avco Corp. 1
Baldwin- Lim_- Hami iton 1
Ball Brothers Research Corp. B (I V) B (I V)
Barnes Engineering Co. 4 3
Beckman Instruments, Inc. 8 (2 BW) 2
Bell Aircraft Corp. I i
Bendix Corp. 4 i
Bolt, Beranek & Newman, Inc. 1 (BW)
Boo z-Allen Research I
Brown University ( Prof. R. A. Dobbins) 1 1
B_Tou_ corp. i (BW)
California Institute of Technology 20 9
Chicago Aerial Industries 2 2
Collins Radio Co. 6 3
Computer Control Co. I Inc. 1
Consolidated Systems Corp. 2
Cook Electric Co. 1 1
Curtiss-Wright Corp. 2 (1 BW) i
DeBell & Richardson, Inc. 2 2
Douglas Aircraft Corp. 6 (i BW) 3
Dow Chemical Co. i (BW)
Duke University 3 3
1 (BW)
3
1
Withdrawn
1
1
2 (l_)
3
Pendin 6
1
1 (BW)
1 (_)
i (_)
1
4 (l_]
3
1
1 (BW)
5
2
2
1 (_)
3 (IBW
i (B_)
Abbreviations: BW-- Blanket waiver
CW -- Class waiver
FR-- Foreign rights only
V -- Voided
C-2
Contractor Petitions
Dynamics Research Corp. i (BW)
Dynatronics, Inc. i (BW)
Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier, Inc. 1
Electric Storage Battery Co. 1
Electrochimica, Inc. 1
Electro-Optical Systems, Inc. 7 (1 BW)
Electro Radiation, Inc. i (V)
Engineering Physics 4 (1 BW)
Farrand Optical Co. 1
Fenwal, Inc. 1
Franklin Institute 1
Garrett Corp. 1
General Dynamics Corp. 2 (1 BW)
General Electric Co. lO (1 BW)
General Mills, Inc. 4
General Motors Corp. 2 (1 BW)
General Precision, Inc. 1 (BW)
General Telephone & Electronics Labs 2
Geophysics Corp. of America lO
Globe Union, Inc. 1 (BW)
B. F. Goodrich Co. 1
Gulton Industries, Inc. 2
Harvard College (Prof. H.C. Ingrano, Sr.) 1
Kazeltine Corp.
Honeywell, Inc.
Merle L. Horne
Hughes Aircraft Co.
IIT Research Institute
Industrial Nucleonics Corp.
Institute for Research Instrumentation
International Business Machines
International Electric Corp.
Ion Physics Corp.
Joyce Industrial Nucleonics
Kaman Aircraft Corp.
Kinelogic Corp.
Kollsman Instrument Co.
Kulite-Tungsten Co.
Laboratory for Electronics
A. D. Little, Inc.
Litton Industries
Livingston Electronic Corp.
Lockheed Aircraft Co.
James A. Lovelock
1
9 (4Bw)
1
io (7BW)
1
2 (i BW)
1
I
1
1 (BW)
1
1
1
3
1
1
2 (1 BW)
2 (1 BW)
_ (1 Bw)
1
i (_)
Action by
Administrator
Granted Denied
1
3
1 (v)
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
3
2
7
1
1
1
1
2
8 (1m) i (cw)
1
1
1
2
1
1 (m)
1 (Bw)
1
Withdrawn
1
1 (Bw)
Pendin_
1 (BW)
i (BW)
1
1
4 (1Bw)
1 (_w)
1 (Bw)
6 (i BW)
2 (1Bw)
1 (_w)
3
1 (Bw)
1
8 (4BW)
1
7 (6 _w)
1
2 (1 Bw)
1
1 (_w)
1
1
1
1 (BW)
1 (BW)
. C-3
Contractor
Martin-Marietta Corp.
MB Associates
McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
Melpar, Inc.
Midland-Ross Corp.
Midwest Research Institute
Hugo S. Miller
Monsanto Co.
William R. Moss
National Research Corp.
North American Aviation, Inc.
North American Phillips, Inc.
Northrop Corp.
Peninsular Ch_mResearch, Inc.
Perkin-Elmer Co.
Philco Corp.
Princeton University
Radiation Instrument Development Labs
Radio Corp. of America
Republic Aviation
Sanders Associates
Mario Schaffner
G. T. Schjeldahl Co.
Schwarz Bioresearch, Inc.
Zac G. Shawhan
Shell Develolmnent Co.
Smithsonian Institute
Southern Research Institute
Sperry Rand Corp.
Stanford Research Institute
Stanford University
Sylvania Electric Systems
Thermo Electron EngineeringCo.
TEW, Inc.
Tyco Labs
Union Carbide Corp.
United idrcraft Corp.
University of Arizona
University of California
University of Illinois
University of Iowa
Varian Associates
Vitro Corp. of America
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
Petitions
9 (_)
1
9
1
1
4
1
5
1
3
37 (1_)
1
1
4
l (Bw)
2 (_)
2
2
2 (l g5
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
k-
9 (2 Bw)
6
1
1
1_ (l _)
1 (BW)
2 (BW)
so (14 BW)
2
I
1
5
1
7 (2BW)
Action by
Administrator
Granted Denied
1
8
i
2
i
3
i
2
16 11
1
1
3
2
2
l (_)
1
1
1
6 (IBW)
3
9 (l m)
l (_)
8 (IBW)
1
2
l (_)
4
Withdrawn
2 (_)
4
1
3
1
2
6
1
1
1
Pendin_
7 (Bw)
1
1
2
2
1
5 (a _)
1
l (BW)
l (_)
i
i
i
2 (1 BW)
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
15
(_)
(Bw)
(_)
(12_3
4 (l_)
c-4
Contractor
GosnellWhittaker Corp.
Yardney Electric Corp.
Totals
121 Contractors
Petitions
1
2 (i _W)
Action by
Administrator
Granted Denied Withdrawn
2 (1
Pending
1
389* 189 28 35 137
Notes: *Included are waiver case numbers 101-492. W-477, W-486, W-491 were
received after December 31, 1965 and are not included in this total.
Foreign rights only: 4 granted.
Class waivers: 2 granted, 1 denied.
Waivers voided: 2.
Blanket waivers (Section 105): 5 granted, 3 denied, 4 withdrawn,
and 61 pending.
Sources: Waiver case files of ICB, NASA.
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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Washington, D. C. 20006
NASA Research Project
Suite 108
2128 H St., N.W.
Dear Inventor:
This University, is making a study of NASA's patenting activities
and their relations to commercial applications. As you know, one of
NASA's objectives is to promote and encourage commercial spillover from
the space effort. The research is sponsored by a grant from NASA.
My associate, Dr. Mary A. Holman, and I need your help to obtain
factual information. As the inventor of one or more government-owned
and NASA-admlnistered patented inventions you have information that is
not available from other sources. We would appreciate your answering
the enclosed questionnaire. It asks about the commercial use, or the
commercial potential, of your invention. It also asks for your opinions
about certain aspects of NASA's patent policies.
We have tried to make the questionnaire as simple as possible
because we know that you are very busy. If you cannot reply to all of
the questions, please answer as many as you can, and return the question-
naire. An incomplete return is better than no response at all. If you
so wish, any of your answers will be kept confidential -- not revealed
outside The George Washington University. Please mark any such answers.
The results of this study will be of interest to you, to industry,
to officials at NASA, and to members of Congress. Thank you for your
help and cooperation.
Yours sincerely,
Donald S. Watson
Professor of Economics
D-2
The George Washington University
Research Project: Evaluation of NASA's Patent Policies
Donald S. Watson and Mary A. Holman
Questionnaire to Inventors
Name(s) of Inventor(s)
Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 104-650l
Patent Number
Title of Invention
1. Please give a brief layman's description of the invention. Please mention the field of technology
and state if the invention is a material, a process, a product component, or a product.
2. Does your patented invention have potential for commercial use?
Yes__ No_ Ifno, proceed to Question 5.
Ifyes, please describe that commercial potential:
3. Can your patented invention be commercially used without further development?
Yes _ No
Ifno, please give an estimate of the development requirements:
4. Has your invention been used commercially? Yes____
Ifyes, please describe:
No
5. If your patented invention has not been used commercially, or has no commercial potential,
please check the reason(s) that apply:
a. Development cost too high
b. Development showed serious flaws
c. Invention already obsolete
d. Superior substitutes became available
e. Insufficientmarket demand
f. Technology too sophisticated
g. Invention for government use only
h. Other (please specify)
6. Has your invention been used by NASA or by another government agency?
Yes__No___
Ifyes, please describe:
D-3
Opinions of Inventors
In recent years, there has been muchpublic debate about incentives for disclosing new tech-
nology, about means of disseminating information on new technology, and about ways of stimulating
commercial use of the new technology arising from government-financed research and development.
We value your opinions on these matters. Please answer the following three questions, using addi-
tional sheets if necessary.
1. What do you think could or should be done to improve incentive programs to encourage greater
disclosure and more complete reporting of the new technology coming from research financed
by NASA?
Please comment:
o How could and should NASA improve its programfor disseminating information about the inven-
tions it owns?
Please comment:
3. How could and should NASA increase the commercial use of inventions arising from the research
it sponsors?
Please comment:
We would appreciate any additional comments you might wish to make about NASA's patent
policies, NASA's technology utilization programs, or about government patent policies in general.
D-4
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Washington, D. C. 20006
NASA Research Project
Suite 108
2128 H St., N.W.
Dear Licensee:
As you know, some of the things coming out of the research sponsored
by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are products used in
the civilian economy. In fact, one of NASA's objectives is to promote and
encourage commercial spillover from the space effort.
This University, under a grant from NASA, is making a study of NASA's
patenting activities and their relations to commercial spillover. My
associate, Dr. Mary A. Holman, and I need your help to obtain factual
information that is not currently available.
We are writing to you because your firm has been licensed to use one
or more of the inventions owned by the Government and administered by NASA.
We would appreciate your answering the enclosed questionnaire. It asks for
commercial use, or your estimate of the commercial potential, of the
invention(s) you are licensed to use.
If you cannot reply to all of the questions, please answer as many as
you can, and return the questionnaire. An incomplete return is better than
no response at all. Your firm is one of the few to have had the initiative
to obtain a license from NASA.
We have tried to make the questionnaire as short and as simple as
possible because we know that you are very busy. If you so wish, any of
your answers will be kept confidential -- not revealed outside The George
Washington University.
The results of this study will be of interest to you, to industry in
general, to officials at NASA, and to members of Congress. Thank you for
your help and cooperation.
Sincerely yours,
Donald S. Watson
Professor of Economics
Fozm app{oved.
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Questionnaire to Companies Licensed to Use NASA Inventions
Name of Company
Title of Invention
Patent Number Patent Application Serial Number
le
e
o
w
Has your company commercialized this licensed invention? Commercialized means actual use in
manufacture or sale of products, or sale of services.
Yes _ No__
Is your company now in the process of putting the invention into commercial use within the near
future? YesNo__
If yes, approximately when?
If your company has not actually used the invention commercially, what is your estimate of the
probability that you will commercialize the invention in the future? Please express your prob-
ability estimate as a percentage (e.g., 10%, or 50%, or 90%):
Has your company incurred engineering or technical development costs in its effort to commer-
cialize this invention? Yes___ No__
Costs to date: Dollar figures are desired. If, however, such figures cannot be supplied, please
answer anyway; you can indicate magnitudes by giving ranges and by using words such
as aslight," _moderate," and asubstantial.m
Expected future costs:
. If your firm has not actually commercializedthe invention, please check the reason or reasons:
a. Development cost too high
b. Development showed serious flaws
c. Invention already obsolete
d. Substitutes are available
e. Insufficient market demand
f. Technology too sophisticated
g. Other (please specify)
6. Would your company have developedthe invention faster or commercialized it if you had had ex-
clusive rights to the invention? Yes No__ Please comment
7. H you have commercialized the invention, how has your company benefited? For example, has
your company had increased sa]es or reduced costs of production? Please describe
If NASAhaslicensedyour flrmtouse more thanoneinvention,answerthefollowingquestions only
once.
8. Please give us a brief description of your firm. Include in your answer your major product
line(s) and the approximate number of your employees.
9. How did your company learn that the invention was available for licensing from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration?
We would appreciate any additional comments you might wish to make about NASA's patent
policies, NASA's contracting policies, NASA's technology utilizationprograms, or about govern-
ment patent policies in general.
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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Washington, D. C. 20006
NASA Research Project
Suite 108
2128 H St., N.W.
Dear Waiver Holder:
This University is conducting a study that will result in an
evaluation of the patent policies of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. The research, which is under my direction, is sponsored
by a grant from NASA. Dr. Mary A. Holman is Associate Investigator.
The evaluation ....I give _1_== =t_Pnt_on to NASA's waiver policy
I am writing to you because your company has been granted one or more
waivers. You can provide facts that are not available from other sources.
We have already been permitted access to the information on waived
inventions, including yours, that is available in NASA's files. To make
a good evaluation of the waiver policy, however, we need to know more
specifics, and more about expectations and incentives. We also need data
on reasons for lack of commercial potential of some waived inventions.
For comparison and perspective, we also would like to know about the
commercial use of the patented inventions you acquired from R & D sponsored
by other government agencies.
We have tried to make the questionnaire as simple as possible; we
know that you are very busy. If you cannot reply to all of the questions,
please answer as many as you can and return the questionnaire. An incomplete
__ _11
If you wish, answers you mark as confidential will be so treated. The
facts in such answers we will bury in totals and averages.
Because of the public debates on government patent policy, the results
of this study will be of interest to you, to industry in general, to
officials at NASA, and to members of Congress.
Yours sincerely,
Donald S. Watson
Professor of Economics
D-8
The George Washington University
Research Project: Evaluation of NASA's Patent Policies
Donald S. Watson and Mary A. Holman
Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 104-6501
and V.
Questionnaire to Contractors Granted Waivers
The questionnaire is in six Parts. Please answer Parts I,II,and VI, and one of Parts Ill,IV,
Contractor
Title of Invention
NASA Waiver Case No Patent Appl. Serial No Patent No.
Part I INFORMATION ABOUT THE INVENTION
1. Please give a brief description of the invention.Include in your answer a statement as to whether
the invention is a product, or a component of a product, or a process or a material.
2. Has the invention ever been used by or for the government? E.g., in products or services sold to
the government? Yes No___ If yes, please give a brief statement about the government
USe.
Part II STATUS OF THE INVENTION
1. The invention is now in actual commercial use by you or by others: Yes No__ If yes,
please answer Part III below. Commercial use means use tn manufacture, or sale of products
and services, or licensing, or sale to foreign governments, or a combination of these. Exclude
sale to U.S. government.
2. The invention has expected future commercial potential, but no commercial use to date:
Yes No Ifyes, please answer Part IV below.
3. The invention now lacks commercial potential but has other benefits to the company. Yes___
No__ Please answer Part V below.
D-9
Part HI ACTUAL COMMERCIAL U_E OF THE INVENTION
Where applicable, dollar figures are desired. If, however, such figures cannot be supplied,
please answer anyway; you can indicate magnitudes by giving ranges and by using words such
as "slight," "moderate," and "substantial."
1. Company-financed development cost:
2. Use by contractor in his own manufacturing operations (if applicable):
Brief description:
Estimated reduction in cost:
Other advantages:
3. Sale of products (if applicable):
The invention is a product or a component of one of _your products
or a component of a product of another company.
Please describe the product or component
Sales to date:
Expected future sales:
The market (e.g., consumers, other companies, foreign):
4. Licensing (if applicable):
Describe (please include any information you have about your licensees' activities):
Income to date:
Expected future income:
Additional remarks:
D-IO
Part IV INVENTION WITH EXPECTED FUTURE COMMERCIAL USE
Please answer these questions for an invention whose commercial use has not yet occurred,
but which is expected to be used in the forseeable future.
1. What is your estimate of the probability thatthe invention will be commercially used by the end
of 19677 Please express your probability estimate as a percentage (e.g.: 10%, or 50%, or 90%).
2. What is your estimate of the probability that the invention will be commercially used by the end
of 19707 Probability in per cent:
3. Please comment on actual or expected development effort and expense
4. Do you expect to use the invention in your own manufacturing?
Yes __ No____ Or research? Yes__ No __
5, Do you expect to sell the invention as a new product? YesNo__ Or as a component of
one of your products? Yes____ No__Or as a component of a product of another company?
Yes No__ Or as part of a service? Yes No__.
Additional remarks:
D-II
Part V INVENTION LACKING ANY COMMWRCIAL POTENTIAL
Answer these questions for an invention that possessed commercial potential at the time of
petition but later lost its commercial potential or for an invention that yields other benefits to your
company.
1. Please give a brief statement of the apparent commercial potential of the invention at time of pe-
tition.
2. Please check the reason or reasons for loss of commercial potential.
a. Development cost too high
b. Development showed serious flaws
c. Invention already obsolete
d. Superior substitutes became available
e. Expected market failed to materialize
f. Technology too sophisticated
g. Too few claims allowed by the Patent Office
h. Other '-_ ....
..... spocify)
o If the invention itself lacked commercial potential for use in manufacture, sale of products, or
licensing at time of petition, what benefits do you expect from owning the invention? (Please
check one or more).
a. Expanding the company's command over an area of new technology
b. Increasing the protection of an existing product or product line
c. Prestige for inventors or for the company
d. Increasing the company's patent portfolio so as to show greater competence to secure future
government contracts
e. Other (please specify)
Additional remarks:
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Part VI GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT AND FOR THE CONTRACTOR
The waiver policy can be evaluated in the light of the facts about its operation. Knowledge of
the background of industry's inventive activities and information about contractors' attitudes toward
the policy are also necessary for an evaluation. Please use additional sheets if necessary.
i. It seems that NASA's contractors have made relatively few petitions for waiver. What could be
the cause(s)?
2. In your opinion, do NASA's new (1964) waiver regulations do more or less than the old (1959)
regulations to move inventions into the stream of commerce? Why?
3. Do you have any recommendations for changes in NASA's waiver regulations and in their admin-
istration? (Please keep in mind the criteria of the Presidential Memorandum of October 10,
1963).
4. Has your company ever declined to bid on some other NASA contract because of NASA's patent
policies? Yes No____. Please comment
.
o
.
How many unexpired patents from other (other than NASA) government-financed R & D does your
company own7
If the exact number is not readily available, please give an estimate.
Number: Estimated number:
Of your company's patents acquired from government-financedR & D, what percentage has been
commercially used7 Again, please give an estimate if an exact figure is not available.
Percentage: Estimated percentage:
Of your company's portfolio of patents from company-financed research, what percentage has
been commercially used?
Percentage: Estimated percentage:
Appendixes
E, F, and G
give data
on the responses to the
questionnaires
Table E--I
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-Owned Patented Inventions
By Invention a By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Government employees
Total in survey n....(Z_ IVVoV
Questionnaires returned 60 75.0
Completed questionnaires 59 73.8
Not completed b 1 1.2
Questionnaires not returned 7 8.8
Questionnaires not received c 13 16.2
_o lOO.o ll4 lO0.0
78 56.1 67 58.8
73 52.5 63 55-3
5 3.6 4 3.5
34 24.5 22 19.3
27 19.4 25 21.9
Employees of contractors
Total in survey 21 lO0.O
Questionnaires returned 14 66.7
Completed questionnaires 14 66.7
Not completed b 0
Questionnaires not returned 0
Questionnaires not received c 7 33.3
30 ioo. 0 28 i0o. 0
22 73.3 20 71.4
20 66.7 18 64.3
2 6.6 2 7.1
0 0
8 26.7 8 28.6
Government employees and
employees of contractors
Total in survey 101 lOO.0
Questionnaires returned 74 73-3
Completed questionnaires 73 72.3
Not completed b 1 1.0
Questionnaires not returned 7 6.9
Questionnaires not received c 20 19.8
169 ioo.o 142 1oo.o
i00 59.2 87 61.3
93 55.0 81 57.1
7 4.2 6 4.2
34 20.1 22 15.5
35 20.7 33 23.2
aIncludes a reply from at least one inventor.
bInventor deceased or refused questionnaire; questionnaires returned by
widow or attorney.
CCorrect addresses unknown; questionnaires returned by the U. S. Post Office.
Table E--2
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-Owned Patented Inventions
Question One
By Invention By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question l: Description of
invention
Employee inventions
Completed questionnaires
Description given
Description not given
Contractor inventions
Completed Questionnaires
Description given
Description not given
Employee and contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires
Description given
Description not given
59 i00.0 73 i00.0 63 i00.0
59 i00.0 73 i00.0 63 i00.0
0 0 0
14 lO0.O 20 lO0.O 18 lO0.O
14 lO0.O 17 85.0 16 88.9
0 3 15.0 2 ll.l
73 i00.0 93 i00.0 81 i00.0
73 i00.0 90 96.8 79 97.5
o 3 3.2 2 2.5
Table E--3
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-Owned Patented Inventions
Question Two
By Invention By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 2: Commercial potential
Employee inventions
Completed questionnaires
Commercial potential
No commercial potential a
Contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires
Commercial potential
No commercial potential a
59 i00.0 73 i00.0 63 I00.0
72.9 51 68.5 44 68.3
15 27.1 22 31.5 19 31.7
14 lO0.O 20 lO0.O 18 lO0.O
8 57-1 ii 55-0 9 50.O
6 42.9 9 45.0 9 50.0
Employee and contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires 73 i00.0
Commercial potential 52 69.9
No commercial potential a 21 30.1
93 ioo.o 81 ioo.o
62 65.6 53 64.2
31 34.4 28 35.8
alncludes inventions for which inventors said the commercial potential was
remote.
Table E--4
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-OwnedPatented Inventions
Question Three
By Invention By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 3: Commercial use without
further development?
Employee inventions
Inventions with commercial
potential 44 I00.0
No further development required 20 45.5
Further development required 24 54.5
Contractor inventions
Inventions with co_ercial
potential 8 lO0.O
No further development required 5 62.5
Further development required 3 37.5
Employee and contractor inventions
Inventions with commercial
potential 52 lO0.O
No further development required 25 48.1
Further development required 27 51.9
51 i00.0 44 lO0.0
26 51.0 24 54.5
25 49.O 2O 45.5
ii i00.0 9 i00.0
6 54.5 4 44.4
5 45.5 5 55.6
62 lO0.O 53 lO0.O
32 51.6 28 52.8
30 48.4 25 47.2
Table E--5
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-OwnedPatented Inventions
Question Four
By Invention By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 4: Any commercial use?
Employee inventions
Inventions with commercial
potential
Commercial usea
No commercial use
Do not knowb
Contractor inventions
Inventions with commercial
potential
Commercial use
No commercial use
Do not knowb
44 i00.0 51 I00.0 44 i00.0
0 0 0
39 88.6 44 86.3 38 86.4
5 Ii.4 7 13-7 6 13.6
8 i00.O ll i00.0 9 i00.0
0 0 0
8 i00.0 ii i00.0 9 i00.0
0 0 0
Employee and contractor inventions
Inventions with commercial
potential 52 lO0.O
Commercial usea 0
No commercial use 47 90.4
Do not knowb 5 9.6
62 lO0.O 53 i00.0
0 0
55 88.7 _7 88.7
7 ll.3 6 ll.3
aOne inventor said his invention is being used on the supersonic commercial
transport. Such commercial use will not materialize for several years.
bIncludes replies marked "?" and questions left blank.
Table E--6
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-OwnedPatented Inventions
Question Five
By Invention By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 5: Reasonsfor lack of
commercial use
Employee inventions
Completed questionnaires
Reasonsknown
Reasonsnot known
Contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires
Reasonsknown
Reasonsnot known
Employeeand contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires
Reasonsknown
Reasonsnot known
59 lO0.0 73 lO0.0 63 100.O
55 93.2 66 90.4 58 92.1
4 6.8 7 9.6 5 7.9
14 ioo.o 20 ioo.o 18 lOO.O
14 ioo.o 18 90.0 16 88.9
0 2 i0.0 2 ii.i
73 lOO.O 93 i00.0 81 lO0.O
69 94.5 84 90.3 7_ 91.
5.5 9 9.7 7 8.6
Table E--7
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-OwnedPatented Inventions
Question Six
By Invention By Questionnaire By Inventor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 6: Govez_ent use?
Employee inventions
Completed questionnaires
Governmentusea
No government use
Do not knowb
Contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires
Governmentuse
No government use
Do not knowb
59 lOO.O 73 ioo.o 63 ioo.o
39 66.1 49 67.1 44 69.8
19 32.2 21 28.8 16 25.4
1 1.7 3 4.1 3 4.8
14 lO0.O 20 lO0.0 18 100.0
8 57.1 10 50.O 9 50.0
5 35.7 9 45.O 8 44.4
1 7.2 1 5.0 1 5.6
Employee and contractor inventions
Completed questionnaires 73 lO0.O
Governmentusea _7 6_.4
No government use 24 32.9
Do not knowb 2 2.7
93 i00.0 81 i00.0
59 63.4 53 65.5
30 32.3 24 29.6
4 4.3 4 4.9
alncludes two inventions used by the Department of Defense but not used by NASA.
bIncludes replies marked "?" and questions left blank.
Table E--8
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Inventors
of NASA-OwnedPatented Inventions
Opinions of Inventors
Reply
Government
Employee
No. Per Cent
Employee
of Contractor
No. Per Cent
All
Inventor s
No. Per Cent
Question i: Howcan NASAimprove
incentive programs?
Completed questionnaires
Reply to question
No reply to question
Question 2: Howcan NASAimprove
dissemination of information
programs?
Completed questionnaires
Reply to question
No reply to question
Question 3: Howcan NASAwiden
commercial use of its inventions?
Completed questionnaires
Reply to question
No reply to question
Request for additional comments
about NASA'sPatent Policy
Completed questionnaire
Additional comments
No additional comments
63 lO0.O
41 65.1
22 34.9
63 ioo.o
41 65.1
22 34.9
63 io0.0
42 66.7
21 33.3
63 lOO.O
24 38.1
39 61.9
18 i00.0
15 83.3
3 16.7
18 lOO.O
13 72.2
5 27.8
18 lO0.O
14 77.8
4 22.2
18 i0o.o
5 27.8
13 72.2
81 lOO.O
56 69.1
25 3o.9
81 lO0.O
54 66.7
27 33.3
81 lO0.O
56 69.1
25 30.9
81 lO0.O
29 35.8
42 64.2
Table F--I
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Companies
Licensed to Use NASA Inventions
By Invention By Company By Licensee
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Number in survey
Questionnaires returned
Completed questionnaires
Not completed a
Questionnaires not returned b
46 I00.0 97 i00.0 107 i00.0
._.. _o _ lC,'_ 93.b-44 95-6 _u ....
42 91.2 84 86.6 94 87.8
2 4.4 6 6.2 6 5.6
2 h.4 7 7.2 7 6.6
aThese companies claimed that they requested information about the inventions
not licenses to use the inventions, and do not consider themselves licensees.
bThese firms are probably out of business. The telephone company had no
business or personal listings for these licensees.
Table F--2
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Companies
Licensed to Use NASAInventions
Questions Oneand Two
By Invention By Company By Licensee
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question l: Commercial use?
Numberin surveya 46 i00.0 97 i00.0 107 I00.0
Yes 4 8.7 3 3.1 4 3.7
Noa 42b 91.3 94 96.9 103 96.3
Question 2: Is companyputting
invention into commercial use?
Not in commercial use 42 i00.0
In process of commercialization 6 14.3
Not in process of commerciali-
zation c 33 78.6
No reply 3 7.1
94 i00.0 103 lO0.O
13 13.8 13 12.6
65 69.1 74 71.8
16d 17.1 16d 15.5
aIncludes seven firms for which the telephone company has no business or
personal listings.
bIncludes four inventions that are commercially available.
CIncludes three companies that claimed not to be licensees.
dIncludes seven firms for which the telephone company has no listings and
three companies that claimed not to be licensees.
Table F--3
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Companies
Licensed to Use NASAInventions
Questions Three and Four
By Invention By Company By Licensee
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 3: Probability of _ture
use?
Not in commercial use
Probability estimate
No probability estimate
Question 4: Company-financed
development?
Numberin survey
Completed reply
Funds spent
No funds spent
Expected future cost
No expected future cost
No reply
42 lO0.O 94 i00.0 103 lO0.O
36 85.7 79 8_.0 88 85.4
6 14.3 15 16.0 15 1_.6
46 10o.0 97 lOO.0 107 100.o
_l 89.1 75 77.3 85 79.4
a a 33 3_-0b 35 32-7b
a a _2 43.3P 50 46.7 b
a a 23 23.7_ 25 23._b
a a 52c 53.6 ° 60 c 56.0b
5 10.9 22 22.7 22 20.6
aNot applicable to individual inventions because some are licensed to more
than one company and because some companies are licensed to use more than one
invention.
bper cent of number in survey.
Clncludes companies responding "no" and those leaving the question blank.
Table F--4
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Companies
Licensed to Use NASAInventions
Questions Five and Six
By Invention By Company By Licensee
Reply No. PeT Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
l
Question 5: Reasons for lack of
con_mercial use
Not in commercial use
Reasons known a
Reasons not known
Question 6: Faster with exclusive
rights?
42 lO0.O 94 lO0.O 10B lO0.O
39 92.9 92 97.9 85 82.5
3 7.1 2 2.1 18 17.5
Number in survey 46 lOO.0 97 lO0.0 107 lO0.0
Completed reply 42 91.3 75 77.3 8_ 78.5
Yes b b 21 28.0 22 26.2
NoC b b 54 72.0 57 67.9
Don't know b b 0 5 5.9
No reply 4 8.7 22 22.7 23 21.5
aIncludes firms that claimed not to be licensees and firms for which the
telephone company had no listing.
bNot applicable because some inventions are licensed to more than one firm
and because some firms are licensed to use more than one invention.
CIncludes firms that said they would not commercialize the licensed inventions.
Table F--5
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Companies
Licensed to Use NASAInventions
Questions Seven and Eight
By Invention By Company By Licensee
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 7: Any benefits from
commercial use?
Actual commercial use or available a 8 lO0.O
Completed reply 7 87.5
No reply 1 12.5
Question 8: Description of firm
6 lO0.0 8 lO0.O
5 83.3 7 87.5
1 16.7 1 12.5
Number in survey &6 lO0.O 97 100.O 107 lO0.O
Completed reply 34 73.9 50 51.5 60 56.1
No reply b 12 26.1 47 48.5 47 43.9
aIncludes four inventions that are commercially available.
bIncludes firms that claim not to be licensees and firms for which the
telephone company has no listings.
Table F--6
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Companies
Licensed to Use NASAInventions
Question Nine and Request
for Additional Comments
By Invention By Company By Licensee
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Question 9: Howdid companylearn
about invention?
Numberin survey 46 100.O 97 lO0.0 107 100.0
Completed reply 40 86.8 61 62.9 71 66.4
No reply a 6 13.2 36 37.1 36 33.6
Request for additional comments
about NASA'spatent policy
Numberin survey
Additional comments
No additional commentsa
46 ioo.o 97 lO0.O lO7 lOO.O
16 34.8 22 22.7 24 22.4
30 65.2 75 77.3 83 77.6
aIncludes firms that claim not to be licensees and firms for which the telephone
companyhas no listings.
Table G--I
Replies to _uestionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers to NASA
By Invention By Contractor
Reply No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
Number of waivers in survey
Questionnaires returned
Completed questionnaires
b
Not completed
Questionnaires not returned
18h 3_0O.O 73 i00.0
177 96.2 67 91.8
a
166 90.2 65 89.1
ii 6.0 2 2.7
7 3.8 6 8.2
a
Includes contractors completing at least one questionnaire.
b
Questionnaires returned with explanation for not answering questions,
i.e., secrecy orders, waivers withdrawn or voided, etc.
Table G--2
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part I: Information about Invention
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question l: Description of invention
Completed questionnaires
Description given
Description not given
Question 2: Government use?
Completed questionnaires
Yes
Description of use
No description of use
No government use
No reply
166 lO0.0
165 99.4
1 0.6
166 lO0.0
ll6 69.7
lll 66.7
5 3.o
47 28.5
3 1.8
Table G--3
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part II: Status of the Invention
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question i: Actual commercial use7
Completed questionnaires 166 i00.0
Yes 21 12.7
Noa 145b 87.3
Question 2: Future commercial
potential only_
Completed questionnaires 166 i00.0
Yes 106 63.8
No 27 16.3
NAa 33 19.9
Question 3: Lacking commercial
potential?
Completed questionnaires 166 i00.0
Yes 33 19.9
No 44 26.5
NAa 89 53.6
alncludes non-responses when a "yes" answer appears on
either of the other questions in Part II.
blncludes nine inventions available for commercial use
but having yet to yield income from sales or licensing.
Table G--4
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part III: Actual Commercial Use
Questions Oneand Two
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question l: Companyfinanced development costs?
Inventions in commercial use or commercially available
Yes
Nob
No reply
Question 2: Used in contractor's manufacturing operations?
Inventions in commercial use or commercially available
Yes
No
No reply
Description of use
Inventions used in contractor's manufacturing operations
Description given
Description not given
Reduction in cost?
Inventions used in contractor's manufacturing operations
Yes
No
No reply
Other advantages?
Inventions used in contractor's manufacutring operations
Yes
No
No reply
22a i00.0
17 77.2
i 4.6
4 18.2
22a i00.0
iI 50.0
4 18.2
7 31.8
ll i00.0
9 81.8
2 18.2
ii I00.0
4 36.4
3 27.2
4 36.4
ii I00.0
9 81.8
0
2 18.2
aIncludes one invention that is commercially available but has not yet
yielded income.
bCalifornia Institute of Technology stated that the development cost was
borne by the licensee.
Table G--5
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part III: Actual Commercial Use
Question Three
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question 3: Sales?
Inventions in commercial use or co_mmerciallyavailable
Inventions available for commercial sales
Not applicable
No reply
Kind of sales
Inventions available for commercial sales
Products
Components
No reply
Description of sales
Inventions available for commercial sales
Description givenb
Description not given
Sales to date?
Inventions available for commercial sales
Yes
No
No reply
Expected future sales?
Inventions available for commercial sales
Yes
No
No reply
Description of market
Inventions available for commercial sales
Description given
Description not given
No reply
22a i00.0
16 72.7
5 22.7
1 4.6
16 lOO.O
7 43.8
7 43.8
2 12._
16 i00.0
14 87.5
2 L2.5
16 lO0.0
12 75.0
3 18.8
1 6.2
16 i00.0
I0 62.5
2 12.5
4 25.0
16 100.O
i_ 87.5
0
2 12.5
aIncludes one invention that is commercially available but has not yet yielded
income, bIncludes references to Part I, question 1.
Table G--6
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part III: Actual Commercial Use
Question Four
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question 4: Are inventions licensed?
Inventions in commercial use or commercially available
Yes
Not applicable
No reply
Description of licensing activity
Inventions available for commercial licensing
Description given
Description not given
Income to date?
Inventions available for commercial licensing
Yes
No
No reply
Expected future income?
Inventions available for commercial licensing
Yes
None or do not know
No reply
22 a lO0.O
13 59.1
3 13.6
6 27.3
13 ioo .0
12 92.3
1 7.7
13 ioo.o
7 53.8
4 30.8
2 15.4
13 ioo.o
3 23.1
3 23.1
7 53.8
alncludes one invention that is commercially available but has not yet
yielded income.
i
Table G--7
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part IV: Inventions with Expected Future Commercial Use
Questions One, Two and Three
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question i: Probability of use by end of 19677
Inventions with future commercial potential
Zero
Greater than zero
Do not know
No reply
Question 2: Probability of use by end of 1970?
Inventions with future commercial potential
Zero
Greater than zero
_u not I_,,_A_
No reply
Question 3: Actual or expected development effort and expense?
106 lO0.O
6a 5.7
96 90.5
2 1.9
2 1.9
lO6 lOO.O
3b 2.8
98 92.5
4 3.8
i o9
Inventions with future commercial potential 106 i00.0
No 19_ 17.9
Yes 51a _8.1
Do not know 28 26._
No reply 8 7.6
acommercial potential after 1967.
bco.,_ercia! potential after 1970.
C
Includes 4 inventions being developed with government funds; and ll
inventions that require no further development.
dCalifornia Institute of Technology stated that substantial development
cost is being borne by licensee.
Table G--8
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part IV: Inventions with Expected Future Commercial Use
Questions Four and Five
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question 4: Expect use in ownmanufacturing?
Inventions with future commercial potential 106 100.O
Yes 42 39.6
No 5O 47.2
No reply 14 13.2
Expect use in research?
Inventions with future commercial potential
Yes
No
No reply
Question 5: Kinds of expected sales
Expect to sell as product?
Inventions with future commercial potential
Yes
No
No reply
Expect to sell as component of own product?
Inventions with future commercial potential
Yes
No
No reply
Expect to sell as component of other's product?
Inventions with future commercial potential
Yes
No
No reply
Expect to sell as part of a service?
Inventions with future commercial potential
Yes
No
No reply
106 i00.0
46 43.4
26 24.5
34 32.1
106 lO0.O
35 33.o
5O 47.2
21 19.8
106 lO0.O
40 37.7
37 34.9
29 27.4
106 i00.0
27 25.5
45 42.4
34 32.1
lO6 ioo.o
io 9.4
55 51.9
41 38.7
Table G--9
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part V: Inventions Without Commercial Potential
Questions One, Two and Three
Reply
By Invention
No. Per Cent
Question i: _.r_i_tion_____ of apparent__commercial potential
at time of petition
Inventions without commercial potential a
Descriptions given
Descriptions not given
Question 2: Reasons for loss of commercial potential
Inventions without commercial potential a
Reasons given
Reasons not given
Question 3: Other benefits from invention?
Inventions without commercial potential a
Statement given
No statement given
39 I00.0
30 76.9
9 23.1
39 ioo.o
37 94.9
2 5.l
B9 I00.0
28 71.8
ll 28.2
aIncludes 6 inventions with remote possibilities for commercial use.
Table G-- l0
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Wiavers by NASA
Part VI: General Questions about and for the Contractor
Questions One_Two, Three and Four
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Numberin survey
Questionnaires returned
Questionnaires not returned a
Question i: Reasonsgiven for few petitions for waivers
Questionnaires returned
Reply
No reply
Question 2: Favor 1959 or 1964 NASAwaiver regulations?
Questionnaires returned
Reply
No reply
Question 3: Recommendationsfor changes in NASAwaiver
regulations
Questionnaires returned
Recommendationgiven
Recommendationnot given
Question 4: Effect of NASApatent policy on willingness to
accept contracts
Questionnaires returned
Reply
No reply
73 lO0.O
67 91.8
6 8.2
67 lO0.O
60 89.6
7 10.4
67 i00.0
59 88.0
8 12.0
67 lO0.O
57 85.o
lO 15.0
67 i00.0
61 91.0
6 9.0
asix contractors did not return questionnaire by July 15.
Table G--II
Replies to Questionnaires Sent to Contractors
Granted Waivers by NASA
Part VI: General Questions about and for the Contractor
Questions Five, Six and Seven
By Invention
Reply No. Per Cent
Question 5: Any unexpired patents from
government-financed R & D?
Questionnaires returned 67 lOO.O
No ii 16.4
Yes 45 67.1
Do not know 3 4.5
No reply 8 12.0
Question 6: Per cent of patented inventions from
government-financed R & D in commercial use
Questionnaires returned 67 lO0.O
None in use 12 17.9
Some in use 35 52.2
Do not know 5 7-5
No reply 15 22.4
Question 7: Per cent of patented inventions from
company-financed R & D in commercial use
Questionnaires returned 67 i00.0
None in use 4 6.0
Some in use 45 67.1
Do not know 4 6.0
No reply 14 20.9
Table H--I
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising frcmR & D Sponsored
by NASA
Percentages of Inventions Evaluated
by Each of Six Criteria
to July 31, 1963
Action by NASA Perfor- Inventive Govern- Contri- Govern- Cc_mer- TOTAL
mance Contribution ment butionto ment cial Number
R & D the Space Use Potea- of Cases
Activity Effort tial Examined
Inventions not
warranting
patent action
Adverse search
because of
prior patents
or printed
publication
Patent
applications
filed
Patent
applications
abandoned
Patents
issued
51.3 87.1 65.1
62 -7 72.9 68.4
66.5 76.3 76.7
34.6 34.6 57.7
31.o 37.2 36.3
54.6 74.4 21.7 456
66.7 8o.2 27.7 177
72.5 88.6 20.3 236
19.2 65.4 3.8 26
31.o 71.7 15.1 LI3
TOTAL 5_.2 75.1 64.6 57.4 78.2 21.2 1008
Source: Files of AGP, NASA.
Table H--2
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising from R & D Sponsored
by NASA
GovernmentUse
to July 31, 1963
Action by NASA None Past Continuing Expected TOTAL
Future
Invention disclosures
not warrantingpatent
action
Adverse search because
of prior patents or
printed publications
Patent applications
filed
Abandonedpatent
applications
Patents issued
All inventions
No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent cent cent
240 70.8 34 i0.0 38 11.2 27 8.0 339 i00.0
lO 7.0 1 .7 91 64.1 40 28.1 142 lO0.O
2 1.0 3 1.4 120 57.4 84 40.2 209 i00.0
i 5-9 2 i1.8 3 17.6
3 3.7 0 0.0 46 56.8
256 32.5 40 5.1 298 37.8
ii 64.7 17 i00.0
32 39.5 81 i00.0
194 24.6 788 i00.0
Source: Files of AGP,NASA.
Table H--3
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising frc_ R & D Sponsored
by NASA
C_mmercial Potential
to July 31, 1963
Action by NASA None Slight Strong Blank or
Not
Available
TOTAL
Invention disclosures not
warraatingpatent action
Adverse search because of
prior patents or printed
publications
Patent applications
filed
Abandoned patent
applications
Patents issued
All inventions
No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent cent cent
74 16.2 18 3-9 7 1.6
14 7-9 19 10.8 16 9.0
9 3.8 26 ll.O 13 5.5
0 0.0 i 3.8 0 0.0
4 3-5 9 8.0 4 3.5
lOl i0.0 73 7.2 40 4.0
357 78.3
]2.8 72.3
188 79.7
25 96.2
96 85.0
794 78.8
456 i00.0
177 zoo.o
236 i00.0
26 i00.0
113 i00.0
lOO8 ioo.o
Source: Files of AGP, NASA.
Table H--4
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising from R & D Sponsored
by NASA
The Performance Criterion
to July 31, 1963
Action by NASA Highly Satis- Partially Unsatis- Not Reduced
Satis- factory Satis- factory to Practice
factory factory
TOTAL
Invention disclosures
not warranting patent
action
Adverse search because
of prior patents or
printed publication
Patent applications
filed
Abandonedpatent
applications
Patents issued
All inventions
No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent cent cent cent
25 I0.7 96 41.0 45 19.2 24 i0.3 44 18.8 234 i00.0
49 44.1 52 46.9 4 3.6 i 0.9 5 4.5 lll lO0.O
83 52-9 57 36.3 3 1.9 0 0.0 14 8.9 157 i00.0
1 ll.1 5 55.6 0
13 37-1 17 48.6 3
171 31-3 227 41.6 55
0.0 0 0.0 3 33.3 9 lO0.O
8.6 0 0.0 2 5-7 35 i00.0
lO.1 25 4.6 68 12.4 546 i00.0
Source: Files of AGP,NASA.
Table H--5
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising from R & D Sponsored
by NASA
The Inventive Contribution Criterion
to July 31, 1963
Action by NASA Pioneer Substantial Routine
Discovery Advancement Improve-
in the Art --_-nt
No
Invention
TOTAL
Invention disclosures
not warranting patent
action
Adverse search because
of prior patents or
printed publications
Patent ---_^°+_
filed
Abandoned patent
applications
Patents issued
All Inventions
No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent
5 1.3 63 15.8 219 55.0
17 13.2 78 6o.5 34 26.4
38 21.i 121 67.2 _ ___,I_v
2 2.2 5 55.6 2 22.2
9 21.4 3o 71.4 3 7.2
71 9.4 297 39.2 279 36.8
NO •
iii
0
O
0
0
ill
Per
cent
27-9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
14.6
NO.
398
129
18o
9
42
758
Per
cent
lO0.O
lO0.O
lO0.O
i00.0
i00.0
i00.0
Source: Files of AGP, NASA.
Table H--6
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising from R & D Sponsored
by NASA
The GovernmentR & D Criterion
to July 31, 1963
_ction by NASA No Govern- Past Past
merit R & D (Com- (Suspended
pleted) or Aban-
doned)
Continu-
ing
Future TOTAL
[nvention disclosures
not warranting patent
action
Adverse search because
of prior patents or
printed publications
Patent applications
filed
Abandoned patent
applications
i
Patents issued
All inventions
No. Per No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent cent
43 14.5 167 56.2 54 18.2 33 ll.1
8 6.6 36 29.7 B 2.5
8 4.4 40 22.2 i .6
1 9.1 2 18.2 0 0.0
3 7.3 5 12.2 2 4.9
63 9.7 250 38._ 60 9.2
7B 60.3
127 70.6
8 72.7
31 75.6
272 41.8
No. Per No. Per
cent cent
0 0.0 297 lO0.O !
i 0.9 121 i00.0
4 2.2 180 lOO.O
0 0.0 ii i00.0
0 0.0 41 i00.0
5 .9 650 100.0
Source: Files of AGP, NASA.
Table H--7
Technical Evaluation of Inventions
Arising frc_ R & D Sponsored
by NASA
Contribution to the Space Effort
to July 31, 1963
Action by NASA Extra- Major Moderate Minor Incidental TOTAL
Ordinary or Foreign
Invention disclosures
not warranting patent
action
Adverse search because
of prior patents or
printed publications
Patent applications
filed
Abandoned patent
applications
Patents issued
All inventions
No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent
0 0.0
0 0.0
l .6
0 0.0
0 0.0
1 .2
No. Per No. Per No. Per
cent cent cent
i0 4.0 b_ 16.9 75 30.1 122 _9.0 249 i00.0
25 21.2 43 36.4 6 5.1 44 37.3 118 i00.0
61 35-7 64 37.4 9 5-3 36 21.0 171 l(X).O
2 33-3 3 50.0 0
16 45.7 ll 31.5 4
ZI4 19.7 163 28.2 94
0.0 1 16.7 6 i00.0
n.4 4 11.4 35 lOO.O
16.2 207 35.7 579 lOO.O
Source: Files of AGP, NASA.
L
Table H--8
Time Lags on NASA Inventions Made by Employees
to July 31, 1963
Time Lags Median Mean Number of
Observations
Inventions not warranting patent action
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation
Inventions found adverse by search
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation
Inventions with statutory bars because
of prior publication
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation
Patent applications filed on inventions
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and patent application
Patents issued on inventions
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and patent application
Patent application and issue
Abandoned patent applications on inventions
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and patent application
Patent application and abandonment
All inventions
Conception and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation a
No. of No. of
Months Months
4 15
6 9
6 13
9 ll
lO1
132
89
lO8
24 28 i0
9 ll ll
9 14 148
l_ 15 172
9 19 69
9 12 8o
32 33 ll4
14 16 16
15 16 21
26 31 25
8 15 431
7 l0 251
aIncludes inventions not warranting patent action, inventions found adverse by
search, and inventions with statutory bar.
Source: AGP files 3 NASA.
Table H--9
Time Lags on NASAInventions Madeby
Employeesof Contractors
to July B1, 196B
Time Lags Median Mean Number of
Observations
No. of No. of
Months Months
Inventions not warranting patent action
Date contract let and conception a
Conception and disclosure
Date contract let and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation
Inventions found adverse by search
Date contract let an_ conception b
Conception and disclosure
Date contract let and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation
Patent --_-o_n=22 ....... ns filed on inventions
Date contract let and conception c
Conception and disclosure
Date contract let and disclosure
Disclosure and patent application
Time lags on all inventions
Date contract let and conception
Conception su_ddisclosure
Date contract let and disclosure
Disclosure and inactivation d
8 ll 178
8 ll 2O9
15 19 358
6 8 353
9 12 34
9 n _l
l_ 18 _7
9 lO 45
i0 15 31
ll _ 52
_J
19 19 56
12 13 56
8 lz 2_3
8 12 302
15 19 _6l
7 9 398
aThirty-three additional inventions were conceived before contracts were let. For
these, the median time lead was 3 months before the date the contracts were let.
bSeven additional inventions were conceived before contracts were _ t--with a median
lead of 5 months.
CEleven additional inventions were conceived before the contracts were let--with a
median lead of 7 months.
dIncludes inventions not warranting patent action and inventions found adverse by
search.
Source: AGP files, NASA.
